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# The Emergence of Pakistan

By  
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REFERENCE

To the memory of my brother  
Dr. Ali Ahmad,  
who urged me to write this book  
but did not live to see it completed.

## *Preface*

THIS BOOK is, in the main, an account of the events in the period 1946-48, immediately preceding and following the partition of British India and the creation of two independent sovereign states—Pakistan and the Union of India—on August 15, 1947. The introductory chapters describe the historical setting in which those events took place, and the social, economic, and political forces that shaped them. The last part of the book deals with the challenging problems which the newly born state of Pakistan had to face. Some of those issues are still alive, and I have in places briefly indicated developments beyond 1948.

Having been associated with the leaders of the Pakistan movement from 1946 onward and having taken an active part in the momentous events that led to the emergence of Pakistan, I have often been asked by friends in the past to write about them. In 1946 I was working as Financial Adviser, War and Supply, in the Government of India. When the Muslim League representatives joined the interim government of India and Liaquat Ali Khan became Finance Minister, my association with the Muslim League leaders became even closer. During the crucial days of partition I was one of the two members of the Steering Committee which was responsible to the Partition



Council for the immense administrative tasks involved in partition. My other colleague, H. M. Patel of the Indian Civil Service, represented India, while I represented Pakistan. The Partition Council was presided over by Lord Mountbatten, the Viceroy of India, and had as its members Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Rajendra Prasad from the Indian side, and Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan from the Pakistan side. On the establishment of Pakistan, I was appointed Secretary-General to the Government of Pakistan, with the duty of coordinating the work of the ministries. I also held the post of Cabinet Secretary.

I had thus an unusual opportunity to observe the movement of history in this part of the world at a critical time. But even though the facts narrated here were mostly in my personal experience, I have, wherever possible, cited documentary evidence from other sources. In particular, where the version of any incident given here differs from that put forward by Indian and British writers, I have taken care to quote from books which cannot be accused of bias against the Indian and British personalities involved. An example is provided by *Mission with Mountbatten*. The author, Alan Campbell-Johnson, was Press Attaché to Lord Mountbatten during his viceroyalty. Campbell-Johnson admired Mountbatten to the point of hero-worship and naturally presents him in the most favorable light. Or there is *Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase*, by Pyarelal, Gandhi's devoted follower and secretary. In dealing with the communal disturbances that form a prominent feature of the period under study, I have, in general, relied upon reports written by impartial British observers of the Indian scene. I mention this not to lessen my responsibility for the contents of this book but to indicate that I have tried as far as humanly possible to present an objective account. I should, however, be guilty of untruth if I were to claim an Olympian detachment. I have recorded the truth as I see it but I am deeply conscious that it is only a facet of the truth which I can see.

I gratefully acknowledge permission to quote from Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (Calcutta, Orient Longmans, 1959); *Cabinet Mission and After*, ed. by Muhammad Ashraf (Lahore, Muhammad Ashraf, 1946); Alan Campbell-Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten* (London, Robert Hale, 1953); John Connell, *Auchinleck* (London, Cassell, 1959); Lord Ismay, *Memoirs* (London, William

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Lahore  
January, 1967

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## CHAPTER 1

### Historical Background

THE ENCOUNTER between Hindu and Muslim cultures that began over a thousand years ago has profoundly influenced both. They have met at a thousand points, on battlefields and at festivals, around market places and in homes, on spiritual heights and in the lowlands of mundane affairs. They have learnt from each other, interacted with each other, and penetrated each other; their tongues have mixed to produce new and rich languages; in music and poetry, painting and architecture, in styles of dress, and in ways of living they have left their mark on each other. And yet they have remained distinct with an emphasis on their separateness. They have mixed but never fused; they have coexisted but have never become one. Hindu and Muslim families that have lived in the same neighborhood for generations can be distinguished at a glance from one another. The clothes, the food, the household utensils, the layout of homes, the manner of speech, the words of salutation, the postures, the gestures, everything about them will be different and will immediately point to their origin. These outer differences are only the reflection of an inner divergence. For among the varied social groups of mankind it is difficult to imagine a more striking contrast than that between Hindu and Muslim social organization and *Weltanschauung*.



The former is a closed society with a rigid hierarchical structure subdivided into thousands of castes. A caste system has been defined as "one whereby a society is divided into a number of self-contained and completely segregated units [castes] the mutual relations between which are ritually determined in a graded scale."<sup>1</sup> The accident of birth determines a man's status throughout life; but high or low birth is itself determined by what a man did in an earlier incarnation. "Observance of caste is equivalent to Dharma; that is, religious observance, righteousness, moral obligation."<sup>2</sup> The grossest social injustice is seen as ordained by a cosmic law, which squares up accounts over aeons. Since reincarnation may take the form of animals, this belief accounts partly for the sacredness attached to animal life. The principle of hierarchy applies here also. A cow is as sacred as the Brahmin, the highest caste of all.

The common people who remain entangled in the web of social life develop a spirit of intense loyalty to their caste, which regulates their diet, training, marriage, profession, and other social relations. From the earliest years of their lives they are conditioned to an intricate system of taboos, customs, and superstitions so that their entire psychic energy is irrevocably canalized into these channels. Since caste determines a man's profession, and since economic activity brings the various professions in economic relations with each other, these thousands of castes are integrated into an organic unity which is Hindu society as a whole. Such a system can make a claim upon men's loyalty only if they have been brought up in it from the time of their birth and are conditioned to accept its intricate patterns of relationship. The system in no way, by a single world view or set of beliefs, tries to appeal to an outsider. In fact, the outsider's status is also fixed by his birth. As someone born outside the fold of Hindu society he is in a literal sense an untouchable. It is not surprising, therefore, that Hinduism makes no effort to convert others. Outsiders may be attracted by the subtlety of its metaphysical thought, by the refinement of its psychological analysis, and by its exploration of the extreme possibilities of the human nervous system as demonstrated in various forms of Yoga, but they can never enter into the experience of feeling an intuitive unity with Hindu society.

Islam presents a radically different aspect of human thought and action. Its call is addressed to the whole of mankind, irrespective of color, race, tribe, and language. It summons all to submit to the One

God, the Ever-Living Creator and Sustainer of the universe to Whom each individual is accountable for his or her actions. Divine unity and human brotherhood are the essence of the teachings the Messengers of God have brought to men so that they may live in truth and justice. Birth confers no special status or privilege. In the earnest endeavor to establish a just social order on earth, Muslims are expected to exert themselves to the utmost and, if need be, to sacrifice life and property. In Islam there is thus a continual emphasis upon right belief and right action. If men live in ignorance and sin, they cannot throw the blame on an assumed incarnation of the past, but must accept responsibility for it here and hereafter.

These differences in world view and principles of social organization were powerfully reinforced by a difference in historical experience. Starting with Muhammad bin Qasim's invasion of Sind in A.D. 712 and ending with Ahmad Shah Abdali's victory over the Maratha confederacy in 1761, the Muslims came to the Indian subcontinent in waves of conquest. Even after the foundation of the Delhi Sultanate by Qutbuddin Aibak in 1206, these periodic attacks continued. The result was an expansion of Muslim power until it was supreme over the entire subcontinent. Inevitably this movement presented itself to Hindus and Muslims in diametrically opposed aspects. Kings and generals who were admired by Muslims as conquering heroes struck terror in the Hindu heart; and those who were ranged against the Muslim Empire appeared as rebels to the Muslims but as patriots in Hindu eyes.

When the British appeared on the scene, they saw that it would be to their own advantage to heighten these contrasts. There was even a deliberate attempt to rewrite Indian history, so as to show Muslims as oppressors and persecutors in order that the Hindus, who formed the bulk of the population, should have a more lively appreciation of the blessings of British rule.<sup>3</sup>

The Muslims who came to India with conquering armies, or in their wake, settled down in India. This, and the conversion of Hindus to Islam caused the population of India to undergo a gradual change. In course of time Muslims came to form one fourth of the total population. In the northwest and the northeast of the subcontinent they formed a majority, but in the center and the south only 15 to 5 percent of the population were Muslims. The spread of Islam in India owed little to the efforts of Muslim rulers. A modern British historian























































































































































































































































































































Finally, we had to be content with a general declaration of the responsibility of both governments for the protection of the rights of the minorities.

The agreement known as the Liaquat-Nehru Pact of April 8, 1950, opened with a solemn undertaking by the governments of India and Pakistan that "each shall ensure to the minorities throughout its territory complete equality of citizenship, irrespective of religion, a full sense of security in respect of life, culture, property and personal honour, freedom of movement within each country and freedom of occupation, speech and worship, subject to law and morality." There were detailed provisions for the protection of migrants from East Bengal, West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura; the restoration of normal conditions in these areas; and machinery for the implementation of the agreement.

An important part of the work of rehabilitation related to the recovery, restoration, and care of abducted women and children. An Indo-Pakistan agreement, reached in November, 1948, recognized the need for special legislation in both countries. The laws enacted under this agreement were so devised that by taking the victims away from the influence of their abductors, fear was eliminated, and by allowing them to resume contacts with their relatives and community they could make their own free decision regarding their future. Recovery offices and transit camps were set up in both India and Pakistan. Dedicated social workers helped greatly not only in the recovery but in the mental rehabilitation of abducted persons. By October, 1952, the number of non-Muslim women and children recovered from Pakistan was 8,326 and that of Muslim women and children recovered from India was 16,919.

The total number of refugees in West Pakistan ultimately rose to nearly nine million or one fourth of the population. Most of them have been rehabilitated, but the process of their integration into the social and economic life of the country is by no means complete. For a number of reasons the process of settlement and rehabilitation has been unduly slow and marred by inefficiency and corruption. Perhaps the main cause is to be found in the policy of staffing the organization almost wholly with temporary government employees whose personal interest is to prolong the period of their employment. Delay in the final settlement of claims has led to neglect of houses and factories allotted on a temporary basis, as well as to the sale of stocks of raw

materials and spare parts to make a quick profit. It has provided greater opportunity for political pressures and for false claims and litigation. Yet the magnitude of the task performed must not be minimized. The problem was colossal and it threw, proportionately, a far greater burden on Pakistan than on India. Many predicted at the time that it would be beyond the economic and administrative resources of Pakistan to solve it and that Pakistan would be engulfed by the refugees. However, Pakistan not only surmounted these difficulties, but emerged stronger and more unified from this forced exchange of populations.



CHAPTER 14

*Junagadh, Hyderabad,  
and Kashmir*

THE STATES of Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Kashmir had not acceded to India or Pakistan by August 15, 1947. All of them were to fall victim to Indian aggression.

Junagadh was a small maritime state, 300 miles down the coast from Karachi. It had an area of 3,337 square miles, and a population of about 700,000. The majority of its population was Hindu and the ruler was a Muslim. Soon after independence, the state offered to accede to Pakistan with which it could maintain communication by sea. The Muslim ruler of Manavadar, a still smaller state contiguous to Junagadh, also acceded to Pakistan. These accessions were not accepted by the Quaid-i-Azam till September 5. The Government of India was also informed. The Indian reaction was immediate and sharp. The Governor-General of India telegraphed to the Governor-General of Pakistan: "Such acceptance of accession by Pakistan cannot but be regarded by Government of India as an encroachment on India's sovereignty and territory and inconsistent with friendly relations that should exist between the two Dominions. This action . . . is . . . in utter violation of principles on which partition was agreed upon and effected."

The "principles on which partition was agreed upon and effected" were that contiguous Muslim majority areas should be separated from contiguous non-Muslim majority areas to form the two Dominions, Pakistan and India, respectively. Junagadh, which had a Hindu majority and was contiguous to India, should not, it was argued, have acceded to Pakistan. The question of its accession should, the Government of India insisted, be decided by a plebiscite to be held under the joint supervision of the governments of India and Junagadh, but not of Pakistan.

Simultaneously with these formal protests, the Government of India took steps to solve the problem by other means. A Kathiawar defense force was organized. Junagadh was surrounded by Indian troops in conjunction with troops of the neighboring Hindu states of Kathiawar, which had acceded to India. The Jam Sahib of Nawanganar, a leading Hindu prince of the area, urged the Government of India to "take immediate and effective steps to assure continued protection of the Kathiawar States,"<sup>1</sup> which were regarded as threatened by Junagadh's accession to Pakistan. An economic blockade of Junagadh was imposed. Rail communications with India were cut off. In consequence, Junagadh's sources of revenues from customs and railways dwindled, and there was a serious shortage of food. A provisional government of Junagadh with Gandhi's nephew, Shamaldas Gandhi, as President was formed at Bombay. The "provisional government" moved its headquarters to Rajkot, nearer Junagadh, recruited volunteers and organized raids into Junagadh.

During September and October, Junagadh formed a major subject of correspondence between the governments of India and Pakistan and was also discussed at various meetings of the Joint Defence Council. The situation was complicated by the presence, inside the Indian Union, of enclaves belonging to, or owing suzerainty to, Junagadh. Their exact status aroused much controversy, but Pakistan was prepared to refer this matter to independent legal opinion. Pakistan was also willing that, where the question of accession was in dispute, a plebiscite should be held. On October 23, the Prime Minister of Pakistan proposed to the Prime Minister of India that the two governments should discuss and settle the conditions for the holding of a plebiscite.

The Government of India was, however, bent on settling the matter by force. The blockade and raids had created such chaotic conditions



in Junagadh by the end of October, 1947, that the Nawab felt compelled to leave for Karachi with his family. On November 1, the enclaves of Babariawad and Mangrol were taken over by Indian forces. Manavadar had already been occupied by India some days earlier. On November 7, an *Azad Fauj*, or liberation army, of 20,000 men with armored cars and other modern weapons entered Junagadh. The Azad Fauj consisted largely of trained military personnel organized and equipped by order of the Government of India. Two days later control over the entire state was assumed by India. Pakistan, at that time, was in no position to defend Junagadh. Her armed forces were in the process of organization. The army was faced with innumerable problems arising from refugee movements. There was only the nucleus of a navy and an air force.

The Pakistan government received a telegram from the Prime Minister of India saying that the Government of India had taken control of Junagadh state at the request of its Dewan, in order to avoid disorder and chaos, and that they intended to ascertain what the wishes of the people were with regard to accession. In reply, the Prime Minister of Pakistan pointed out that since Junagadh had duly acceded to Pakistan, the Dewan had no authority to negotiate a settlement with India, and that India's action was a clear violation of Pakistan's territory and a breach of international law. He demanded that the Government of India immediately withdraw their forces from Junagadh and restore the administration of the rightful ruler as a preliminary for discussions between the two Dominions. Further correspondence led nowhere. Some months later, the Government of India held a referendum under its own supervision. The result of the referendum was a foregone conclusion. A majority of votes were cast in favor of accession to India. Pakistan, which was in no way associated with the referendum, refused to recognize its validity. India is still in unlawful occupation of Junagadh. A complaint lodged by Pakistan with the Security Council of the UN is still pending.

Hyderabad was the most important state of India. It had an area of 82,000 square miles, and a population of 16,000,000. Its annual revenues were Rs. 260 million, and it had its own currency and stamps. The majority of its people were Hindus, but its ruler, the Nizam, was a Muslim. The dynasty was founded in the early years of the eighteenth century by Nizamul Mulk, a grandee of the Mughul

Empire. The Nizam had the distinction of the title "His Exalted Highness," and was designated as the "faithful ally of the British Government." Hyderabad occupied a special place in the affections of Muslim India because of its association with the glory of the Mughul Empire. By virtue of its size, resources, importance, and prestige, Hyderabad felt entitled to the status of an independent sovereign state. On the announcement of the June 3 plan the Nizam declared that he would not accede to India or Pakistan. He hoped to secure Dominion Status for his state, and sent a delegation to the Viceroy on July 11, 1947. Mountbatten told the delegation that the British government would not agree to Dominion Status for Hyderabad. Instead, he pressed Hyderabad to accede to India. This, however, was not acceptable to the Nizam. When the delegation hinted that if India pressed the Nizam too hard he might consider joining Pakistan Mountbatten replied, "There was no doubt that the Nizam was legally entitled to do so, but . . . the mechanical difficulty presented by the facts of geography was very real. . . . Without implying any kind of threat, he foresaw disastrous results to the State in five or ten years if his advice were not taken."<sup>2</sup> The facts of geography to which Mountbatten was referring were that Hyderabad had no outlet to the sea and was surrounded on all sides by Indian territory.

No decision was reached by August 15. Further negotiations with the Nizam were entrusted by the Indian cabinet to the Governor-General, Lord Mountbatten; he strove to the utmost to bring Hyderabad within the Indian fold. The Nizam was reluctant to sign the standard instrument of accession, but expressed willingness to enter into a treaty of association with India in respect of defense, foreign affairs, and communications. Sir Walter (later Lord) Monckton, who was a friend of Mountbatten, was the Nizam's principal adviser in these negotiations with the Government of India. The Government of India, however, insisted on accession and would not agree to anything less.

In Hyderabad itself, the Muslim organization Ittehadul Muslimin and its leader Kasim Razvi were gaining strength. At the end of November, 1947, Mir Laik Ali, a leading Muslim industrialist of Hyderabad, became Prime Minister with their support, although the Quaid-i-Azam on being consulted by the Nizam had advised against the appointment.<sup>3</sup> The attitude of Pakistan leaders toward Hy-



derabad in its difficulties with India was one of sympathy, but it was felt that the decision as to its precise relationship with India must be left to the judgment of the Nizam and his government.

A standstill agreement between India and Hyderabad was concluded on November 29, 1947. The Nizam also gave a secret promise to Mountbatten not to accede to Pakistan.<sup>4</sup> The Government of India claimed that under the standstill agreement Hyderabad could not enter into any kind of relationship with any foreign country. Serious exception was taken to a loan of Rs. 200 million, which the Nizam's government had made to Pakistan, despite their protestation that it was a commercial transaction. The loan was in the form of Government of India securities. To deny its proceeds to Pakistan, the Government of India issued an ordinance freezing the securities.

K. M. Munshi, a former minister in Bombay and a staunch believer in Akhand Bharat, or undivided India, was selected by Sardar Patel to become the Agent-General of the Government of India under the standstill agreement. He took it as his patriotic duty to undermine the authority of the Nizam's government by inciting the Hindus and by other means. Allegations were made that Hyderabad had violated the standstill agreement, but when the Nizam's government offered to refer the matter to arbitration, as provided for by the standstill agreement, the Government of India did not agree. The Nizam was also asked to ban the Ittehadul Muslimin and to disband the Razakars, or volunteers. War was threatened. In a speech in Bombay on April 26, 1948, Nehru said: "If the safety of the people in Hyderabad was endangered by the activities of the Razakars, the Government [of India] would intervene in Hyderabad State."<sup>5</sup> Patel talked of Hyderabad going the way of Junagadh. In short, every kind of pressure was brought to bear on the Nizam by the Government of India to force him to accede to India.

Mountbatten and the Indian leaders believed that the entire Hindu population in Hyderabad was for accession to India. They stressed time and again that the issue of Hyderabad should be left to the people to decide. In August, 1947, Mountbatten had written to the Nizam offering "a referendum under the supervision of British officers," but the Nizam had not agreed.<sup>6</sup> In June, 1948, however, Mir Laik Ali accepted Mountbatten's proposal for the holding of a free plebiscite under impartial auspices "on the question whether the State should accede to India or remain independent." Much to Mir Laik

Ali's surprise and distress, the Government of India now insisted that the state should accede to India on defense, foreign affairs, and communications and "if the Government of Hyderabad so wished, they may have the matter further confirmed by a plebiscite."<sup>7</sup> The demand was also made for the immediate introduction of responsible government, since, as the Government of India stated in their *White Paper on Hyderabad*, "plebiscite without an interim Government representative of and satisfactory to the majority population in Hyderabad will only be a fraud on the people."

Lord Mountbatten left India on June 21, 1948, without having achieved his ambition of securing Hyderabad's accession. The pressures against Hyderabad increased in intensity. An economic blockade was imposed. Military preparations were begun. There were mutual charges of border raids and breaches of the standstill agreement. In a parliamentary debate on July 30, Winston Churchill referred to a speech made by Nehru four days earlier in which he was reported to have said, "If and when we consider it necessary we will start military operations against Hyderabad." Nehru went on to say that the regime of the Nizam's state was composed of gangsters, that the only alternative to its accession was its disappearance as a state, and that in the event of action against Hyderabad he would not confer upon it the designation of war. "It seems to me," commented Churchill, "that this is the sort of thing which might have been said by Hitler before the devouring of Austria."

On August 24, Hyderabad filed a complaint before the Security Council of the UN. But before the Security Council could arrange a hearing, India forced a military decision on Hyderabad. On September 13, 1948, less than two days after the Quaid-i-Azam's death, a full-scale invasion of Hyderabad state by the Indian armed forces was launched. After a brief resistance, the Hyderabad army surrendered on September 17. In due course the state was dismembered and incorporated into the different provinces of the Indian Union. The complaint before the Security Council is still pending.

Kashmir, or to give its full name, the state of Jammu and Kashmir, is the northernmost part of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. Its area of 84,471 square miles was the biggest of any state in India. Its international boundaries with Tibet, China, Afghanistan and, but for a small intervening strip, with Russia, gave it great strategic importance. Owing to its mountainous character the state was sparsely pop-



ulated except in the beautiful valley of Kashmir. The total population of the state, according to the 1941 census, was about 4,000,000, of whom 77 percent were Muslims. The Muslims were in a majority in every province of the state; there was a 93 percent Muslim population in the Kashmir province; 61 percent, in Jammu province; and almost 100 percent, in the northern region of Gilgit. In Ladakh, which adjoins Tibet, there was a small Buddhist population.

Geographically the state is a continuation of the plains of West Pakistan into the mountains. The rivers Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab, which are the life-line of West Pakistan, flow from the state into the plains, making the whole a single geographical unit. All the rail and road communications of the state were with Pakistan. Its exports and imports moved through Pakistan. Timber, which was its most important source of revenue, was exported by being floated down the rivers into Pakistan. The cultural connections between the Muslims of the state and those of West Pakistan are so close as to make them virtually identical. The destiny of West Pakistan and Kashmir is linked together by nature and by all possible interests—economic, religious, cultural, and strategic.

Under the Treaty of Amritsar in 1846, the British had sold the state of Jammu and Kashmir to Gulab Singh, a petty Dogra chieftain, for the sum of 7.5 million rupees, or one and a half million dollars. Lord Lawrence, who negotiated the treaty, referred to this transaction as an "iniquitous arrangement."<sup>8</sup> The Maharaja and his Dogra kinsmen established and maintained for a century a despotic, reactionary, and oppressive regime in the state. No effort was made to develop the natural wealth of the state. The people were ruthlessly taxed and reduced to a condition of abject poverty. The Muslims suffered discrimination in every sphere. The Hindus had a more or less complete monopoly of state appointments. Since the cow is sacred to the Hindus, its slaughter was forbidden. If a Muslim killed his own cow to feed his family, the penalty was death—later mercifully reduced to a ten-year jail sentence. The Kashmiris are a highly gifted people, but their spirit was broken by repressive measures and arbitrary punishments.

With the spread of modern education, a demand for elementary political rights began in the early 1930s. The leaders of this movement were Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah and Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas. The former belonged to the valley of Kashmir and the latter to

Jammu. Together they organized the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. The Maharaja resorted to repressive measures of unusual severity. There were arrests and firings. To help their brethren, Muslims from the neighboring areas of the Punjab entered the state in large numbers. As many as 30,000 volunteers courted arrest. A Kashmir committee in support of the struggle in Kashmir was formed in Lahore under the chairmanship of the national poet, Iqbal, whose family had come from Kashmir to settle in the Punjab. The struggle led to the appointment of the Glancy Commission by the Government of India. On the recommendation of the commission, a measure of constitutional reform was introduced and a partly elected legislative assembly was formed.

In 1939, Sheikh Abdullah came under the spell of Gandhi and Nehru. The Congress leaders assured him of their support in the struggle against the Maharaja if the Muslim Conference was turned into a noncommunal organization. Accordingly, the Muslim Conference was converted into the National Conference. Soon, however, divergences between the interests of the Muslim and the Hindus came to the surface. The demand for an independent sovereign Pakistan, the very name and concept of which included Kashmir as an integral part, produced a new situation. The struggle between the Congress and the Muslim League over the partition of India had its repercussions in Kashmir. The Muslim Conference was revived under the leadership of Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas. Sheikh Abdullah continued with the National Conference as its leader. But as the idea of Pakistan gained ground, the National Conference, which was allied with the Hindu Congress, started losing its popularity. Sensing this, Sheikh Abdullah turned to the Quaid-i-Azam. In 1944, at the request of both the National Conference and the Muslim Conference, Quaid-i-Azam visited Kashmir and tried to bring the two organizations together, but without success. Sheikh Abdullah was too deeply committed to the Congress leaders. In particular, Nehru made much of him and professed attachment to him as a personal friend. In 1946, when Sheikh Abdullah was put in jail by the Maharaja for having started the "Quit Kashmir" movement in order to get rid of the Maharaja, Nehru, in the midst of negotiations with the Cabinet Mission, rushed to Kashmir to defend his friend. This dramatic gesture was intended to tie Sheikh Abdullah firmly to the side of the Congress.

When the Congress leaders accepted partition, they did so with the



intent to truncate Pakistan and make it as unviable as possible. They tried their hardest to detach the North-West Frontier Province, but that province had no contiguity with India except through Kashmir. The desperate efforts of Gandhi and other Congress leaders to prevent the inclusion of the North-West Frontier Province in Pakistan make sense only as part of a broader strategy covering Kashmir as well as the Frontier Province. But entirely apart from the North-West Frontier Province, Kashmir had an intrinsic importance of its own. The occupation of Kashmir would give India control over all the rivers on which the economy of West Pakistan depends, and would make the most vital areas of Pakistan militarily vulnerable. Gandhi realized that Kashmir "had the greatest strategic value, perhaps, in all India."<sup>9</sup> Sheikh Abdullah in a statement to the press in Delhi on October 21, 1947, observed, "Due to the strategic position that the State [Kashmir] holds, if this State joins the Indian Dominion, Pakistan would be completely encircled."<sup>10</sup> By getting hold of Kashmir, India would gain a commanding position against Pakistan.

There was an important reason why the Congress leaders could not immediately come out in the open with their plans regarding Kashmir. The reason was provided by Hyderabad. Except for its far superior administration, Hyderabad was Kashmir in reverse. The former was a Hindu majority state ruled by a Muslim, and the latter a Muslim majority state under a Hindu ruler. Hyderabad occupied a pivotal position in the Deccan, or Southern India, and was nearly as important for the Indian Union as Kashmir was for Pakistan. If the Hindu Maharaja of the Muslim majority state of Kashmir had acceded to India before Hyderabad, the claim of the Congress to Hyderabad as a Hindu majority state would have been greatly weakened, and the Nizam of Hyderabad might have acceded to Pakistan. The Congress plan, therefore, was to reach a secret understanding with the Maharaja of Kashmir for accession to India, but not to accept that accession openly until Hyderabad had been brought within the fold of India. I received information of this "Hyderabad first and then Kashmir" plan of the Congress from a reliable source during the partition days, and the attitude and activities of the Indian leaders confirmed it.

Another reason for the seeming indifference of Indian leaders toward Kashmir during the partition days was the lack of communications between the Indian Dominion and the state of Jammu and

Kashmir. Their common border ran across high mountains through which no roads had been built. Although, as related earlier in Chapter 10, an understanding had been reached between Mountbatten and the Congress leaders regarding the partition of the Gurdaspur district, no overt action could be taken until Radcliffe actually awarded the Muslim majority tahsils of Gurdaspur and Batala in Gurdaspur district to India, and thus provided a link between India and Kashmir.

In the meantime every effort was being made by the Congress to win over the Hindu Maharaja. Acharya Kripalani, the Congress President at that time, was the first to pay a visit to Kashmir. Soon after the announcement of the June 3 plan, Nehru expressed a desire to go there. When the Maharaja objected, Gandhi said he would go in place of Nehru, if need be, in a private capacity. The Maharaja apprehended that visits by Gandhi or Nehru might lead to a visit by the Quaid-i-Azam; and he was strongly opposed to any Muslim League leader coming to Kashmir.<sup>11</sup> Mountbatten, through whom these negotiations for a visit by Nehru or Gandhi were conducted, decided to go first.

In the third week of June, 1947, Mountbatten spent four days in Kashmir discussing the situation with the Maharaja. Since both Nehru and Gandhi had been very anxious that the Maharaja should make no declaration of independence, Mountbatten urged the Maharaja and his Prime Minister "not to declare independence but to find out in one way or another the will of the people of Kashmir as soon as possible and to announce their intention by 14th August to send representatives accordingly to one Constituent Assembly or the other. He told them that the newly created States Department was prepared to give an assurance that if Kashmir went to Pakistan this would not be regarded as an unfriendly act by the Government of India. He went on to stress the dangerous situation in which Kashmir would find itself if it lacked the support of one of the two Dominions by the date of the transfer of power."<sup>12</sup> Actually the States department was created some days after Mountbatten's return from Kashmir, although the proposal for it had been made earlier. The above report of Mountbatten's talks with the Maharaja was, however, that given by Mountbatten to his Press-Attaché, Campbell-Johnson. It is confirmed by Mountbatten's speech before the Royal Empire Society in London on October 6, 1948, in which he described how he urged the Maharaja "to ascertain the will of his people on joining one Dominion or



another. Had he joined with Pakistan the Government of India would have made no trouble. Had he joined with India, well, Pakistan did not exist, so again there would have been no trouble."

Mountbatten's attitude toward Kashmir's accession during these critical days of partition when he was Viceroy deserves careful study. At no stage did he tell the Maharaja, that, in view of the geographical and strategic factors and the overwhelmingly Muslim population of the state, it was his plain duty to accede to Pakistan. The arguments he so forcefully put before Hyderabad, Jaipur, and Jaisalmer for accession to India applied with equal strength to Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. But he never used them with the Maharaja. On the other hand, "He assured the Maharaja that [were] . . . he . . . to accede to one Dominion or the other before 15 August, no trouble would ensue, for whichever Dominion he acceded to would take the State firmly under its protection."<sup>13</sup> The assurance was given in June, 1947, when—assuming that an impartial boundary award were made—India would have had no means of communication with Kashmir, and the accession of the state to India in respect of defense, foreign affairs, and communications would have been meaningless.

Mountbatten could hardly ignore the Muslim majority in the population of the Kashmir state, but he did not draw the obvious conclusion and put it to the Maharaja. In Hyderabad and other Hindu majority states with Muslim rulers he had given forthright advice in favor of immediate accession to India. Only in Kashmir did he suggest that the Maharaja should not make a decision until he had somehow or other ascertained the will of the people.

Explaining his policy to Campbell-Johnson in October, 1947, Mountbatten said that he had "exerted his whole influence to prevent him [the Maharaja of Kashmir] from acceding to one Dominion or the other without first taking steps to ascertain the will of his people by referendum, plebiscite, election, or even, if these methods were impracticable, by representative public meetings."<sup>14</sup> Even in the matter of ascertaining the will of the people, there is a striking contrast between Mountbatten's methods in Hyderabad and Kashmir. In Hyderabad, Mountbatten insisted on a free plebiscite under impartial auspices and offered to hold it under the supervision of British officers. In Kashmir, he imposed no such condition and made no such offer, but left it to the Maharaja to sound the people in any manner he pleased. In a plebiscite or referendum held in Kashmir under impar-

tial auspices the overwhelming majority of Muslims and some of the Hindus as well would have voted for Pakistan. For among the Hindus also there were leaders, like Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz, who were sincerely convinced that accession to Pakistan was in the best interest of Kashmir. But in the vague and indefinite method of public meetings held under a despotic regime, the Maharaja and his administration could proclaim any result they liked.

Thus, while maintaining an outward appearance of impartiality, Mountbatten was playing the Congress game in Kashmir and cannot be acquitted of complicity in the plans of Congress leaders to acquire Kashmir by hook or by crook. The way he equated the unequal claims of India and Pakistan, the assurance he gave of protection to the Maharaja if he decided on accession to India, the indefinite method he suggested for ascertaining the wishes of the people could only have left the impression on the mind of the Hindu Maharaja, that he could, with equal facility, accede to India if he so desired.

The Muslim League's attitude to the question of Kashmir's accession was stated by the Quaid-i-Azam in a talk with a delegation of the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference workers in July, 1947. In the course of his talk he remarked: "I have already made it clear more than once that the Indian States are free to join either the Pakistan Constituent Assembly or the Hindustan Constituent Assembly or remain independent. I have no doubt that they, the Maharaja and the Kashmir Government, will give the closest attention and consideration to this matter and realise the interest not only of the ruler but also of his people." Actually he was convinced that a dispassionate consideration of the relevant facts of population and geography, the economic and cultural ties, and even the Maharaja's dynastic interest would inevitably point toward accession with Pakistan. He expressed a desire to go to Srinagar, but Mountbatten persuaded him to drop the idea in the face of objections made by the Kashmir government.

Although Mountbatten had dissuaded the Quaid-i-Azam from going to Kashmir or sending any Muslim League leader there, he arranged for Gandhi's visit there on August 1, 1947. This was Gandhi's first visit to the beautiful valley. He had not, needless to say, undertaken this long journey, at the age of seventy-seven, for aesthetic reasons. He saw the Maharaja and the Prime Minister, and had a series of interviews with the workers of the National Conference, among them Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad. The Prime Minister



of Kashmir at this time was Pandit Ram Chandra Kak; and although he was a Hindu he opposed the state's accession to India.

Gandhi's object was to oust Kak and to win over the Maharaja for accession to India. His approach was to play upon the religious sentiments of the Maharani through her spiritual guide. The reverence in which Gandhi was held by every pious Hindu helped him to gain his political ends. The Maharaja, who in his youth was easily blackmailed by a woman of easy virtue and her associates in London, was hardly of the caliber to withstand in his declining years pressures of a more exalted kind.

The measure of Gandhi's success can be judged from the report of his visit that he sent to Nehru and Patel. "I met [the Maharaja and the Maharani]. . . . However much they might wish to join the Union [of India], they would have to make the choice in accordance with the wishes of the people. . . . Bakhshi (Ghulam Mohammad) was most sanguine that the result of the free vote of the people, whether on the adult franchise or on the existing register, would be in favour of Kashmir joining the Union [of India] provided of course that Sheikh Abdullah and his co-prisoners were released, all bans were removed and the present Prime Minister was not in power." To Patel alone he wrote that the Maharaja wished "to remove Kak. . . . The only question (before him) is how. . . . In my opinion the Kashmir problem can be solved."<sup>15</sup>

Pandit Kak was removed from the office of prime minister within ten days after Gandhi's visit to Kashmir. A month later Sheikh Abdullah was released from jail, but Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas and other Muslim Conference leaders remained in prison. The Kashmir problem was on the way to being solved to Gandhi's satisfaction.

After independence was declared, a standstill agreement was signed between Pakistan and Kashmir. This was partly necessity, since postal communications and export and import trade via India would take time to organize, and partly camouflage. The Kashmir government also offered a standstill agreement to India, but the Government of India took no action on it. As already explained, it did not suit India to take overt action for taking over Kashmir until later.

The wishes of the Muslim population of Kashmir were demonstrated in an unmistakable fashion on independence day. August 15, 1947, was celebrated as "Pakistan Day" throughout the state. But August 15 was also the signal for the Maharaja to put into action his

plan of liquidating the Muslim majority. To advise the Maharaja of Kashmir on this problem there were visits by the Sikh Maharajas of Kapurthala and Patiala. Kapurthala state had had a Muslim majority, but almost all the Muslims had been killed or driven out with the help of state forces. The Maharaja of Patiala was an even greater expert in genocide. If similar methods were followed in Kashmir, and the Muslim population was cut down and terrorized, accession to India might present no difficulty. To execute this plan, the Dogra General Janak Singh was appointed Prime Minister in place of Pandit Kak. The civilian population was ordered to deposit with the state authorities all arms in their possession. Sikhs and RSSS murder gangs started operations and were actively supported by state troops. Treachery was added to the methods adopted in East Punjab. Muslims were promised safe conduct if they left for Pakistan, and then were ambushed and slaughtered on the way. "In one area," reported the *London Times* of October 10, 1947, "237,000 Muslims were systematically exterminated, unless they escaped to Pakistan along the border, by the forces of the Dogra State, headed by the Maharajah in person." Ian Stephens, who was editor of the *Statesman* of Calcutta at that time, wrote:

Within a period of about eleven weeks starting in August, systematic savageries, similar to those already launched in East Punjab and in Patiala and Kapurthala, practically eliminated the entire Muslim element in the population, amounting to 500,000 people. About 200,000 just disappeared, remaining untraceable, having presumably been butchered, or died from epidemics or exposure. The rest fled destitute to West Punjab.<sup>16</sup>

In Poonch, which is the western part of Jammu province, things did not go according to the Maharaja's plan. Poonch was one of the recruiting areas for the Indian army and was the home of 65,000 veterans of the Second World War. In August, 1947, there were demonstrations in many places in Poonch against the Maharaja's contemplated move to join India. State troops fired upon the meetings, inflicting heavy casualties. The people who had suffered so long rose against the Maharaja's rule. They obtained arms from tribal areas and fought back. The man who raised the standard of revolt was Abdul Qayyum, but "the folly of Dogras who burnt whole villages where only a single family was involved in the revolt," rallied the entire Muslim population to the popular cause.<sup>17</sup> In six weeks the districts of Poonch and Mirpur, except the town of Poonch, had been



cleared of state troops. A little later, the Azad Kashmir government, under the presidency of Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim, a local barrister, was organized. Speaking in Delhi on October 21, 1947, Sheikh Abdullah, after referring to the fact that the Muslims of Kashmir were afraid that the state's accession to India portended danger to them, said:

The present troubles in Poonch . . . were caused by the unwise policy adopted by the State. The people of Poonch . . . had started a people's movement for the redress of their grievances. It was not communal. Kashmir State sent its troops. . . . But most of the adult population of Poonch were . . . ex-servicemen in the Indian Army with close connections with the people in Jhelum and Rawalpindi [in Pakistan]. . . . They evacuated their women and children, crossed the frontier, and returned with arms supplied to them by willing people. The present position is that the Kashmir State forces have been forced to withdraw in certain areas.<sup>18</sup>

During this time the Pakistan government had its hands full; it had to deal with the task of establishing a new administration, the ordeal in the Punjab, and the mass migration that was under way. The people of Pakistan felt the most lively sympathy with their brethren in Jammu and Kashmir. The tragedy being enacted there appeared as part of a vast conspiracy to overwhelm Pakistan at its birth. As hundreds of thousands of Muslim refugees from Jammu and Kashmir moved into the neighboring areas of Pakistan, a new and grave threat to Pakistan took shape. These planned massacres signified evil. The Pakistan army authorities were greatly concerned as soldiers, who had been on leave to their homes in Poonch, reported that Muslim villagers there were being attacked by state troops. Vigorous protests to the Maharaja's government were made. But instead of putting its own house in order, the state government accused Pakistan of having deliberately cut off supplies of food, gas, and other essential commodities. There was no truth in these allegations. The movement and feeding of millions of refugees had put the utmost strain upon supplies and rail and road communications in the Punjab. If shortages occurred in the state, it was due to the wholly exceptional circumstances produced by the greatest migration in history. Nevertheless, the Pakistan government was anxious to do all it could.

The Quaid-i-Azam himself wanted to go to Kashmir about the middle of September; he hoped to have a friendly talk with the Maharaja, but the Maharaja did not want him to come. On October 2,

1947, Liaquat Ali Khan suggested that the question of civil supplies for Kashmir should be discussed by representatives of the two governments. The reply given by the Prime Minister of Kashmir was that at the moment he was too busy. Despite this, the Pakistan government sent a senior officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Colonel Shah, for discussion with the state authorities. The Prime Minister of Kashmir refused to discuss matters with him, and he had to return.

During September, 1947, significant moves had been made by the Government of India in collaboration with the Maharaja of Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah was released but, as noted earlier, Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas, the leader of the Muslim Conference, was not. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, who had been Prime Minister of Kashmir from 1937 to 1943 and who was notoriously anti-Muslim, was appointed Minister without Portfolio in the Indian cabinet. On September 30, a provisional defense committee of the Indian cabinet was formed which included the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, the Finance Minister and, significantly enough, the Minister without Portfolio. Although Gopalaswami Ayyangar was an expert on Kashmir, he could hardly be regarded as an expert on defense. To make up this deficiency, Mountbatten was made Chairman of the committee "in view of his knowledge and experience of high military matters."<sup>19</sup> Preparations for aggression in Kashmir had started. What moved the Government of India to start these preparations at this time was presumably the freedom movement in Poonch, which the Maharaja's forces had failed to put down, and which was spreading to other areas.

The next step immediately following the formation of the provisional defense committee was the appointment of a trusted Indian, Mehr Chand Mahajan, as Prime Minister of Kashmir in place of the Dogra General Janak Singh. From the very outset, Mahajan's attitude was aggressive. On the day he assumed office he held a press conference in which he denounced Pakistan. On the same day, October 15, 1947, he sent a telegram to the Pakistan government, suggesting an impartial enquiry into the complaints of the Maharaja's government and adding significantly: "If . . . this request is not heeded the Government much against its wishes will have no option but to ask for assistance to withstand the aggressive and unfriendly actions of the Pakistan people along our border." The reference was obviously to assistance from India. It was a clear pointer that Indian plans for a



military occupation of Kashmir at the invitation of the Maharaja's government had reached a point where they could be openly avowed. The Pakistan government readily accepted the proposal for an impartial enquiry and suggested an immediate meeting between the representatives of the two governments. But the Kashmir government took no notice of this acceptance and made no further reference to the matter. Three days later, on October 18, another telegram came from the Prime Minister of Kashmir, this time to the Quaid-i-Azam, repeating all the previous allegations and again threatening to seek outside assistance. It was evident that a pretext for Indian military intervention in Kashmir was being sought. The Quaid-i-Azam in his telegraphic reply, on October 20, requested the Maharaja to send the Prime Minister of Kashmir to Karachi for discussions in order to smooth out difficulties and adjust matters in a friendly way. The Quaid-i-Azam stated:

The threat to enlist outside assistance shows clearly that the real aim of your Government's policy is to seek an opportunity to join the Indian Dominion, as a coup d'état, by securing the intervention and assistance of that Dominion. This policy is naturally creating deep resentment and grave apprehension among your subjects, 85 per cent of whom are Moslems. The proposal made by my Government for a meeting with your accredited representative is now an urgent necessity.

No reply was sent by the Maharaja to this telegram despite a reminder by the Quaid-i-Azam.

About this time, unknown to the Pakistan government, a storm was brewing in the tribal areas. News of atrocities committed by the Maharaja's government on the Muslims of Kashmir had reached tribal areas from refugees and ex-soldiers from Poonch, who had gone there to purchase arms. Massacre of Muslims in East Punjab had already inflamed the feelings of the tribesmen. Now they felt a call for *jihad*, or holy war, in Kashmir. On October 21, Liaquat Ali Khan told me in a state of unusual excitement that a tribal lashkar, some thousands strong, was on the way to Kashmir. I asked him if he had informed the Quaid-i-Azam and he said, "Not yet," he had just received the report. There was nothing the Pakistan government could do about it. An attempt to prevent the tribesmen from performing what they conceived to be a religious duty would have set the whole frontier ablaze. The Pakistan army was neither fully organized nor adequately equipped. The demands made on it by the refugee

problem were more than it could cope with. The tribal lashkar, which crossed the bridge on the river Jhelum into state territory on October 22, quickly overpowered the state forces, and by October 26 had reached the vicinity of Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir. The previous night the Maharaja fled from Srinagar to Jammu. Had the tribal lashkar been more disciplined, and had it not indulged in plunder on the way, it would have been in occupation of the Kashmir valley on October 26.

When the Indian cabinet received news of the tribal incursion into Kashmir, it wanted "to rush in arms and ammunitions already requested by the Kashmir Government," but Mountbatten urged that accession should first be obtained. "He considered that it would be the height of folly to send troops into a neutral State, where we had no right to send them, since Pakistan could do exactly the same thing, which could only result in a clash of armed forces and in war."<sup>20</sup> V. P. Menon was sent off to Srinagar to secure accession. Simultaneously Mountbatten, as one of his staff told me on my visit to Delhi a fortnight later, assumed direction of military operations—to use his dramatic language—"The mantle of the Governor-General fell from him and he assumed the garb of the Supreme Commander." To Mountbatten himself it might have appeared as only an extension of his functions as Chairman of the provisional defense committee. Anyhow, his great experience of combined operations during the Second World War was put at the service of Indian aggression in Kashmir. When, on the morning of October 27, 1947, he signed the instrument of accession V. P. Menon had brought back with him, the airlift of Indian troops to Srinagar had already started. As the formation of the provisional defense committee on September 30 and the threats of the Maharaja's government in mid-October to call in outside assistance clearly indicate, the Indians had been planning armed intervention in Kashmir for quite some time. But the credit for the improvisation of air-borne operations within a few days, and their success in halting the tribal lashkar outside Srinagar, must go to Mountbatten's military skill, even as the stratagem of obtaining the Maharaja's immediate accession is attributable to his diplomatic finesse. As Campbell-Johnson wrote, "Mountbatten's extraordinary vitality and canniness were well-adapted to the demands of the hour."<sup>21</sup> His was the brain that conceived the strategy and the hand that directed the operations.



Mountbatten's attitude toward Pakistan and Kashmir at this critical time in the history of Indo-Pakistan relations has been described by Ian Stephens, who was called to dinner by Lord and Lady Mountbatten on the evening of October 26.

I was startled by their one-sided verdicts on affairs. They seemed to have "become wholly pro-Hindu." The atmosphere at Government House that night was almost one of war. Pakistan, the Muslim League, and Mr. Jinnah were the enemy. . . . Because of the Pathan attack, the Maharaja's formal accession to India was at that moment being finalized. Subject to a plebiscite, this great State, its inhabitants mainly Muslim, would now be legally lost to Jinnah. The Pakistanis had been crazy to accept the accession of Junagadh. Indian troops were to be flown into Kashmir at once; arrangements had been made.

His memorandum records Mountbatten as "persuasive, confident, charming, a successful commander on the eve of an important operation."<sup>22</sup>

Foreign writers reviewing the events of those days have questioned Mountbatten's role and wondered why the Indian cabinet and, in particular, Mountbatten did not take the obvious course of consulting the Pakistan government, with whom the Maharaja had entered into a standstill agreement and who had the most vital interests at stake in this issue. Lord Birdwood asks:

How was it, then, that on 24 or 25 October no one in Delhi thought of getting on the telephone to the Pakistan Prime Minister and dealing with the crisis as a solemn responsibility to be shouldered by a display of joint statesmanship? If Mr. Nehru could not have risen to the occasion of his own free will, was there no one at his elbow of sufficient vision [the reference is to Mountbatten] to have influenced him to do so? Therein was the tragedy.<sup>23</sup>

Josef Korbel, who as the Indian nominee on the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan had an exceptional opportunity to study the Kashmir problem, wrote:

Why . . . did he [Mountbatten] advise that Indian military assistance to the Maharaja must be covered by the legal technicality of accession? How could he have reasoned that it would be illegal for Kashmir (which was at the time of invasion technically an independent country) to ask for military help from India without preceding the request by accession? . . . Why was there at this point no appeal made to the United Nations? . . . Finally, it is most difficult to understand why no one, particularly Mountbatten, advanced the most obvious idea—that of immediately getting into contact with the Karachi government for consultation.<sup>24</sup>

The Quaid-i-Azam was at this time in Lahore, and not, as Mountbatten assured Ian Stephens, "waiting at Abbotabad ready to drive in triumph to Srinagar." When news of the Indian invasion of Kashmir reached him, he immediately ordered General Gracey, the acting Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army, to send troops into Kashmir. Gracey did not carry out the order but telephoned instead to the Supreme Commander, Field Marshal Auchinleck, in Delhi for instructions. The contrast with Delhi must be noted. There the British Commander-in-Chief of the Indian army did not question the orders emanating from the Governor-General Lord Mountbatten and the Indian cabinet to fly troops into Kashmir. Obedience to the Quaid-i-Azam's orders would, as Auchinleck reported to the Chiefs of Staff in London, have entailed the issuance of the "Stand Down Order," which called for the withdrawal of all British officers in the event of armed conflict between the two Dominions.<sup>25</sup>

Auchinleck flew to Lahore on October 28, the morning after the Indian invasion, to discuss the situation with the Quaid-i-Azam. As a result of the discussion, the Quaid-i-Azam agreed to withdraw his order to the Pakistan army to march into Kashmir and accepted Auchinleck's proposal for an immediate conference in Lahore between the Governors-General and the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan. Mountbatten and the Indian cabinet also accepted Auchinleck's proposal but almost immediately afterward started resiling from it. Nehru took to bed from an indisposition; Patel, who had strongly opposed Nehru's going to Lahore, said he could not leave Delhi. The conference, which was due to be held on October 29, was postponed from day to day and finally Mountbatten alone reached Lahore on November 1.

The letter of October 27, 1947, through which the Governor-General of India accepted the Maharaja's request for accession stated: "Consistently with their policy that, in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government's wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people."<sup>26</sup>

In a telegram to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on the same day, the Prime Minister of India said: "I should like to make it clear that



question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency is not designed in any way to influence the State to accede to India. Our view which we have repeatedly made public is that the question of accession in any disputed territory or State must be decided in accordance with wishes of people and we adhere to this view."

In a further telegram sent on October 31, Nehru gave this pledge: "Our assurance that we shall withdraw our troops from Kashmir as soon as peace and order are restored and leave the decision regarding the future of this State to the people of the State is not merely a promise to your Government but also to the people of Kashmir and to the world."

The Pakistan government saw through these assurances. A press communique issued in Lahore on October 30 stated that, "in the opinion of the Government of Pakistan the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union is based on fraud and violence and as such can not be recognized." It could not be recognized since it was manifestly contrary to the wishes of the people. The Maharaja, having already entered into a standstill agreement with Pakistan, was debarred from entering into relations with any other power unilaterally. Furthermore, at the time he offered accession to India, the Maharaja had been divested of authority over large portions of the state by the people's rebellion. Only the people of Kashmir could decide the question of the accession of the state. The communique added: "The reference to a plebiscite for Kashmir is merely put forward to mislead as it ostensibly seems attractive but as a practical proposition it remains on paper. If the Indian Government are allowed to act freely and unfettered as they please by virtue of having already occupied Kashmir and landed their troops there, then this 'eldorado' of plebiscite will prove a mirage."

In the meeting with Mountbatten on November 1, the Quaid-i-Azam put forward the following proposals to settle the Kashmir dispute:

1. A proclamation should be made by the two Governors-General giving forty-eight hours' notice to the opposing forces to cease fire and warning the tribesmen that, if they did not comply, the forces of both countries would wage war on them.
2. Simultaneous withdrawal from Kashmir of the Indian troops and the tribesmen should be effected.
3. The two Governors-General should be vested with full powers

to restore peace, undertake the administration of the state, and arrange for a plebiscite under their joint control and supervision.

Mountbatten offered to refer these proposals to the Indian cabinet, but pleaded his inability as constitutional Governor-General to take a decision, or to conduct the plebiscite jointly with the Quaid-i-Azam. His position as constitutional Governor-General had not, however, debarred him from being the chief negotiator with Hyderabad or from directing military operations in Kashmir. When the proposals were referred to the Government of India, they did not accept them. But in a broadcast on November 2, Nehru declared that the Government of India "are prepared when peace and order have been established in Kashmir to have a referendum held under international auspices like the United Nations."<sup>27</sup>

The meeting on November 1 finally disillusioned the Quaid-i-Azam with Mountbatten. At this meeting Mountbatten gave the Quaid-i-Azam his word of honor that Nehru had really fallen ill and was unable to come to Lahore. But the very next day a high ranking British officer told the Quaid-i-Azam that he had seen Nehru as fit as ever the day before in Delhi.

The turn of events in Kashmir had an adverse effect on the Quaid-i-Azam's health. At the time of partition he had been confident of Kashmir's accession to Pakistan because of its Muslim population and geographical situation. "Kashmir," he would say, "will fall into our lap like a ripe fruit." Now he felt deceived, and his earlier optimism gave way to a deep disappointment. "We have been put on the wrong bus," he remarked.

While these discussions between the governments of India and Pakistan were proceeding, a local revolution occurred in Gilgit in the far north of Kashmir. The area is mountainous and its only communications with the rest of the state are two high passes that are snow-bound in winter. The population is almost wholly Muslim. Although Gilgit formed part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, it was administered by the British Government of India through a political agent. When independence was declared, the area was retroceded by the British government to the state, and the British political agent was replaced by a Dogra Governor. When the unexpected news of the Maharaja's accession to India reached Gilgit, the people were outraged and decided to throw off the Maharaja's yoke. On October 31, the Hindu Governor was taken into custody by the Gilgit Scouts, and



on November 2, the Pakistan flag was hoisted amidst popular acclaim. In response to a request to take over the administration, the Pakistan government flew a representative to Gilgit on November 14. A little later, the rulers of Hunza and Nagir, which are comprised in the Gilgit Agency, requested accession to Pakistan. Since then, the whole area has been administered by the Pakistan government and has remained outside the arena of conflict in Kashmir.

On November 8, I accompanied Abdur Rab Nishtar to Delhi for a meeting of the Joint Defence Council. After the meeting, Nishtar had an exchange of views with Nehru about Kashmir and returned to Pakistan. Mountbatten asked me to stay on for further discussions. I worked with Ismay and V. P. Menon to find a solution for states whose accession was in dispute. In each of them the ruler of the state did not belong to the community to which the majority of his subjects belonged. The only manner in which the dispute over accession could be resolved was by a reference to the will of the people under conditions guaranteeing a free vote. In Kashmir it was essential that the tribal lashkar and the Indian troops should both withdraw. In the evening I was told that Mountbatten and Sardar Patel agreed to such a plan, but not Nehru, and I was advised to see him.

I had a long discussion with him and came away convinced that Nehru was resolved to hold Kashmir by force and had no intention of allowing the people of Kashmir the right to determine their future. My argument that a fair solution of the Kashmir dispute was the best guarantee of friendly relations between India and Pakistan, and was, therefore, in the best interests of both countries, left him cold. He talked only in terms of power politics, and said again and again that in matters of state no sovereign independent power could be trusted. If Pakistan had to be, it must never have the strength to be a possible threat to India. I pointed out that Kashmir's accession to Pakistan could not pose a threat to India because of the mountainous barrier between Kashmir and India. On the other hand, India would, by occupying Kashmir, be commanding the heights of Pakistan and controlling its life-line of rivers flowing from Kashmir. I found no trace in him of those sentiments of attachment to Kashmir with which he is often credited by virtue of his family's origins in Kashmir. The fact that in a prolonged struggle over Kashmir its people would be the worst sufferers did not move him in the least. What mattered to him

was that Kashmir's accession to Pakistan would strengthen Pakistan.

Three weeks later, Liaquat Ali Khan came to Delhi for another meeting of the Joint Defence Council and there was a renewed effort at solving the Kashmir dispute. Again Ismay, V. P. Menon, and I worked together to produce a basis for discussion between the two Prime Ministers. The lines leading to a solution were clear. The fighting should stop, and both tribesmen and the Indian troops should withdraw. The governments of India and Pakistan should make a joint request to UN to hold a free and fair plebiscite in Kashmir under its auspices. Conditions of peace should be established so that citizens of the state who had been driven out could return to their homes. All political prisoners should be released. There should be no restriction on legitimate political activity. Similarly, a plebiscite should be held in Junagadh to decide its future. Had there been a will to abide by the decision of the people of Kashmir, there would have been no difficulty. But Nehru was neither prepared to withdraw Indian forces from Kashmir, nor to allow an impartial plebiscite to be held.

Sardar Patel, although a bitter enemy of Pakistan, was a greater realist than Nehru. In one of the discussions between the two Prime Ministers, at which Patel and I were also present, Liaquat Ali Khan dwelt at length on the inconsistency of the Indian stand with regard to Junagadh and Kashmir. If Junagadh, despite its Muslim ruler's accession to Pakistan, belonged to India because of its Hindu majority, how could Kashmir, with its Muslim majority, be a part of India simply by virtue of its Hindu ruler having signed a conditional instrument of accession to India? If the instrument of accession signed by the Muslim ruler of Junagadh was of no validity, the instrument of accession signed by the Hindu ruler of Kashmir was also invalid. If the will of the people was to prevail in Junagadh, it must prevail in Kashmir as well. India could not claim both Junagadh and Kashmir. When Liaquat Ali Khan made these incontrovertible points, Patel could not contain himself and burst out: "Why do you compare Junagadh with Kashmir? Talk of Hyderabad and Kashmir, and we could reach an agreement." Patel's view at this time and even later was that India's effort to retain Muslim majority areas against the will of the people was a source not of strength but of weakness to India. He felt that if India and Pakistan agreed to let Kashmir go to Pakistan and



Hyderabad to India, the problems of Kashmir and of Hyderabad could be solved peacefully and to the mutual advantage of India and Pakistan.

There was a second round of talks between the two Prime Ministers in Lahore on December 8, but they also produced no results. Nehru even backed out of the agreed proposal for a joint request to the UN to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir. During this time fighting was going on in Kashmir. The Azad Kashmir forces, ill-equipped and outnumbered as they were, bravely resisted the Indian army and succeeded in consolidating and strengthening their position. Mountbatten was afraid that without the intervention of a third party there was serious danger of war between the two Dominions, and he was most anxious to avert this. The British Prime Minister pleaded with Nehru for a peaceful and just solution, but to no avail. An appeal to the United Nations appeared to Mountbatten to be the only way of bringing in an outside mediator. Eventually, despite Gandhi's disapproval, Mountbatten succeeded in persuading Nehru to go to the United Nations with a complaint against Pakistan.

On January 1, 1948, the Government of India appealed to the Security Council to ask Pakistan to prevent its personnel, civil and military, from participating or assisting in the invasion of Jammu and Kashmir, to call upon other Pakistan nationals to desist from taking any part in the fighting in the state, and to deny to the invaders access to its territory, supplies, and other aid. The Government of India also stated that after the restoration of normal conditions the people of Kashmir would be free to decide their future by a plebiscite under international auspices.

Pakistan lodged a countercomplaint setting forth the attempts made by India to destroy Pakistan; the genocide of Muslims in East Punjab, Delhi, and other places in India, the forcible occupation of Junagadh, and the action taken by India to secure the accession of Kashmir by fraud and violence. The Security Council was requested by Pakistan to bring about a just and fair settlement of these disputes. For Kashmir, the request was for cessation of fighting, the withdrawal of all outsiders whether belonging to India or Pakistan, the return of Kashmir refugees, the establishment of an impartial administration, and the holding of a plebiscite "to ascertain the free and unfettered will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir as to whether the State shall accede to Pakistan or to India."

The Pakistan delegation to the Security Council was led by Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan, and included M.A.H. Ispahani, Pakistan's Ambassador in the USA and M. Wasim, the Advocate General. I was also made a member of the delegation on the Quaid-i-Azam's express orders. Golpalaswami Ayyangar was the leader of the Indian delegation, which included Sheikh Abdullah, who was first associated with the Maharaja's government and later appointed Prime Minister of Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah was used by India in moral justification of her occupation of Kashmir. At that time, Sheikh Abdullah had been led by Nehru to believe that India fully respected the right of the people of Kashmir to self-determination, and that, after peace was restored, a plebiscite would be held. Sheikh Abdullah and I had been at college together. Now, after over two decades, we met in the corridors of the United Nations building at Lake Success. Although we were ranged on opposite sides, we arranged to have a private meeting in a New York hotel. We went over the whole problem of Kashmir in the context of Indo-Pakistan relations. I found Sheikh Abdullah firmly convinced that Nehru intended to grant virtual independence to Kashmir. I pointed out that Kashmir did not have the military potential to safeguard its independence and would have to depend upon a neighboring power for its security. If that power was India, and Indian armed forces were stationed in Kashmir, its so-called independence would be purely nominal and could be destroyed at any time. Could Muslim Kashmir safely entrust its destiny to predominantly non-Muslim India? But nothing I said could shake his faith in Nehru's personal assurances to him. At that time, Sheikh Abdullah had no inkling of how each undertaking would be violated by his friend Nehru and how he himself would suddenly be dismissed from the office of Prime Minister of Kashmir on August 9, 1953, and be thrown in prison along with his followers, to remain there for eleven years.

The Security Council started its hearing of India's complaint and Pakistan's reply on January 15, 1948. Zafrullah Khan's masterly exposition of the case convinced the Security Council that the problem was not simply one of expelling so-called raiders from Kashmir, as the Indian representative would have them believe, but of placing Indo-Pakistan relations on a just and peaceful basis and solving the Kashmir dispute in accordance with the will of the people of the state. Zafrullah Khan frankly admitted that volunteers from Pakistan



had gone to the aid of their brethren in Kashmir, but, in the face of the universal sympathy in Pakistan for the just cause of the people of Kashmir, the Government of Pakistan could not have stopped them from going. On January 17, the Security Council adopted a resolution calling upon the two governments to take measures to improve the situation and requesting them to report to the Council any material change in it. By another resolution, made on January 20, the Council established the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, which was to be composed of three members, one to be nominated by India, one by Pakistan, and the third jointly by the two members. The number was later raised to five.

These first resolutions were followed by a debate in the Security Council which lasted for a fortnight, in which the representatives of India and Pakistan participated, and in which every aspect of the Kashmir question was brought under discussion. The consensus of opinion in the Security Council was crystallized in a draft resolution laid before the Council by its President, General McNaughton of Canada, on February 6. The draft resolution demanded an end to all acts of violence and hostility; the withdrawal of all irregular forces and armed individuals who had entered Jammu and Kashmir; the cooperation of the armed forces of India and Pakistan in the establishment of order and security; the withdrawal of regular armed forces on the reestablishment of law and order; the return of refugees to their homes, and the removal of restrictions on legitimate political activity; the release of political prisoners; the establishment of an interim administration commanding general confidence and respect of the people of the state; and the holding of an impartial plebiscite to be organized, held, and supervised under the authority of the Security Council at the earliest possible date to decide the question of whether the state of Jammu and Kashmir should accede to India or Pakistan.

To the surprise of the Security Council, the Indian representative strongly objected to the draft resolution and, in particular, to the withdrawal of the Indian army after the restoration of law and order, the establishment of an impartial administration, and the holding of a plebiscite under the authority of the Security Council. All he would agree to was "having the Security Council give advice and guidance to the Kashmir Government in the organization and holding of that plebiscite and to having the Security Council send observers to see how that plebiscite is conducted."<sup>28</sup> What India desired was that a

plebiscite, held under the shadow of Indian bayonets, by a pro-Indian administration, should be accepted by the Security Council as the free vote of the people of Kashmir. The Security Council, on the other hand, wanted a plebiscite that would be really fair and recognized as such by the world. As Warren Austin, the United States representative on the Security Council, put it, "There is nothing, in my view of the matter, that will command that approbation as will a machinery that is free from suspicion and that gives to all the world the appearance of impartiality by actually being an impartial administration of the plebiscite."<sup>29</sup>

Although he had been stressing "the urgency and immediacy of the solution of this problem," the Indian representative now asked for a five or six weeks' adjournment of the debate. The Security Council was unhappy about an adjournment, but agreed to it despite Pakistan's strong plea against any postponement. We were convinced that India's only object in asking for an adjournment was to gain time in which to exert diplomatic pressure on the governments concerned, particularly the British government. The draft resolution before the Security Council had the support of the majority necessary for passing it. Russia and Ukraine were neutral, but the United States, the United Kingdom, Syria, Colombia, Argentina, and all the other countries represented on the Security Council had strongly supported the principles on which it was based. If the Security Council had pressed 'on with its business, the resolution would have been passed and the Security Council would have gained respect for its firmness.

The United Kingdom was represented in the Security Council by Philip Noel-Baker, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. He had taken a leading part in the discussions that culminated in the draft resolution. His high idealism and sincere devotion to the cause of peace, which deservedly won him the Nobel Prize for Peace some years later, shone through every speech he made. But this was precisely the quality that made him disliked in India. "Mountbatten," wrote Campbell-Johnson, "is worried because he feels that Attlee and Noel-Baker do not seem to be showing themselves sufficiently alive to the psychological influences of this dispute and that their attempt to deal out even-handed justice is producing heavy-handed diplomacy."<sup>30</sup> Mountbatten had himself never made such a mistake in his conduct of Indian affairs. He was at this time engaged in working out a formula by which India could continue to



be a member of the British Commonwealth, even after she became a republic under her new constitution. And he saw his whole diplomacy being wrecked by Noel-Baker's attempt to deal out even-handed justice in Kashmir. "Mountbatten says frankly," continued Campbell-Johnson, "that although individual Indian leaders are alive to the advantages of the continued Commonwealth connection, their political position has been weakened and the attitude of the Government adversely affected by the policy adopted towards Kashmir by the British delegation at the Security Council."<sup>31</sup> Once again, as in every conflict of interest between India and Pakistan, in particular at every critical moment in the Kashmir dispute, Mountbatten made himself the instrument of Indian ambitions. By exerting the full weight of his influence as the highest British official on the spot, he tilted the balance heavily in favor of India.

The threat that India would leave the Commonwealth unless the British government changed its policy toward Kashmir was enough to unnerve Attlee. Anticipating Indian pressure on the British government, Zafrullah Khan and I went to London. Zafrullah Khan's interview with Attlee confirmed our worst fears. Noel-Baker was overruled and a new line, in keeping with Indian wishes, was adopted. Because of their long connection with the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, the views of the British government on its affairs commanded great respect in the counsels of Western nations. The United States, Canada, and other nations were easily induced to follow the United Kingdom's new line. As a further insurance to keep the Western powers on their own side, the Indians also threw out hints of turning to Russia to secure a Russian veto.

When the Security Council met again in March, 1948, McNaughton's draft resolution of February 6 was totally forgotten; and a vastly different resolution was moved by Tsiang, the Chinese representative, who was the President of the Security Council for the month. The new resolution, as Zafrullah Khan pointed out, made numerous concessions to India in violation of the principles which the members of the Security Council had themselves advocated before adjournment. The Indian representative was also critical of the new resolution which, although one-sided, was not sufficiently one-sided for him. However, the Security Council passed this resolution with a few amendments on April 21. The resolution provided for a plebiscite to be held after the restoration of peace; but the plebiscite adminis-

trator, although a nominee of the UN Secretary General, was to act as an officer of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The weakness the Security Council displayed, first in agreeing to an adjournment and, later, in abandoning the draft resolution of February 6 was disastrous for the Kashmir case and for the prestige of the UN. Having taken the measure of the Security Council, India felt she could safely defy the UN. The resolution of April 21, despite its many concessions to the Indian point of view was not accepted by India. Pakistan while criticizing the resolution did not reject it.

While the debates in the Security Council were in progress, the Indian army in Kashmir was being strengthened. In the midst of winter rains and snowstorms, roads and airfields were being improved in preparation for a spring offensive. On March 15, 1948, the Indian Defence Minister announced in the Indian constituent assembly that the Indian army would clear out "the raiders" from Kashmir within the next two or three months. The Azad Kashmir forces and the tribesmen had put up a brave resistance against the onslaughts of the Indian army, but they had neither the strength, nor the equipment, to withstand a well-prepared offensive by far stronger regular troops.

On April 20, General Gracey, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army, submitted to the Pakistan government his appreciation of the military situation. After giving details of the build-up of the Indian army he concluded:

It is obvious that a general offensive is about to start very soon now. . . . If Pakistan is not to face another serious refugee problem with about 2,750,000 people uprooted from their homes, if India is not to be allowed to sit on the doorsteps of Pakistan to the rear and on the flank at liberty to enter at its will and pleasure; if the civilian and military morale is not to be affected to a dangerous extent; and if subversive political forces are not to be encouraged and let loose within Pakistan itself, it is imperative that the Indian Army is not allowed to advance beyond the general line Uri-Poonch-Naoshera.

There was another vital consideration. Mangla Headworks from which the Upper Jhelum Canal took off to irrigate large areas in West Pakistan was in state territory. If the Indian offensive succeeded, Mangla Headworks, with its control of supplies from the river Jhelum, would fall into Indian hands. In an attempt to paralyze Pakistan's economy, India had on April 1, 1948, shut off water from the headworks on the rivers Sutlej and Ravi, which Radcliffe had unjustly



awarded to India. By getting hold of Mangla Headworks as well, India would obtain a complete stranglehold over the economy of West Pakistan. An idea of the importance of Mangla can be gained from the fact that it is the only site at which a dam is being built for the replacement of water supplies from the three eastern rivers which are under India's control.

The Pakistan government accepted the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief and sent limited forces to the state to hold certain defensive positions. The instructions to the army were, "Prevent India from obtaining a decision by force of arms." Only the army was engaged in this essentially defensive task; the air force was not used. The Indians had thus uncontested control of the air. Despite this and other handicaps, the Pakistan army succeeded in holding the Indian offensive.

The UN Commission for India and Pakistan, which had been established by the Security Council resolution of January 20 and had been instructed "to proceed to the spot as quickly as possible," took unduly long to form and arrived in Karachi on July 7, 1948. It was composed of five members: Argentina, nominated by Pakistan; Czechoslovakia, nominated by India; Colombia and Belgium, selected by the Security Council; and the United States, nominated by the Council's President. At the very first meeting with the commission, Zafrullah Khan notified it of the action taken by Pakistan in sending troops into the state. When the commission moved to Delhi, the Indians made much of what they alleged to be Pakistan's aggression. The members of the commission were new to the subcontinent and were only dimly aware of the historical forces behind the conflict in Kashmir. They were somewhat bewildered by the opposing points of views advanced with passionate advocacy by India and Pakistan. Eventually, they produced a plan of action and embodied it in the commission's resolution of August 13, 1948. The resolution provided for a cease-fire to be followed by a truce agreement under which the Pakistan troops, tribesmen, and volunteers on the one hand; and the bulk of the Indian army on the other hand, were to withdraw from the state. The last part of the resolution dealing with the plebiscite was extremely vague and provided only for negotiations between the two governments and the commission to determine fair and equitable conditions for a plebiscite. In the view of the Pakistan government, no real settlement was possible without a firm guarantee

for a free plebiscite. The commission in its inexperience could not perceive this. Josef Korbel, a member of the commission, wrote: "Pakistan obviously was of the opinion that once the fighting had stopped, India would be satisfied with a de facto division of Kashmir (the better part of which was in her possession), the situation would subsequently become stabilized, and India would then obstruct a free plebiscite. The Commission was bitterly disappointed."<sup>32</sup>

Negotiations with the commission were resumed toward the end of the year in Paris, where the General Assembly of the United Nations met. The result was the resolution of January 5, 1949, that laid down the principles and procedures for a free and impartial plebiscite to be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations.

During these months, fighting was going on in Kashmir with varying fortunes. The Indian attacks on Uri and Titwal were halted and the line of battle stabilized in the south and west of the state. In the north, Zoji La, which was the gateway to the Valley of Kashmir, was threatened by the Gilgit Scouts, but the Indians succeeded in moving tanks up there. In November, 1948, the Indians were able to relieve Poonch town which had long been beleaguered, and to link up Naoshera with Poonch; the whole area east of that line, including Mendhar tahsil, the granary of Kashmir, was lost to them. There was a fresh influx of tens of thousands of Muslim refugees into Pakistan. Pakistan had not until then interfered with the Indian lines of communications though they were easily vulnerable. Now, however, the situation called for stronger measures. A sustained bombardment of the bridge at Beri Pattan shattered Indian ammunition dumps and threw the Indian lines into complete disorder. The Indians could have saved their forces in Kashmir only by an attack on and through Pakistan territory. Such an attack would have involved both Dominions in a general war. Though confronting each other in Kashmir, India and Pakistan had refrained from provoking unlimited warfare. Now, when they were on the brink of war, both shrank from it. With Nehru's consent, the Indian Commander-in-Chief, General Bucher, on December 30, approached the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief, General Gracey, for a cease-fire. General Gracey supported the proposal and the Pakistan government accepted it. The cease-fire became effective on January 1, 1949; Map V shows the cease-fire line.


The decision for a cease-fire has often been severely criticized in Pakistan as unwise. The Pakistan army, which had proved itself to be



superior to the Indian army in the contest in Kashmir, could, it is argued, have won Kashmir before India could do much damage to Pakistan. Pakistan knew that India was determined to block a plebiscite and to maintain her military occupation of Kashmir. By placing a wholly undeserved trust in the ability of the United Nations to arrange a plebiscite, Pakistan committed a serious mistake of judgment. At this time I was lying ill in France, where I had gone with Zafrullah Khan for discussions with the UN commission, and cannot, therefore, speak from firsthand knowledge. But my impression is that the decisive consideration in the mind of Liaquat Ali Khan was the desire to avoid a general war between India and Pakistan, which, he was convinced, would lead to the destruction of both. India would not have taken its losses in Kashmir as a final defeat, but would have sought satisfaction by continuing the war with Pakistan. Neither Dominion had the military potential for a prolonged war. Both countries would soon have placed themselves at the mercy of outside powers in order to obtain needed war supplies, and would have put their new-won freedom in serious peril. In the last analysis, the decision was a political one based on wider considerations than the immediate prospects of gain on the Kashmir front.

As soon as the cease-fire was effected, tribesmen and Pakistan volunteers departed for their homes without waiting for the conclusion of the truce agreement. Indian propaganda has made much of the excesses committed by the tribesmen during the first few days of their incursion into Kashmir. Compared with the atrocities committed by the Maharaja's state force and the Indian army on the people of Kashmir, the plunder in which these undisciplined irregulars indulged for some days pales into insignificance. If plunder had been their only motive they would have evaporated as soon as they had to fight against the Indian army. But they continued to fight bravely against far superior forces for fourteen months, with no other end in view than the freedom of their brethren in Kashmir. The people of Kashmir and of Pakistan owe them a debt of gratitude for their gallant and, on the whole, selfless fight. The Azad Kashmir forces fought heroically in defense of their homes. The entire population of Azad Kashmir endured the privations of war and the bombings of the Indian air force with great courage and fortitude.

The two resolutions of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan, dated August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949, were approved by the





Security Council and accepted by both India and Pakistan. They constitute an international agreement that has still to be implemented. The essence of the agreement is that the people of Jammu and Kashmir should have the right to determine their future and decide in a free and impartial plebiscite held under UN auspices whether to accede to India or to Pakistan without coercion or intimidation by the state administration and the military of either country.

The many efforts made by the UN to secure compliance with the international agreement on Kashmir have produced no result. It is a sad commentary upon the anarchic state of world politics that the highest world organization has been powerless to break Indian intransigence, and to secure for the people of Kashmir their undoubted right to decide in a free vote whether they will join India or Pakistan. The detailed history of these events lies outside the scope of this book. Here it will suffice to indicate in broad outline their trend.

The UN Commission for India and Pakistan was soon to realize that Pakistan was right in having apprehensions about India's intentions to obstruct the plebiscite. The Indian tactics were essentially the same as they had adopted in dealing with the Cabinet Mission plan. They would misinterpret the plain words of the agreement to suit their own ends, and then refuse to accept any other interpretation, even that offered by the authors of the agreement. In keeping with this technique, the Indians insisted upon the disbandment of the Azad Kashmir forces, even though there was no mention of it in the agreement, and even though the commission stated specifically that "the Resolution [of August 13, 1948] does not contemplate the disarmament or disbanding of Azad Kashmir forces." Other points were raised on which again the Government of India would not accept the interpretation of the commission. Thereupon, the commission proposed that the differences be submitted to the arbitration of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz (of Second World War fame) who had been designated Plebiscite Administrator for Kashmir. President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee appealed to India and Pakistan to accept the proposal for arbitration. Pakistan accepted and India rejected the proposal.

This pattern of behavior was repeated on eleven subsequent occasions when eminent statesmen and mediators put forward proposals for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute—Pakistan accepted and India rejected. The distinguished Australian judge Sir Owen Dixon was ap-

pointed United Nations Representative in 1950; he replaced the UN commission and was to prepare and supervise a program of demilitarization and carry out its other functions. He reported to the Security Council:

In the end I became convinced that India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarization in any such form, or to provisions governing the period of the plebiscite of any such character, as would in my opinion permit of the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperilled.

In January, 1951, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London informally discussed every aspect of the Kashmir problem. To allow a plebiscite to be held under impartial conditions without jeopardizing the security of the state, three alternative methods were proposed by Prime Minister Menzies of Australia and endorsed by the other prime ministers including Prime Minister Attlee. They were a commonwealth force, a joint Indo-Pakistan force, or a local force to be raised by the Plebiscite Administrator. Each was accepted by Pakistan but rejected by India.

In April, 1951, former United States Senator Dr. Frank Graham was appointed UN Representative to make recommendations for implementing the resolutions (dated August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949) of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan. He submitted a number of reports to the Security Council but because of Indian insistence on keeping a large force in Kashmir failed to bring about agreement on demilitarization.

In August, 1953, at a critical moment following the dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah, the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan met and in their joint communiqué stated as their firm opinion that the Kashmir dispute "should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State with a view to promoting their well-being and causing the least disturbance to the life of the people of the State. The most feasible method of ascertaining the wishes of the people was by a fair and impartial plebiscite." The communiqué announced that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed by the end of April, 1954. But before the appointment could be made, Nehru backed out of his commitment on the specious grounds that the agreement between the United States and Pakistan under the Mutual



Security Act had upset the balance of power on the subcontinent and changed the entire context of the Kashmir negotiations. Just because Pakistan entered into an agreement for military aid to safeguard its security, why should the people of Kashmir be denied their right of self-determination?

In February, 1957, the Security Council deputed its Swedish President, Gunnar Jarring, to visit India and Pakistan and arrange a peaceful settlement, but the visit produced no results. Dr. Graham's subsequent efforts were equally fruitless.

Meanwhile, India set up a so-called constituent assembly in Kashmir that under Indian manipulation declared the state to be "an integral part of the Union of India." Thereupon the Security Council in its resolution of January 24, 1957, reaffirmed its earlier stand that any action by this assembly "would not constitute a disposition of the State," which could only be made "through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations." Although India gave repeated assurances to the Security Council that any opinion expressed by the so-called constituent assembly on the question of accession would not bind the Government of India which would abide by its international commitments, Indian official spokesmen have, with the passage of time, become bolder and bolder in asserting that Kashmir is an integral part of India and have even denied the existence of the Kashmir dispute.

This pattern of behavior was changed for a short while following the serious Indian reverses against China in November, 1962. As a result of the efforts made by Averell Harriman, the United States Assistant Secretary of State and Duncan Sandys, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth relations, the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan in a joint communiqué agreed that "a renewed effort should be made to resolve the outstanding differences between their two countries on Kashmir and other related matters." Between December, 1962, and May, 1963, six rounds of talks were held between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, but no agreement was reached. India reverted to its intransigent line.

For over eighteen years India has flouted her international undertakings and broken her pledges. She has subjected the people of Kashmir to a corrupt and vicious tyranny and denied them the right of self-determination. She has killed, imprisoned, and tortured the patriots of Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah, whose support was paraded as

the moral justification for India's provisional acceptance of the Maharaja's offer of accession, was kept in prison for eleven years, his only crime being his demand for self-determination by his people. This demand voices the innermost sentiments of the people of Kashmir that nothing can suppress.

The tremendous agitation that followed the desecration of the Hazrat Bal shrine in Srinagar in the winter of 1963-64 was an expression of these same sentiments that took the form of an insistent demand for the release of Sheikh Abdullah. Shortly before Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's death in May, 1964, Sheikh Abdullah and his companions were released and it looked for a brief moment as if the great wrong that had been done to the people of Kashmir and their leader might be set right. With Nehru's consent, Sheikh Abdullah came to Pakistan in an endeavor to bring India and Pakistan together for a peaceful solution of the Kashmir question. In Pakistan he received a memorable welcome, but before he had completed his visit Pandit Nehru died. Nehru's successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, at first appeared not to stand in the way of Sheikh Abdullah's peace initiative, but he soon moved in the opposite direction and started integrating Indian-occupied Kashmir into the Indian Union. Over the years the special status accorded to the state of Jammu and Kashmir in the Indian Constitution was eroded bit by bit, until practically nothing of it was left. In December, 1964, the Government of India decided to extend the scope of certain provisions in the Indian Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir so as to effect the integration of the state by decree. When Sheikh Abdullah returned to Delhi after a pilgrimage to Mecca in May, 1965, he was immediately arrested for speeches he had delivered abroad pleading for Kashmir's right of self-determination and was put in detention for an indefinite period.

These actions of the Indian government inevitably produced a strong reaction in Kashmir and worsened relations between India and Pakistan. During the border dispute between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch area, India attacked and occupied three Pakistan posts at Kargil across the cease-fire line in May, 1965. This serious violation of the cease-fire line in Kashmir was only rectified after a strong protest was made by the UN Secretary General. On August 9, 1965, the anniversary of Sheikh Abdullah's dismissal and arrest in 1953, there were reports of a widespread revolt in Indian-occupied Kashmir, which led to clashes between the Indian armed forces and



the patriots of Kashmir. The Government of India alleged that this was the work of armed personnel who had infiltrated from Azad Kashmir across the cease-fire line with the connivance of the Pakistan government. The allegation was denied by the Pakistan government who contended that a fight for freedom from the Indian yoke was being waged by the people of Kashmir aided by their brothers in Azad Kashmir. These accusations and counteraccusations brought bitterness between India and Pakistan to a new pitch of intensity. On August 15, Indian forces crossed the cease-fire line and reoccupied the three posts at Kargil. There was fierce fighting all along the cease-fire line. In a large-scale attack in the Uri-Poonch sector, the Indian forces captured Haji Pir Pass. A village in Gujrat district, West Pakistan was shelled on August 23. To forestall an attack in the vital southern sector, Azad Kashmir forces supported by the Pakistan army moved across the cease-fire line into the Chhamb area on September 1 and made a rapid thrust toward Akhnur, thus threatening Jammu and the Indian lines of communications. The Indians threw their air force into the attack and air battles began.

In the early hours of September 6, Indian forces crossed the international boundary between India and Pakistan and launched a three-pronged surprise attack on Lahore, the capital of West Pakistan. Against this naked aggression the President of Pakistan invoked the right of self-defense under the UN Charter and declared war between India and Pakistan. In the face of heavy odds, the Pakistan army and air force fought with superb courage and military skill and halted the attack on Lahore. Bigger and fiercer battles were fought in Sialkot district, West Pakistan, which the Indians attacked with a large force including an armored division. One of the biggest tank battles since the Second World War was fought in this area. The Pakistan army was outnumbered by three to one and yet succeeded in holding the Indian offensive and driving the enemy back. The small but highly efficient Pakistan air force took a heavy toll of the much bigger Indian air force and having gained command of the air, was able to give splendid support to the ground forces. The Pakistan navy also came into the action and in a daring raid demolished the Indian military base at Dwarka.

The Security Council was most seriously concerned. On September 4, the UN Secretary General made a fervent appeal for a cease-fire and withdrawal of armed personnel that was endorsed by the Security

Council in its resolutions of September 4 and 6. On September 9, the UN Secretary General flew to Pakistan and India to negotiate peace, but without success. There was danger of a wider conflagration, when China gave an ultimatum to India to vacate its aggression against Chinese territory across the Sikkim border.

On September 20, the Security Council passed a resolution demanding that a cease-fire should take effect on September 22 to be followed by a withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the positions held on August 5, 1965. The resolution went on to say that thereafter the Security Council would consider "what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict." That problem is none other than the Kashmir dispute, as the whole world knows. And it is because India is stubbornly resisting a plebiscite in Kashmir in defiance of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949, that the dispute is still unresolved. The cease-fire became effective on the morning of September 23, 1965, and at the time of writing (October, 1965) there is an uneasy truce.

Every possible method of resolving the dispute has been tried. There has been international mediation. There have been proposals for arbitration. There have been direct negotiations between the governments of India and Pakistan at the highest level. Nothing has worked. World opinion has expressed itself unmistakably that India is in the wrong. The Kashmir dispute is the most vital and dangerous dispute between India and Pakistan. It is an ever present threat to the peace of the subcontinent and of the world. But ignoring every consideration of justice, morality, and international peace, India continues to hold Kashmir by force and to deny the people of Kashmir their right of self-determination. The people and the Government of Pakistan are resolved to persist in their endeavor to secure for the people of Kashmir their right to decide whether to accede to India or Pakistan. The people of Kashmir through all these long years of suffering have not reconciled themselves to Indian tyranny. Their brave struggle against Indian occupation will go on until they have won their cherished goal of self-determination.



## CHAPTER 15

# *The Indus Basin Water Dispute*

THE INDUS BASIN water dispute had its origin in the partition of the Punjab. It broke into the open on April 1, 1948, when East Punjab in India cut off the flow of canal waters to West Punjab in Pakistan.

West Pakistan has fertile soil but a hot and dry climate. The rainfall is scanty and undependable. More than half of the area receives less than ten inches of rainfall a year and the rest, less than twenty inches. Agriculture, the mainstay of the economy, is dependent almost entirely upon irrigation by canals drawn from the Indus and its five tributaries. The three western rivers—the Indus, the Jhelum, and the Chenab—flow into Pakistan from the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and the three eastern rivers—the Ravi, the Beas, and the Sutlej—enter Pakistan from India. In a very real sense, the Indus river system is West Pakistan's source of life. Without its lifegiving waters, West Pakistan would be incapable of supporting more than a small fraction of its population of 43 million. By contrast, India has many river systems which flow to the sea virtually untapped, and much of its territory receives enough rain to support agriculture without irrigation.

From time immemorial the Indus Basin was irrigated from the overflow of rivers and by inundation canals. During the last hundred years, under the guidance of British engineers, irrigation was greatly extended through the construction of headwork weirs on the rivers and through a network of canals. Flourishing colonies were established. Cultivation of cotton, wheat, rice, and sugar cane was expanded. New towns sprang into existence. Orchards and well-tended farms covered the countryside. More land is irrigated from the Indus rivers than from any other river system in the world.

Before partition, approximately 37 million acres received irrigation from the Indus rivers. About 31 million acres are now in West Pakistan. In addition to this, there are in West Pakistan at least 55 million acres of desert that could be turned into farmland if there were enough water. The flow supplies (water available from the river flow without the construction of storage reservoirs) were almost wholly used up in the irrigation systems established and planned before partition. Throughout the winter and during the critical spring and autumn months, when the water requirements of the *Rabi* (spring) and *Kharif* (autumn) crops overlapped, the existing canals exhausted the available flow of water. As chief engineer A. M. R. Montague reported in 1946: "For the majority of the year every single drop of water available to the Punjab is extracted from its rivers for distribution to the crops." And since the variations from year to year in the river flow are considerable, there were, periodically, serious shortages in many canals.

During the monsoon season of July and August the rivers are, of course, in spate, and enormous quantities of water flow into the sea. But to harness these summer floods, big storage reservoirs are needed. Such projects are costly, take a long time to build, and need suitable sites. The only one planned before partition was the Bhakra Dam on the Sutlej River in East Punjab with a storage capacity of 4 million acre-feet. Before it was sanctioned, the downstream province of Sind complained that the operation of Bhakra Dam would adversely affect the functioning of its inundation canals.

To determine the rights of the various provinces and states to the waters of the Indus Basin, the Government of India appointed, in 1941, a commission under the chairmanship of Sir B. N. Rau, later a judge of the International Court of Justice. The Rau commission laid down, as the principle governing the respective rights of the parties,



"equitable apportionment." This principle, which is internationally recognized as regulating the rights of states having a common river basin, includes the rule that an upper riparian can take no action that will interfere with existing irrigation of the lower riparian.

The partition of the Punjab cut across the rivers and canals of the Indus Basin irrigation system, making India the upper and Pakistan the lower riparian. Among the official committees appointed to deal with the various problems arising out of the partition of the Punjab was Committee B. This Committee consisted of an equal number of officials from East Punjab and from West Punjab, and was charged with settling questions of the future management of joint assets, the division of other physical assets and their valuation. In paragraph 15 of its report, Committee B, with the unanimous agreement of its members, stated: "The Committee is agreed that there is no question of varying the authorized shares of water to which the two Zones and the various canals are authorized." The Committee thus agreed on the maintenance of the prepartition division of the water resources, but it could not agree on the valuation of the canal systems through which the water was distributed, nor could it agree on the value of the crown wastelands brought under irrigation.

The report of Committee B came up before the Punjab Partition Committee, presided over by the Governor and consisting of ministerial representatives of East Punjab and West Punjab. The Partition Committee accepted the matters on which Committee B was in agreement, namely that the prepartition shares of West Punjab and East Punjab in the canal waters would be maintained. It appointed two members of Committee B to implement the provision in paragraph 15 with respect to the maintenance of supplies of water to each zone and canal. The Partition Committee, like Committee B, was, however, unable to agree on the valuation of the canal system and it was decided to refer this question, along with the related question of the valuation of crown wastelands, to the Arbitral Tribunal. All this happened during the partition days, before August 15, 1947.

The question of the apportionment of the irrigation waters of the rivers common to India and Pakistan was not referred to the Arbitral Tribunal because there was no dispute to refer.

When the Boundary Award was announced on August 17, 1947, it was seen that Radcliffe had not only given away large Muslim majority areas to India but had so drawn the boundary as to leave on the

Indian side of the border both the Madhopur Headworks on the Ravi River and the Ferozepore Headworks on the Sutlej River. The former controlled the Upper Bari Doab canals, of which the Central Bari Doab canals in West Punjab were only a continuation. The latter controlled the Dipalpur canal in West Punjab and the Eastern Grey canal, which irrigated part of Bahawalpur state. In his award on the Punjab boundary Radcliffe said:

The fixing of a boundary in this area was further complicated by the existence of canal systems, so vital to the life of the Punjab but developed only under the conception of a single administration. . . . I think I am entitled to assume with confidence that any agreements . . . as to sharing of water from these canals or otherwise will be respected by whatever Government hereafter assumes jurisdiction over the headworks concerned.

Despite the fact that the Radcliffe Award had placed the control of headworks vital for Pakistan in the hands of India, the West Punjab government remained content because of the agreement reached by Committee B and the Punjab Partition Committee, that the prepartition shares of water would not be varied. No formal document specifying the precise shares of East Punjab and West Punjab in irrigation waters was drawn up and signed. The West Punjab ministers and officials felt assured by the repeated declarations of their counterparts in East Punjab that there was no question of any change in the prepartition arrangements for canal waters. The same declarations were also made by the East Punjab representatives before the Arbitral Tribunal, when the disputed question of the valuation of the canal system came up for a hearing. Actually, as events showed, the East Punjab ministers and officials were planning a deadly blow against Pakistan and were lulling the West Punjab government to sleep with sweet words. They were waiting for the day when the life of the Arbitral Tribunal would come to an end on March 31, 1948. On the side of East Punjab there was Machiavellian duplicity. On the part of West Punjab there was neglect of duty, complacency, and lack of common prudence—which had disastrous consequences for Pakistan.

On April 1, 1948, the day after the Arbitral Tribunal ceased to exist, the East Punjab government cut off the water supplies in every canal crossing into Pakistan. These consisted of the Central Bari Doab canal system, the Dipalpur canal system, and the Bahawalpur state distributary. Of this action, Sir Patrick Spens, Chairman of the



Arbitral Tribunal, said before the joint meeting in London of the East India Association and the Overseas League on February 23, 1955:

I remember very well suggesting whether it was not desirable that some order should be made about the continued flow of water. . . . But we were invited by both the Attorney-Generals [of India and Pakistan] to come to our decision on the basis that there would be no interference whatsoever with the then existing flow of water, and the award which my colleagues made, in which I had no part, they made on that basis. Our awards were published at the end of March, 1948. I am going to say nothing more about it except that I was very much upset that almost within a day or two there was a grave interference with the flow of water on the basis of which our awards had been made.

The irony of the situation was that, in its award, the Arbitral Tribunal accepted, in principle, the contention of India that Pakistan should be accountable for a higher valuation of the canal system than its book value. It reached this decision on the premise that the existing allocation of water would be respected, for, without water, canals are dry ditches, a liability and not an asset. The Tribunal also required Pakistan to account to India for the crown wastelands at an appreciated value due to the advent of irrigation.

As soon as the Arbitral Tribunal ceased to exist, all promises made before it by the representative of India that "there would be no interference whatsoever with the then existing flow of water" were forgotten and water was shut off from Pakistan canals on which the irrigation of 1.66 million acres depended. East Punjab now contended that Pakistan had no right to any water and demanded seigniorage charges as a condition for reopening the canals. There was acute distress which, with every day that passed, became more and more intolerable. In large areas where the subsoil water is brackish there was no drinking water. Millions of people faced the ruin of their crops, the loss of their herds, and eventual starvation due to lack of water.

Under these distressful circumstances, a delegation was sent from Pakistan to Delhi in the beginning of May, 1948, to seek a solution to the problem. The delegation was led by Ghulam Muhammad, the Finance Minister of Pakistan, and included two ministers from West Punjab—Shaukat Hayat Khan and Mumtaz Daultana. At the meetings in Delhi, East Punjab representatives insisted that they would not restore the flow of water to the canals unless West Punjab acknowledged that it had no right to the water. To this the representa-

tives of West Punjab could not agree. The Pakistan proposal that the two governments should submit their differences to the arbitration of the International Court of Justice was not acceptable to India. There was an impasse. Ghulam Muhammad appealed to Mountbatten who consulted with Nehru. A statement was then placed before Ghulam Muhammad, and he was asked to sign it without changing a word or a comma—a condition for restoring the flow of water.

On May 4, 1948, the statement was signed by Ghulam Muhammad and the two West Punjab ministers on the one hand and by Nehru and two East Punjab ministers on the other. The statement declared that, apart from the questions of law involved, the governments were anxious to approach the problem in a practical spirit. The East Punjab government would progressively diminish its supply to the Central Bari Doab and Dipalpur canals in West Punjab in order to give reasonable time to the West Punjab government to tap alternative sources. The statement announced that water was being restored to these canals, that West Punjab was to deposit in escrow such "ad hoc sum as may be specified by the Prime Minister of India" to cover certain disputed payments, and that, after an examination by each side of the legal and other issues involved, further meetings would take place. In conclusion, the Dominion governments expressed the hope that a friendly solution would be reached.

Though India restored the flow of water to the Dipalpur canal and the principal branches of the Central Bari Doab canals, water was still withheld from the Bahawalpur state distributary and nine lesser distributaries of the Central Bari Doab system. Eventually, considerable areas in Bahawalpur state reverted to desert. Notwithstanding the compulsion under which the arrangement was signed, Pakistan performed its part and deposited in escrow the sums specified by the Prime Minister of India. Later, Nehru, in an apparent fit of amnesia, denied that there had been any compulsion. In a letter to Liaquat Ali Khan in September, 1950, Nehru wrote: "Your Government's communication [states] that the agreement of 4 May 1948 was accepted by Pakistan 'under compulsion.' This has surprised and distressed me greatly. . . . I cannot imagine how any question of compulsion could possibly have arisen in these circumstances. There was then no kind of threat or even suggestion about stopping the flow of the water."

The further meeting between the two Dominion governments envisaged in the May 4 statement took place in Lahore in July, 1948.



At this meeting India reverted to the contention that "proprietary rights in the waters of the rivers in East Punjab vest wholly in the East Punjab Government"; and proposed that this should be embodied in a final agreement "which would take the place of all rights and liabilities which either side may have in law." Naturally no agreement could be reached on this basis. Nor could a settlement be brought nearer by correspondence between the two prime ministers. In a telegram sent on October 18, 1948, Nehru demanded that the May 4 arrangement be interpreted as recognizing "the right of the East Punjab Government to progressively diminish supply of water to the West Punjab," and stated that "any further meetings between representatives of the two Governments should be on the basis of this recognition by West Punjab." He warned that "If there was an unreasonable delay on the part of one side, it is open to the other party to put an end to the agreement by giving reasonable notice." In other words, unless Pakistan accepted the Indian contention quickly, India would end the arrangement and once again cut off the supplies of water. For Pakistan to accept the Indian interpretation would have been a permanent renunciation of Pakistan's legal rights. Pakistan offered to refer the legal issues in dispute to the International Court of Justice. India refused.

Direct negotiations between the two governments also produced no result. The only agreement reached in a conference in August, 1949, was to have another conference. Representatives of India and Pakistan met in Karachi toward the end of March, 1950. At this conference, which I attended as the leader of the Pakistan delegation, I tried to explore a purely practical basis for the settlement of the dispute. I proposed that existing uses be met from existing sources, and that new supplies be provided from flood waters now running to the sea, by building dams on the Sutlej, Beas, Ravi, and Chenab rivers, the costs involved to be shared in proportion to the benefits derived. An equitable division would be made of the new supplies in the light of relevant facts. The Indian delegation, which included A. N. Khosla, the Chairman of the Central Power, Irrigation, and Navigation Commission, suggested that the waters of the Sutlej, on which the Bhakra Dam was being built, be utilized wholly for areas in India, but that the waters of the Beas, the Ravi, and the Chenab be utilized for the maintenance of existing uses in Pakistan, subject to certain adjustments in favor of India. Any deficiencies in the supplies to Pakistan canals would be made good by building a link from the Chenab River,

the entire flow of which would be available to Pakistan. If necessary, a dam on the Chenab could be built to make up for any deficiency that still remained and to provide supplies for an extension of irrigation. It was agreed that engineers on both sides should study the two plans, and put up the relevant engineering data before another meeting to be held in Delhi in May, 1950.

At the end of the meeting in March, I had been fairly hopeful of reaching a reasonable agreement. But when I arrived in Delhi two months later, I found the atmosphere completely changed. The Indians were unwilling to proceed along the lines discussed at Karachi. They announced that they proposed to appropriate the entire usable flow not only of the Sutlej, but also of the Beas and the Ravi, and besides, take 10,000 cusecs from the Chenab through a tunnel at Maru. In other words, India wanted to take all the water it could and leave Pakistan to fend for itself. The supplies from the Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi rivers had historically provided water for more than 5.6 million acres in West Pakistan and had supported a population of over 5 million people. India was now threatening these people with extinction. I had an interview with Nehru and placed before him the consequences of the attitude of his government. He was effusive in expressing those soulful sentiments that have appealed so much to foreigners and professed anxiety for a humane solution; but I could not change his mind on the point in question.

It was clear that no agreement on the sharing of water could be reached in bilateral negotiations. The question of legal rights was even more difficult to resolve. Pakistan had asked India many times to refer this issue to the World Court for adjudication. India had just as often refused. The interim arrangement of May 4, 1948, instead of paving the way toward an agreement had become an obstacle. When, in 1950, India filed it with the United Nations as Treaty No. 794, Pakistan explained the true nature of the statement to the UN and certified that it had been terminated.

The United Nations Charter provides that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice. A word of explanation is needed to show why Pakistan did not take this dispute to the World Court. After the First World War, undivided India became a member of the League of Nations and, like the rest of the British Commonwealth, accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, except in disputes between members of the Commonwealth. The assumption was that such



disputes would be settled within the family of nations comprising the Commonwealth. When the subcontinent was partitioned into two sovereign states, the Dominion of India laid claim to being the successor of the old entity that was India. In consequence it inherited the international rights and obligations of undivided India, including compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, except for disputes between members of the Commonwealth. Although the Commonwealth had shown itself powerless to resolve disputes between its members, yet, by virtue of the old proviso, the canal waters dispute could not be referred to the International Court of Justice by Pakistan unless India agreed. And India, knowing that its stand was invalid in international law, would not agree.

Finally, in September, 1950, the Government of India did offer to submit the legal issues to adjudication, but not before the World Court or any other impartial tribunal, but to a court of two Indian and two Pakistani judges. When the Prime Minister of Pakistan suggested an impartial chairman, Nehru replied: "To think ab initio of a third party will be . . . a confession of continued dependence on others. That would be hardly becoming for proud and self-respecting independent nations." Nor would he agree to refer to a further court with an impartial chairman issues on which the first court might be divided. It was clear that India's purpose was to prolong negotiations until the Bhakra Dam, the Rajasthan Canal, and other engineering works were completed, the effect of which would be to deprive Pakistan of vital water supplies.

Meanwhile, India was steadily increasing its forcible appropriation of water at the expense of Pakistan. Supplies to Pakistan canals were reduced at the critical times when crops were being sowed or were maturing. A headworks at Harike at the junction of the Sutlej and the Beas was under construction and was to bring additional areas in India under irrigation. New canals were being built. The height and storage capacity of the Bhakra Dam were greatly raised above the prepartition design so that it would be capable of storing the entire flow of the Sutlej River even during the monsoon season. The Bhakra Dam as actually constructed by India is the highest in the world. Its height of 740 feet is 14 feet more than that of the world-famous Hoover Dam in the United States. It can store 8 million acre-feet of water instead of the 4 million acre-feet originally planned.

To provide an insurance against continued Indian threats to cut off

water supplies and, also, to provide a more uniform system of irrigation in the various colony areas some link canals such as the Balloki-Suleimanki link were built by Pakistan at its own expense. But these link canals could not wholly solve the problem. It was essential to find suitable sites for storage dams. Soon after the Indians stopped the flow of canal waters I asked West Punjab engineers to survey sites for storage dams on the Jhelum and Indus rivers. Of these sites Mangla, on the Jhelum, was the most promising. On the Indus River a site at Darband was at first favored, but later studies showed Tarbela to be more suitable. The Mangla Dam was sanctioned by the Pakistan government and work on its design and construction was started. No foreign aid was available so long as the dispute with India was not resolved.

In 1951, David Lilienthal, former head of the Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States, visited both India and Pakistan and recorded his observations in an article that appeared in *Collier's* magazine in August, 1951. He called the canal water dispute "pure dynamite, a Punjab powder keg" and warned that "peace in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent is not in sight with these inflammables around." He continued:

With no water for irrigation [West Pakistan] would be desert. 20,000,000 acres would dry up in a week, tens of millions would starve. No army, with bombs and shellfire, could devastate a land as thoroughly as Pakistan could be devastated by the simple expedient of India's permanently shutting off the sources of water that keep the fields and the people of Pakistan alive.

Lilienthal concluded by making a constructive proposal:

The starting point should be, then to set to rest Pakistan's fears of deprivation and a return to desert. Her present use of water should be confirmed by India, *provided* she works together with India (as I believe she would) in a joint use of this truly international river basin on an engineering basis that would also (as the facts make clear it can) assure India's future as well. [He suggested that the new engineering works be jointly financed,] perhaps with World Bank help.

Eugene Black, President of the World Bank, felt attracted by the idea. He wrote to the prime ministers of India and Pakistan in September, 1951, offering the good offices of the Bank, if their governments were disposed to look with favor upon Lilienthal's proposal which



contemplates meeting the requirements of both countries for expanded irrigation through the cooperative construction and operation of storage dams and other facilities to be financed in part perhaps by this Bank. It is the essence of the proposal, as I read it, that the development of the Indus water resources should be dealt with on an engineering basis and it appears to be Mr. Lilienthal's belief, after visiting both countries and talking with the highest personalities in the Governments, that it is within the realm of practicability to treat water development as a common project that is functional, and not political, in nature and that could therefore be undertaken separately from the political issues with which Pakistan and India are confronted.

Both governments accepted President Black's offer, and both sides agreed not to take any action to diminish the supplies available to the other side for existing uses, while the cooperative work continued with the participation of the World Bank. It was recognized that legal rights would not be affected.

India, notwithstanding its undertaking not to diminish supplies, continued to withhold water from Pakistan canals and to expand its own irrigation. In October and November, 1952, during the critical wheat sowing season in the Punjab, Pakistan received only 40 percent of its due share of these supplies. In February, 1953, it received only 8 percent. India used all of its share and, in addition, appropriated most of Pakistan's share. In 1952, India announced the opening of new distributaries from the Upper Bari Doab canal to bring under irrigation 108,000 acres not previously irrigated. In 1953, when supplies in the rivers were very low owing to drought, and crops in West Punjab were failing from lack of water, agriculture in East Punjab had one of its best years. While West Pakistan was facing a famine, the Governor of East Punjab, which before partition had been a deficit area in food, reported that "the food position is good," and gave figures of export of foodgrains.

When Pakistan brought the situation to the notice of the World Bank, President Black proposed that, in order to verify the data regarding the water supply, a commission be established consisting of an engineer from the World Bank, an engineer from India, and an engineer from Pakistan. Pakistan accepted; India refused. President Black proposed, as an alternative, that the World Bank designate engineers to work with Indian engineers in India, and Pakistan engineers in Pakistan, to the end that verified data might be available to both parties. Pakistan again accepted; India again refused. The

pattern of behavior exhibited by India in the Kashmir dispute was being repeated in the Canal Waters dispute. In consistence with that pattern, Nehru declared on February 20, 1953: "We have not deliberately deprived them [Pakistan] of canal water nor do we propose to do so."

It would take us too far beyond the scope of this book to give a history of the long drawn-out negotiations between the World Bank and the governments of India and Pakistan. A brief outline of the three main stages in the mediatory efforts of the World Bank will suffice.

The Indus Basin working party, consisting of engineers appointed by India and Pakistan and their advisers, worked with the Bank representative and its consultants for almost two years to prepare a comprehensive plan for the utilization of the waters of the Indus system. No common approach was found. India claimed all of the supplies of the Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi rivers, and some of the supplies of the Chenab, and wanted to use these supplies for extending irrigation to large areas outside the Indus Basin. These new areas could well be irrigated from the Jumna River, but that would not serve the Indian objective of depriving Pakistan of vital water supplies. Pakistan proposed the maintenance of existing uses and the sharing of the uncommitted surplus on an equitable basis. Subsequent discussions produced some concessions, but no agreement was reached.

On February 5, 1954, the World Bank put forward its own proposal for the consideration of the two parties. The Bank frankly recognized that "water supplies and storage potentialities are inadequate to the needs of the basin." The proposal noted that "although the Working Party are planning on the basis of the development of the Indus Basin as an economic unit, two sovereign states are involved [and when] two sovereign authorities are concerned, it is difficult to use resources to the greatest advantage." But the most serious difficulty of all, in the Bank's view, was the "basic divergence of concept" between India and Pakistan.

The Bank plan provided that:

The entire flow of the Western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) would be available for the exclusive use and benefit of Pakistan, and for development by Pakistan, except for the insignificant volume of Jhelum flow presently used in Kashmir. The entire flow of the Eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) would be available for the exclusive use and benefit of India and for development by India, except



that for a specified transitional period India would continue to supply from these rivers, in accordance with an agreed schedule, the historic withdrawals from these rivers in Pakistan.

The Bank plan allowed a

transition period [in which] to complete the link canals needed in Pakistan to make transfers for the purpose of replacing supplies from India [and stipulated that] India would bear the cost of such works to the extent of the benefits to be received by her therefrom.

The transition period was estimated to be about five years.

The Bank plan contemplated no storage dam, aside from the Bhakra Dam, which was already under construction in India to be used for Indian purposes only. It asserted that "even without further storage construction . . . Pakistan could supply her historic withdrawals and could bring most of the Sutlej Valley Canals up to allocation" from the flow supply of the western rivers.

The Bank plan was a complete departure from Lilienthal's proposal to develop the water resources of the Indus Basin as a single unit through the construction of storage dams and other facilities. It went in the opposite direction and proposed to divide the water resources of the Indus Basin into two on the basis of political boundaries; and it envisaged no cooperative development. The plan's justification, according to the World Bank, lay "in the fact that, after transfer works are completed, each country will be independent of the other in the operation of its supplies." It purported to avoid the complexities that would arise if the supplies from particular rivers were shared by the two countries.

India readily accepted the Bank plan, which conceded all that she had been asking for except the requirement that she should leave the flow of the Chenab undisturbed. According to the Bank plan, India was to bear part of the cost of link canals in Pakistan, but that was a small price to pay for precious water supplies. When an entire economy is dependent upon water, money can be no substitute for it.

The Bank plan confronted Pakistan with an intolerable situation. Vigorous representations were made to the Bank that the flow supply of the western rivers was totally inadequate to replace Pakistan's existing uses of the water from the eastern rivers. The construction of storage dams that would be necessary to make up for the shortage would be a costly and lengthy affair; and the Bank plan made no pro-

vision for them. Even with such a provision, Pakistan's limited storage capacity would be used merely to maintain her existing position and could not be utilized for the developing needs of her growing population. Like Alice in Wonderland, Pakistan would have to run as hard as she could in order to remain where she was.

An independent engineering appraisal of the Bank plan was undertaken for Pakistan by R. J. Tipton, a consulting engineer of Denver, Colorado. It revealed that the Bank proposal did not meet the standard of fairness required under international law, that it failed to apportion equitably the waters of the Indus system, and that it went contrary to the principle of using water resources in such a manner as to promote development most effectively. Tipton's studies disclosed that Pakistan would be very adversely affected by the Bank plan. Certain areas would be permanently deprived of water supplies; historic withdrawals would not be maintained; prepartition planned uses would be invaded; and Pakistan's future development potential would be seriously curtailed.

The next stage was reached when, after eighteen months of further studies by its own consultants, the Bank reached the conclusions contained in its aide memoire of May 21, 1956. The aide memoire conceded that "there would be consistent shortages in Rabi, occasionally beginning in late September or extending into early April . . . of a degree, duration and frequency which the Bank Group could not regard as 'tolerable.'" The Bank therefore felt "that an adjustment, in its Proposal of February 1954 [was] called for. This adjustment should, in the Bank's view, assure to Pakistan timely water sufficient to eliminate the shortage referred to."

The adjustment could take the form of continued deliveries of "timely" water from the eastern rivers, or construction of storage on the western rivers at India's cost. The Bank preferred the latter course, and suggested that for this purpose, the "flow of the Western rivers (Indus as well as Jhelum and Chenab) should be exploited to the maximum possible extent and that the minimum inroads should be made on Pakistan's limited storage capacity." In short, after nearly two years of argument and investigation, the Bank realized that the loss of water from the eastern rivers could not be made good by the flow supply of the western rivers. It is to the Bank's credit that it was prepared to rectify the mistaken assumption on which its origi-



nal plan was based, if not by deliveries of water from the eastern rivers, at any rate by construction of storage on the western rivers at India's cost.

The World Bank therefore recommended in its letter of July 30, 1956, that both governments should be willing to continue the construction work with the assistance of the Bank on the basis of the Bank proposal of February 5, 1954, and of its aide memoire of May 21, 1956. Both governments agreed.

It took another four years of hard negotiating to work out a concrete solution. The difficulties did not arise merely from differences in approach between India and Pakistan. There were big problems of finance. It had become apparent that the cost of the constructions required for a settlement on the lines of the World Bank proposal was far beyond the capacity of India and Pakistan. The final agreement was made possible by the steadfast perseverance and "economic diplomacy," to use his own phrase, of President Black of the World Bank, and through the friendly assistance of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and West Germany.

The Indus Waters Treaty was signed on September 19, 1960, in Karachi, by the representatives of India, Pakistan, and the World Bank. Simultaneously with the signing of the treaty, an international financial agreement was also executed by the representatives of the governments of Australia, Canada, West Germany, New Zealand, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the World Bank. This agreement created an Indus Basin development fund of almost 900 million dollars to finance the construction of irrigation and other works in Pakistan. The fund is made up of 640 million dollars to be provided by the participating governments, 174 million dollars payable by India under the Indus Waters Treaty and a loan of 80 million dollars by the World Bank to Pakistan. The program for construction work in Pakistan includes eight link canals nearly 400 miles long for transferring water from the western rivers to areas formerly irrigated by the eastern rivers; two storage dams, one on the Jhelum and the other on the Indus; power stations; 2,500 tubewells; and other works to integrate the whole river and canal system. The Indus settlement also envisages the construction of a storage dam on the Beas River in India which, together with the Bhakra Dam on the Sutlej and the Rajasthan canal, will irrigate large new areas in India.

The treaty provides for a transitional period of ten years, which may be extended by another three years, during which India will supply water to Pakistan from the eastern rivers. The treaty also provides, in case of need, for the services of a neutral expert to make a final decision on technical questions and for a court of arbitration to resort to under special circumstances.

Only time will show if the system of canals and reservoirs envisaged in the treaty will on completion fulfill its expectations. In the main, it is designed to maintain existing irrigation in Pakistan, but it also holds out hopes of development to meet the need for a higher standard of living by a growing population. There are those who seriously doubt its efficacy. They point out that dams on silt-laden rivers do not have a long life, and that the cost of maintaining the huge link canals and servicing the loans incurred by Pakistan will be beyond the productive capacity of the irrigation system. Far more serious concern is expressed over the hesitation to proceed with the storage dam on the Indus; without it all hopes of development would vanish and the liabilities would outweigh the advantages. It is too early yet to pass final judgment.



## CHAPTER 16

## Economic and Financial Problems of the New State

EVER SINCE the idea of Pakistan was put forward, doubts had continually been thrown on its economic and financial viability. Hostile Hindu propaganda had concentrated on the theme, so much so that even those friendly to the concept were affected. When the British journalist Beverley Nichols interviewed the Quaid-i-Azam in December, 1943, the first question he asked after hearing an exposition of the concept of Pakistan was about the economic aspect of Pakistan: "Are the Muslims likely to be richer or poorer under Pakistan?" The Quaid-i-Azam's reply was characteristic: "The Muslims are a tough people, lean and hardy. If Pakistan means that they will have to be a little tougher, they will not complain. But why should it mean that? What conceivable reason is there to suppose that the gift of national-ity is going to be an economic liability?"<sup>1</sup>

In September, 1945, Sir Homi Modi and Dr. John Matthai published their *Memorandum on the Economic and Financial Aspects of Pakistan*. It was a dispassionate study by two distinguished public men, one of them a prominent Parsi businessman and the other a leading economist who had been economic adviser to the Govern-

ment of India and was subsequently its Finance Minister. They summed up their views in two propositions:

1. Judged solely by the test of ability to maintain existing standards of living and to meet budgetary requirements on a pre-war basis but excluding provision for defence, separation would appear to be workable on economic grounds.
2. If, however, provision is to be made for future economic development on a scale sufficient to raise the general standard of living to a reasonable level and for measures of defence which may be considered adequate under modern conditions, any scheme of political separation which may be contemplated should, as a necessary prerequisite, provide for means of effective and continuous cooperation between the separate States in matters affecting the safety of the country and its economic stability and development. If such cooperation did not exist, the position of both Pakistan and Hindustan might be seriously jeopardized.

Cooperation would have been to the advantage of both Dominions, but Congress hostility to Pakistan destroyed the basis for it. The Punjab massacres and the disputes over cash balances, defense stores, Kashmir, canal waters, and other questions arose from an aggressive spirit that would have liked to strangle Pakistan at its very birth. The Indian leaders were partly impelled by a blind rage that saw in the establishment of Pakistan the temporary defeat of their ambition to rule over the whole of the subcontinent. But in the main they reckoned that, since Pakistan was not economically viable while India was, they could, without serious injury to themselves, hasten Pakistan's collapse by an antagonistic policy.

The Union of India is not only five times bigger than Pakistan in area and population; it is a single geographical bloc separating the two parts of Pakistan. It is richly endowed with natural resources, particularly coal and iron, and has a strong industrial base. The British had administered the entire subcontinent as a single economic unit. Free trade within the whole area, a single tariff, a unified system of currency and credit, and a network of railways and telegraphs had helped to integrate the economy. But no regard had been paid by the British to the balanced development of various regions. In fact, the concept of planned development was foreign to British rule, concerned as it was primarily with defense and the maintenance of law and order. Its major achievement in the economic field was the development of the great ports of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras and the lines of communications radiating from there to the remotest parts of



the country; and even this owed more to strategic necessity than to planned economic welfare.

These major ports and the industrial centers that grew up near them or in other places were all located in the Indian Union. There was very little industry in the areas that were to become Pakistan. The agricultural products of these areas were transported to industrial centers in India to be used in manufacture or to be exported. The commercial houses and banks that controlled the integrated economy of the subcontinent had their headquarters in those centers. The trade and industry of the subcontinent was in Hindu or British hands. The entrepreneurs and investors, the industrial managers and the technicians were mostly Hindu. The Congress leaders, in the pride of superior strength, felt under no obligation to extend cooperation to Pakistan. On the contrary, they thought that by applying pressures and exploiting the structural weakness of Pakistan they would succeed in undermining its economy. Sardar Patel's view that the Indian Union "will be so powerful that the remaining portions will eventually come in" <sup>2</sup> was shared by almost all Hindu leaders.

Pakistan is unique in being composed of two equally important parts separated by a thousand miles of foreign territory. The population figures, according to the 1961 census, are 51 million for East Pakistan and 43 million for West Pakistan, making a total of 94 million. The population, which has been growing at an annual rate of over 2 percent was about 74 million at the time of independence. East Pakistan comprises an area of 55,000 square miles and West Pakistan has an area of 310,000 square miles. Thus East Pakistan, though its area is one sixth that of West Pakistan, has a population somewhat in excess of West Pakistan. The physical characteristics of the two regions are very different.

East Pakistan has a subtropical climate with an average rainfall of 88 inches a year. The land is mostly flat—in fact, a delta in the process of formation. The great river systems of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra, which flow into the Bay of Bengal, enrich the soil each year by spreading over it millions of tons of silt. There are thousands of streams that serve as channels of communication. Periodically, however, cyclones, torrential rains, and abnormal floods bring devastation to large areas. The fertile soil and the hot humid climate produce luxuriant vegetation. Rice and jute are the main crops. Tea is grown in the hilly areas to the north and east. Tropical fruits such as

bananas, pineapples, and coconuts abound. East Pakistan is one of the most densely populated areas of the world. The average density of population is 922 persons per square mile; in some parts it rises to 1,500 per square mile.

West Pakistan lies north of the tropics. The rainfall averages 12 inches a year and hot summers are followed by severe winters. Large parts of the region are desert or barren hills incapable of supporting a large population. The average density of population is 138 persons per square mile. Agriculture depends for the most part upon artificial irrigation. The high mountains in the north give rise to a number of rivers that flow down to the Arabian Sea. In areas irrigated by canals from these rivers, there is a prosperous agriculture, but the area under cultivation could be doubled if water were available. The ravages of salinity and waterlogging reduce the area under cultivation by 75,000 acres every year and decrease the fertility of large tracts of land. Wheat and cotton are the main crops. Sugar cane, rice, maize, and tobacco are also grown. There are plenty of orange and mango orchards.

East Pakistan was dealt a staggering blow at the time of partition when Calcutta became part of India. Over 90 percent of the industrial units in undivided Bengal were located in Calcutta or nearby, in West Bengal. East Pakistan had only 5 percent of the total number of industrial workers of undivided Bengal at the time of partition. Industries, banks, insurance companies, commercial houses, import and export firms, communication centers, power stations, and educational institutions were all located in Calcutta, which had been the capital of undivided Bengal and its main port.

Undivided India had a virtual monopoly of raw jute in the world. The area which became East Pakistan produced nearly 75 percent of this golden fiber and all of its best varieties. But there was not a single jute mill in East Pakistan, and only a few modern baling presses. Almost all the jute produced in East Pakistan was sent to Calcutta, to be manufactured into hessian and other jute products in the numerous jute mills there, or to be baled and shipped for export. Jute is the most important cash crop of East Pakistan, and the prosperity of the farmers depends upon the price realized for it. But they were, to a large extent, at the mercy of conditions in the Calcutta market, where speculators and shippers made large fortunes at the expense of primary producers.



At partition, East Pakistan had only one port in Chittagong. It was a minor port with a capacity of half a million tons. It would take years before its capacity could be expanded and the lines of traffic oriented toward it. In the meantime there was no outlet for jute and other products from East Pakistan except Calcutta. There was an export duty on jute from which the Government of India and the provincial government of Bengal derived considerable revenue. As related earlier, in Chapter 9, the representatives of Pakistan suggested at the time of partition that, at least as an interim measure, the proceeds of customs and central excise duties should be pooled and distributed between the two Dominions on an equitable basis. The Indian representatives refused to agree and insisted that each Dominion should keep the revenue collected within its territory. Nor would they accept a special agreement for jute. The Pakistan government was therefore forced to levy an export duty on jute crossing the land frontier from East to West Bengal, and to face the difficulties that arise from maintaining a customs barrier along a long frontier. The difficulties were particularly great, since hundreds of waterways crossing the frontier provided many opportunities for smuggling.

In West Pakistan, the most important cash crop is cotton; it occupies a position similar to that of jute in East Pakistan. The area that became West Pakistan produced 40 percent of the raw cotton crop of undivided India including some of the best medium staple cotton of the American type. The cotton textile industry was by far the biggest industry in undivided India, but at partition 380 of its 394 cotton mills were located in the Indian Union and only 14 in Pakistan. The raw cotton produced in West Pakistan was moved, mostly by rail, to the centers of the textile industry in Ahmedabad and Bombay, which in return supplied cloth to Pakistan.

Thus, by and large, the relationship between Pakistan and India at the time of partition was that between a supplier of raw materials and an industrial producer. The pattern of trade between India and the two parts of Pakistan would inevitably have undergone a change in the course of time. But the Punjab disturbances and the wholesale exchange of population that took place between West Pakistan and northern India disrupted the normal channels of trade and traffic and violently forced them to flow in other directions. Cotton and other commodities that had moved by rail to industrial centers in India had to find an outlet to the outside world through Karachi. All exports

and imports for West Pakistan moved through Karachi, which rapidly grew in importance. The growth of trade between East and West Pakistan enhanced the importance of Karachi at one end and of Chittagong at the other.

Both India and Pakistan were underdeveloped, but of the two, Pakistan was more underdeveloped and poorer. A primitive agriculture provided employment for the bulk of the population. Over 60 percent of the total national income of 18.6 billion rupees in 1949-50 was derived from agriculture. The per capita income stood at 237 rupees, slightly less than 50 dollars. Most people had barely enough on which to subsist. In years of drought or flood, famine threatened the land. Education and health services were inadequate. Most of the population—87 percent—lived in villages. Hardly 16 percent were literate.

The most pressing tasks confronting the country after independence were the establishment of an administration and the rehabilitation of refugees. How these problems were tackled has been described. But there were other urgent problems that also had to be solved.

At the time of partition, West Pakistan had a surplus of foodgrains. The colony areas of the Punjab exported wheat to deficit areas in India as far down as Madras. East Pakistan, however, had a deficit in rice, its staple food crop. In the summer of 1947 there were severe floods in the Chittagong and Noakhali districts of East Pakistan that damaged about 500 square miles. The *aus* crop of rice as well as the *aman* seedlings in the flood-affected area were destroyed. By the end of the year, 100,000 tons of foodgrains would be required; of that, 4,000 tons were needed immediately. Memories of the 1943 Bengal famine were still fresh in people's minds. The situation was so serious that the East Bengal Chief Minister, Khwaja Nazimuddin, came to Karachi on August 25, 1947, to ensure supplies. Fortunately West Pakistan had a surplus of rice, but there were difficulties of procurement and transport. On some branches of the railway system in West Pakistan, services had to be suspended because of the shortage of coal. Shipping was scarce. However, food shipments from West Pakistan were arranged in time. After January, 1948, there was a wheat shortage in West Pakistan caused by the vast upheaval of the refugee movement. In some districts scarcity conditions prevailed. No surpluses were available from the outside world. (Indeed, the Director



General of FAO had warned delegates in Geneva in August, 1947, that millions in Europe would be worse fed in the following winter and spring than during the war.) The year 1948 continued to be one of anxiety on the food front. In West Pakistan an area of 3.5 million acres was affected by floods and 600,000 tons of the Kharif, or autumn crop, were destroyed. The normal surplus of 400,000 tons was converted into a deficit. Even so, it was essential to send supplies of foodgrains to East Pakistan, where also considerable damage had been done by floods. Appeals were made to economize food consumption and legislation was introduced to check hoarding and dealings in the black market. There was a growing awareness of the precarious food position, of the need for increasing the output of foodgrains and taking protective measures against floods, as also of the pressure of a fast rising population. The change in the composition of population also had its effect on the food problem. The replacement of the vegetarian Hindus by Muslims greatly increased the consumption of meat. There was serious danger of the depletion of the cattle population on which agricultural operations and the supply of milk and milk products depended. Two days in the week were declared meatless.

The problem of communication was outstandingly important. East and West Pakistan are separated by 1,200 miles by air and 3,000 miles by sea. Telecommunication between East and West Pakistan was an urgent necessity. Work on the establishment of Radio Pakistan and the acquisition of a transmitter of sufficient power had started during the days of partition. Of no less importance was communication by air and sea. Karachi had an international airport that connected Pakistan with the outside world, but Dacca was not on the route of international airlines. It was essential to establish a domestic air service between East and West Pakistan. This need was met by a small company, Orient Airways; it shifted its headquarters from Calcutta to Karachi and improvised repair facilities. In 1948, another private company, Pak Air, was formed. The company owed its existence to the initiative of Ghulam Muhammad, the Finance Minister. Ghulam Muhammad, who had been Finance Minister of Hyderabad some years earlier, was very keen to have the Nizam transfer part, if not the whole, of his vast treasure of gold, precious stones, and cash by air to Karachi for safe custody. He paid a visit to Hyderabad but failed to persuade the Nizam, whose love of money was too great to

let him send it out of his sight. Later, the Nizam lost all of it to the Indian government. Nevertheless, Ghulam Muhammad succeeded in getting a substantial contribution from Hyderabad to finance Pak Air. However, the company was ill-managed and went into liquidation after some serious crashes in which many valuable lives were lost, including two of the ablest officers of the Pakistan army, Major General Muhammad Iftikhar Khan and Brigadier Sher Khan.

Trade between East and West Pakistan was bound to grow but certain requirements, such as the shipment of food and salt from West to East Pakistan, were needed immediately. There was no mercantile fleet to speak of and even second-hand vessels were not easy to acquire. In the immediate postwar period, capital goods of all kinds were scarce. The reconstruction of the war-torn economies of the United Kingdom, Western Europe, Russia, and Japan took priority over all other demands. New and developing countries faced difficulties and delays in having their orders accepted and delivery dates were unduly long. It was against this background that Pakistan had to get its economy going.

With the loss of Calcutta and its facilities, the most important problem in East Pakistan was the creation of the basic framework of communications and power within which the economy could develop. This was in the nature of things and even more so in the conditions then prevailing in the world a slow and lengthy process. The foremost task was the modernization and expansion of the port of Chittagong. It was the first major project sanctioned by the central government, but, unfortunately, there is an inevitable interval between approval and execution. The appointment of competent consultants, the completion of surveys, the preparation of designs and estimates all take time. Railway tracks and rolling stock in East Pakistan had been worn out by the heavy movement of military supplies and personnel for the Burma front during the Second World War. Extensive replacements were needed. There were serious shortages of coal. Inland water transport, which plays a large part in the economy of East Pakistan, was disorganized. The headquarters of the Joint Steamship Company, which was by far the largest operator, were in Calcutta, and this produced a crop of difficulties.

In West Pakistan the position was better. Despite the disorganization caused by the vast disturbances in the Punjab and neighboring areas, the North Western Railway was able to cope with the mass



movement of refugees. Karachi port, although needing repairs and expansion, was big enough for immediate needs.

In the matter of roads West Pakistan was also better off than East Pakistan. The network of roads in West Pakistan was one of the most developed in the subcontinent, partly for strategic reasons. In East Pakistan, on the other hand, the scarcity of stone and the character of the terrain, which has innumerable streams meandering through a flat plain, make the construction of roads a difficult and expensive business. Inland water traffic with its thousands of boats carries the main burden of transport.

Both in East and West Pakistan there was a shortage of electrical power. A large area in West Punjab was supplied by electricity from the Mandi Hydroelectric Works in East Punjab. With partition this became an undependable source. The total installed capacity in the country at the time of partition was 75,028 kw., but lack of repairs and of competent staff had greatly reduced effective capacity. In East Pakistan the capacity was only 15,600 kw. The Karnaphuli Hydroelectric Project held out prospects for the future, but it would take many years to translate the idea into reality. In West Pakistan also surveys were carried out for hydroelectric projects, and some years later Warsak Project in the North-West Frontier Province was taken in hand. Present needs could only be met by thermal stations, but the demands of postwar reconstruction in Europe were so great that orders for any kind of machinery took long to be fulfilled. West Pakistan produced some inferior coal and a small quantity of oil. East Pakistan, which had drawn its supplies of fuel from India in the past, faced continual difficulty in getting coal and oil. An industrial civilization rests upon a mineral base. Very little exploration of oil and mineral resources in Pakistan had been carried out before independence. The Geological Survey of India had barely scratched the surface.

Amidst these and numerous other difficulties and shortages, the work of development was taken in hand. The movement for Pakistan was inspired by the urge to develop the human and material resources of Muslim homelands so as to promote the moral and material welfare of the people, provide adequate living standards and social services, secure equality of opportunity, and achieve the widest and most equitable distribution of income and property. These social and economic objectives had their roots in the Islamic principles of social

justice and the brotherhood of man. In furthering them, the government would be fulfilling the deepest aspirations of the people. And the work had to be done and brought to fruition as rapidly as possible. The neglect of centuries had to be made good in decades, if not in years. The financial and economic resources available were inadequate for the magnitude of the task. The country could not afford the waste of haphazard action. While the energies of the people had to be aroused and used to the maximum extent, the government itself had to play a positive and constructive role in the shaping of policy and the coordination of public and private enterprise. The railways, telegraphs and telephones, ports, defense installations, irrigation headworks, canals, and forests were owned by the government. There were also other fields of endeavor that private enterprise might feel shy to enter for want of capital or fear of loss. In Dacca, to give one example, even a hotel had to be built by the provincial government with a loan from the central government. The economy of Pakistan would inevitably be mixed and planned. But the deliberate policy of the government was strongly biased in favor of free enterprise.

Early in 1948, a development board was formed to coordinate plans, recommend priorities, and make periodic reports to the government on the progress of development projects. The Chairman of the Board was the Minister of Economic Affairs; I, the Secretary-General, was the Vice-Chairman; and the secretaries of the ministries concerned with development were its members. At the same time a planning advisory board, comprising officials of the central, provincial, and state governments and representatives of the private sector, was also set up to advise the government on planning, and to promote public cooperation with the development effort. The planning advisory board was assisted by a number of committees established by the central and provincial governments. In 1950, when a Six Year Development Program for Pakistan was formulated under the Colombo Plan, an economic council under the presidentship of the Prime Minister was set up. These early exercises in planned development were of considerable help at the time, but a properly integrated plan could only be prepared when a separate planning organization was set up in 1953.

Under the adapted Government of India Act, 1935, which formed the interim constitution, industry was a provincial subject, but rapid and planned development of the country demanded that key indus-



tries should be subject to the control of the central government. An industries conference, which was held by the central government in December, 1947, recommended the setting up of certain basic industries and laid down targets for them. In April, 1948, a statement of industrial policy was issued by the Pakistan government. The policy was kept under review and revised as occasion demanded. It laid down that Pakistan would seek, in the first place, to manufacture those goods made of its own raw materials for which there was an assured market at home or abroad. Of these jute and cotton were the most important and received the earliest attention. The jute industry would increase the country's earnings of foreign exchange; and the production of cotton textiles would meet an essential need of the people and save foreign exchange. At the same time the government would "develop any heavy industry . . . considered essential for the speedy achievement of a strong and balanced economy." Three groups of industries were reserved for public ownership: arms and munitions; generation of hydroelectric power; and the manufacture and operation of railway, telephone, telegraph, and wireless equipment. The rest of the field was open to private enterprise. It would, however, be the responsibility of the government to ensure that "employers of labour maintain fair labour standards especially in matters of hours of work, wages, conditions of work and employment."

Twenty-seven industries were to be subject to planning by the central government. These included iron and steel, heavy engineering, machine tools, heavy chemicals, cement, minerals and mineral oils, sugar, textiles, and tobacco. The government also reserved the right to take over or participate in any industry vital to the security or well-being of the state; and to set up a limited number of standard units if private capital was not forthcoming in adequate measure for the development of any particular industry of national importance.

The policy statement announced that "Pakistan would welcome foreign capital seeking investment from a purely industrial and economic objective and not claiming any special privileges." An assurance was given for the remittance of profits and for the repatriation of capital invested, including profits ploughed back. If any undertaking was nationalized, just and equitable compensation would be paid and allowed to be remitted. There was provision for participation of indigenous capital to the extent of 51 percent in thirteen specified industries and 30 percent in the rest, but if the requisite amount of

indigenous capital was not forthcoming, the balance might, with government approval, be subscribed by foreign investors. Later, the requirement for local participation was reduced to 40 percent. In particular, foreign companies were encouraged to explore for oil and gas.

To stimulate industrial growth, the government gave every possible assistance through the provision of basic facilities, tariff protection, and fiscal incentives. The facilities included the survey of mineral resources, the development of electrical power, the improvement of communications, assistance in the procurement of machinery and essential raw materials as well as in the acquisition of land for industrial use, the promotion of technical education, scientific and industrial research, and the construction of industrial trading estates. The very first budget announced important tax concessions. For the first five years, profits up to 5 percent of the capital employed by new industrial undertakings were exempted from income tax as well as super tax and business profits tax. An initial depreciation allowance of 20 percent on new machinery and plant, and 15 percent on new buildings for industrial purposes, was granted. These depreciation allowances were like interest-free loans given to industrial enterprises by the government. The Industrial Finance Corporation was formed by the government in 1949 to give loans to industrial projects on a medium and long term basis. Fifty-one percent of its capital of Rs. 20 million was subscribed by the Pakistan government and the rest was offered to the public.

The response from entrepreneurs and the investing public was, however, disappointing. The reason for this was to be found partly in the lack of managerial ability and technical skill—a common failing in underdeveloped countries. But a more important cause was the lure of big and quick profits to be made in trade. The dislocation in business activity brought about by the departure of Hindu traders was being rapidly repaired. There was a good market for Pakistan's goods abroad. The severe controls on imports, which had been imposed during the Second World War, had built up a back-log of demand for consumer goods. When, in August, 1948, import policy was liberalized, imports jumped up from Rs. 115 million in the first half of the year to Rs. 310 million in the second half. Cotton textiles and yarn constituted over one third of the imports. Under these conditions, it is not surprising that the available capital flowed into trade rather than industry. The government appointed an investment en-



quiry committee to examine the causes and to suggest remedies. Frequent appeals to the patriotism of would-be industrialists were made. They had little effect until economic conditions were created that made industry as profitable as trade. As a result of the precipitous fall in commodity prices after the end of the Korean War, Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings were greatly reduced. Consequently, the unduly liberal import policy of earlier years, which had brought in far more consumer goods than capital goods, was drastically revised in 1952 and reoriented in favor of plant and machinery for new industries. The restrictions on the import of foreign cloth and other consumer goods stimulated and protected domestic industrial production. The result was a remarkable shift of capital and enterprise from trade to industry. At the same time, the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation was established (January, 1952) to set up industries of national importance for which private capital was not forthcoming. The Corporation was wholly financed by the central government. Under the vigorous chairmanship of G. Faruque and with the help of the liberal resources placed at its disposal by the Pakistan government during a period of serious financial stringency, the Corporation made an outstanding contribution to the industrialization of the country. It promoted the jute industry on its own initiative and in collaboration with private enterprise. It set up the Karnaphuli Paper Mill and a number of sugar, cement, and chemical plants and also shipyards. The result of the combined efforts of private and public enterprise was that during the four years from 1952 to 1955 industrial production went up by over 100 percent—a remarkable rate of economic growth for any country at any time.

Agriculture, which provided raw materials for industry and food for the people, and which earned almost all the foreign exchange of the country and employed the great majority of workers, was a provincial subject. The central government helped by giving loans and grants for development projects. Irrigation projects, such as the Thal Project in West Pakistan and the Ganges Kabodak Project in East Pakistan were of great importance for the development of agriculture. To coordinate the work and provide technical assistance, the Pakistan government set up the Central Engineering Authority. An agricultural enquiry committee under Lord Boyd Orr was appointed by the Pakistan government. The central government also established the Agricultural Development Finance Corporation. But the primary re-

sponsibility for agriculture remained with the provincial governments, which unfortunately did not pay adequate attention to it.

Basically, the problem is how to transform existing methods of cultivation into those of scientific agriculture and thus increase productivity per acre and per man-hour. This requires a change in the social and economic conditions of rural life, reform in the system of land tenure, extension of cooperation into new fields, large investments in land improvement, provision of adequate credit facilities, opening up of communications, improved seeds, the use of scientific farming techniques, and the establishment of industries to produce fertilizers, pesticides, tractors, and other farming equipment. It also requires a reorientation of the attitude of farmers, so that they advance from a static economy, where they produce merely enough for themselves, to a more dynamic one, with emphasis on production for the market.

Small uneconomic holdings, which are becoming still smaller and more fragmented with the growth of populations, are the norm in East Pakistan and in most parts of West Pakistan. To consolidate holdings is an urgent need. In East Pakistan, where the population density is one of the highest in the world, the pressure on the land is particularly great. A fuller use of the land, for example, by raising an additional winter crop by artificial irrigation, is needed. In West Pakistan, water is the major problem and the use of land is limited by the amount of water available. A large and growing population can subsist upon limited land resources only by developing a highly intensive and scientific agriculture. This must be integrated with small and medium industries; for these the provision of electricity all over the countryside is essential. Uneconomic holdings and the low staying power and poor creditworthiness of individual peasants point the way towards cooperative action and collective endeavor.

In the first few years after independence, the magnitude and complexity of the problems involved in developing agriculture were not fully realized. The rainfall was normal. The country was self-sufficient in food—by how narrow a margin few cared to ponder. The prices of the main cash crops, jute and cotton, were reasonable with a tendency to rise. The much-feared depression after the end of the Second World War had not occurred. The departure of Hindu moneylenders from West Pakistan had almost wiped off the debt burden and given immediate relief to the cultivators, and the shortage of rural credit was not to make itself felt until later. Indian action in stopping



canal supplies had given a jolt to West Punjab, but this was an external threat of a rather different kind from the challenge of internal problems, such as those of land tenure or floods and waterlogging.

In East Pakistan, the Permanent Settlement of Bengal by Lord Cornwallis in 1793 had created a class of *zamindars*, or landlords, mostly Hindus, who paid a fixed sum of land revenue to the government, but were free to extort what they could from the cultivator. The landlord rented out his interest to a subordinate tenure-holder who employed still another rent-receiver, and thus the cultivator supported by his toil a number of idle intermediaries. The cry for land reform had often been raised, but the political influence of the powerful landlord class made it ineffective. Despite the recommendations of the Land Revenue Commission of Bengal in 1940 to abolish the Permanent Settlement, the system remained unchanged until the end of the British rule. With the establishment of Pakistan, it became possible to carry out long needed reforms. The East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act of 1950 abolished the Permanent Settlement and established direct relations between the cultivator and the government. But other problems arose, such as the maintenance of embankments to secure protection from tidal waves and river erosion. With the abolition of zamindari these fell into disrepair, and the cultivators lacked the financial resources and power of organization to maintain them. Gradually, with government assistance and cooperative action, these problems are being overcome. But there remain still bigger problems relating to the control of abnormal floods and other natural calamities that periodically inflict severe damage on the economy. Huge works in cooperation with India are needed in order to train and contain the mighty rivers, Brahmaputra and Ganges, which flow from India into the flat delta areas of East Pakistan. Whether such cooperation will be forthcoming is open to question in view of the disregard shown by India to East Pakistan's interests in the construction of the Farakka barrage on the Ganges.

In West Pakistan, there was a large class of peasant proprietors who owned the land they tilled, but there were also big landlords, particularly in Sind and in some areas of the Punjab and North-West Frontier Province. The need for reforms was felt. In the Punjab, the Protection and Restoration of Tenancy Rights Act was passed in 1950, but it did not produce the desired results. The Tenancy Act of 1950 passed in the North-West Frontier Province worked somewhat

better. Sind was the stronghold of big zamindars who owned 87 per cent of the cultivated area. The Sind Tenancy Act of 1950 granted some meager rights to the *haris*, or cultivators. The states in West Pakistan had a feudal structure except where, as in the colony areas of Bahawalpur, newly irrigated lands had been developed by peasant proprietors.

Another big problem for West Pakistan is waterlogging and salinity, which has been spreading over the countryside like a cancerous growth. To reclaim the vast areas affected by this disease and to prevent its further ravages, an extensive system of pumping and drainage is needed, together with large volumes of fresh water with which to wash down the salts in the soil.

Education was also a provincial subject. One of the effects of independence was to stimulate the demand for education, but the provincial governments were not able to cope with it adequately. The departure of Hindu teachers had thinned the teaching cadres and temporarily set back education. The central government gave guidance and grants for universities and technical education. Karachi was a federal area, and the responsibility of education fell on the Pakistan government, which established the Karachi University. A council of scientific and industrial research was set up with a central laboratory in Karachi and regional laboratories in East and West Pakistan.

Similarly, health services were the responsibility of the provinces and the role of the central government was limited to advice, coordination, and assistance in such projects as malaria eradication. To relieve the housing shortage in the cities which were getting overcrowded, the Pakistan government set up the House Building Finance Corporation.

In addition to these problems of social and economic development, Pakistan also faced a heavy burden of defense. By its very structure, Pakistan is the guardian of the frontiers of the subcontinent in the northwest and the northeast. Until a few years ago, the high wall of the Himalayas to the north presented an impenetrable barrier. The great invasions, whether prehistoric as those by the Aryans, or historic as those by Alexander and others, had been from the northwest. The Japanese threat to the subcontinent during the Second World War had arisen in the northeast. But, in the immediate present, by far the biggest threat to the security of Pakistan was from the Indian Union. Indian aggression in Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Kashmir was



a constant reminder of how precarious was peace in the subcontinent.

It is against this background that the Pakistan Finance Minister presented his first budget in March, 1948, for the financial year 1948-49. To the surprise of every one, friend and foe, it was a balanced budget. Following British practice, the budget in India and Pakistan was divided into a revenue budget and a capital budget.

For the seven and a half months, from August 15, 1947, to March 31, 1948, there had been a deficit; but the circumstances of that period were altogether exceptional. The establishment of a new administration and the vast influx of refugees had thrown a heavy financial burden on the government. The disruption of communications and trade had brought business activity and revenue receipts to a low level. Arrears of tax left behind by evacuees could not be recovered. The standstill arrangement with India under which each Dominion received only the revenue collected in its own territory operated unfavorably for Pakistan. Taxes were collected at the head offices of firms, most of which were located in India. Central excise duties were levied at points of manufacture, and India refused to give rebates of duty on excisable commodities exported to Pakistan.

The first budget presented for a full year was that for 1948-49; and it was balanced. In order to achieve this result, certain adjustments had to be made in the scheme of federal finance inherited from undivided India. The railway budget was included in the central budget. The North Western Railway, even after allowing for the loss from strategic lines in the North-West Frontier Province, was running at a substantial surplus while the East Bengal Railway showed a loss. The combined result, after making provision for depreciation, was a net surplus which was used in support of general revenues. After consultation with the provinces, sales tax, which was a provincial source of revenue under the Government of India Act, 1935, was temporarily taken over by the central government on the understanding that the provinces would be paid from the proceeds what they would have otherwise collected. The rest of the prepartition scheme of federal finance remained in force. Under the Niemeyer award of 1936, jute-growing provinces were entitled to 62.5 percent of the export duty on jute, and the central government had given an annual subvention of Rs. 10 million to the North-West Frontier Province. These payments continued to be made.

On the side of expenditure, there was a provision of Rs. 371 mil-

lion for defense services and Rs. 83 million on defense capital outlay. Economic development was not neglected. Apart from a capital outlay of Rs. 100 million on railways, posts and telegraphs, and other projects of the central government, provision was made for grants of Rs. 15 million to provincial governments for development in addition to loans of Rs. 120 million. This was not much, but a beginning had been made. In subsequent years, as the revenue position improved, far bigger amounts were allocated for development.

The provincial governments also managed to live within their means, but not without serious difficulty. East Bengal had to establish a new administration and a new capital in Dacca, and had thus to incur extraordinary expenditures. Although East Bengal had double the population of West Bengal, its revenue was only half that of West Bengal at the time of partition. This was an inevitable consequence of the loss of Calcutta and other industrially developed areas. To make matters worse, East Bengal's share in the joint assets was not received from West Bengal. The Government of India also refused to pay, on one pretext or another, the large sum of Rs. 120 million, due for lands and buildings requisitioned during the Second World War. All in all, East Pakistan faced very considerable financial difficulties. The economy of West Punjab was shattered by the vast scale of the disturbances and the mass exchange of population. Agriculture, trade, industry, communications, in short every aspect of economic life had suffered and had to be revived. Millions of refugees had to be rehabilitated. Nevertheless, the recovery was remarkably rapid. Of all the provinces, the position of Sind was the most comfortable. It had ample resources in land and water in relation to its population. Large areas had been brought under irrigation by the Sukkur barrage. Another barrage at Kotri on the lower Indus was nearing completion.

The overall position was that the provinces could maintain the existing administration, but they had insufficient means for nation-building activities and felt that the revenue distribution between the central government and the provincial governments needed to be reappraised and revised. Such an appraisal was carried out in the winter of 1951-52 by Sir Jeremy Raisman, former Finance Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council in undivided India, and his recommendations were accepted.

The first budget of Pakistan had a significance far greater than its merely financial aspect. It showed that the Pakistan government had



sufficient resources to provide not only for the civil administration but also for defense and development. The dismal prophecies of its opponents were proved wrong. Pakistan was viable. The faith of the people in the economic stability of Pakistan was strengthened. In a speech on April 1, 1948, the Quaid-i-Azam said:

When we first raised our demand for a sovereign and independent State of Pakistan there were not a few false prophets who tried to deflect us from our set purpose by saying that Pakistan was not economically feasible. . . . The very first budget must have caused a shock to those false prophets. It has already demonstrated the soundness of Pakistan's finances and the determination of its Government to make them more and more sound and strong.<sup>3</sup>

There was still another step which gave satisfaction and confidence to the nation. This was the opening of the State Bank of Pakistan on July 1, 1948. During the days of partition, I had pressed for the establishment of our own Central Bank and Monetary Authority at the earliest possible date, for, without it, we would be hampered in pursuing an independent policy. Ghulam Muhammad, the Finance Minister-designate, however, thought it more prudent to let the Reserve Bank of India manage our monetary affairs for about a year. Zahid Husain, a financial expert of great experience, was the obvious choice for Governor of the State Bank, but, in view of the decision to entrust the Reserve Bank of India with operations in Pakistan till October 1, 1948, he was temporarily appointed High Commissioner for Pakistan in India. When in December, 1947, under instructions from the Government of India, the Reserve Bank of India withheld Pakistan's agreed share of cash balances, the need for an early take-over became obvious, and the date was advanced by three months.

The State Bank of Pakistan was established on July 1, 1948, with a capital of Rs. 30 million, of which 51 percent was subscribed by the central government and the rest by the public. A Central Board of Directors, partly nominated by the government and partly elected by private shareholders is responsible for general direction and supervision. There are local boards at each of the three centers, in Karachi, Dacca, and Lahore.

In undivided India, banking had been a closed field reserved for non-Muslims, and only a few Muslims were trained in this profession. The difficulties which every department and institution in Pakistan faced from shortage of experienced personnel, confronted the State

Bank in an even greater measure. There was very little time for completing all the preliminaries. But under the able leadership of Zahid Husain, the Bank started functioning on the due date.

The opening ceremony on July 1, 1948, was performed by the Quaid-i-Azam, who defied ill-health to come down from Quetta to the heat of Karachi specially for this function. The occasion was made still more memorable by the fact that it was the last public appearance of the Quaid-i-Azam. "The opening of the State Bank of Pakistan," he said, "symbolizes the sovereignty of our State in the financial sphere." And he concluded his speech with some observations which show the deep concern he felt over the social and economic ills from which the world was suffering, and the direction in which a remedy was to be sought:

The economic system of the West has created almost insoluble problems for humanity and to many of us it appears that only a miracle can save it from the disaster that is now facing the world.

. . . The adoption of Western economic theory and practice will not help us in achieving our goal of creating a happy and contented people. We must work our destiny in our own way and present to the world an economic system based on true Islamic concepts of equality of manhood and social justice.<sup>4</sup>

Among the first tasks of the State Bank was the replacement of prepartition currency. From April 1, 1948, Indian notes superscribed with the words "Government of Pakistan" had been in circulation. These were gradually replaced by Pakistan notes. The Security Printing Corporation was set up in Karachi, by agreement with the British firm of Thomas De La Rue, for the production of currency notes and other security documents.

The main function of the State Bank was to ensure monetary stability and to promote the growth of the monetary and credit systems in the best national interest. In undivided India, banking had been a virtual monopoly of Hindus. During the partition days (from June 3 to August 15, 1947) most Hindu-managed banks transferred their headquarters and funds from Pakistan to India. The Punjab disturbances completed the process. Of 487 offices of scheduled banks in West Pakistan, only 69 were left after partition.<sup>5</sup> Only one bank—the Muslim-owned Habib Bank—moved its headquarters from India to Pakistan. Credit facilities were thus greatly curtailed and a special effort was needed in this field.

The State Bank was also entrusted with the control of foreign ex-



change and the management of the public debt. In view of the rudimentary state of the money market, it was decided to canalize all government borrowing through the central government, including loans to the provincial governments for their development projects. A series of loans were floated in 1948 and met with an enthusiastic response from the public. The total subscriptions during the year amounted to Rs. 705 million, which, considering the economic conditions in the country at that time, was a very remarkable result. It was another manifestation of the determination of all classes of people to build Pakistan into a strong modern state.

The foreign exchange position was comfortable. There was a good market for the commodities produced by Pakistan. In addition to current earnings, there was Pakistan's share of sterling balances accumulated during the Second World War, which amounted to £147 million. Releases from this blocked account for current spending were negotiated from time to time. The major exports were, on the average, 6 million bales of raw jute and 1.6 million bales of cotton per year. Jute contributed approximately half of the total export earnings and cotton about a third. The contribution of cotton rose to 47 percent during boom resulting from the Korean war, but declined substantially after the development of the domestic textile industry. Next in importance was the group of minor exports, tea, raw wool, and hides and skins. The principal imports were cotton cloth and yarn, machinery, vehicles, metals, oil, chemicals, and medicines.

The pattern of trade was that inherited from preindependence times. India was the chief purchaser of raw jute. On the import side, purchases from the United Kingdom led the rest. This was partly the result of Imperial preferences, under which British manufactured goods, including textiles and steel, were admitted at preferred rates of duty, and partly the effect of the long British connection with the subcontinent. There was a persistent trade deficit with the United Kingdom, which sold more to Pakistan than it purchased.

It was necessary to change this lopsided pattern in favor of a more balanced and diversified one, so that the economic fortunes of Pakistan were not tied to those of one or two countries. In pursuance of this policy, trade agreements were negotiated with a number of countries. These agreements laid down targets for mutual purchases which, although they were not invariably lived up to, served a useful

purpose in opening up new avenues of trade and gave greater freedom and independence in the framing of policies.

A severe test of Pakistan's economic independence came in September, 1949, when the United Kingdom decided to devalue the sterling by nearly 30 percent. Both India and Pakistan were members of the sterling area. India followed the United Kingdom and devalued the Indian rupee. Pakistan decided not to devalue the Pakistan rupee. Pakistan's exports at this time consisted almost entirely of raw materials that found a ready market in the world at reasonable prices. Devaluation would not have promoted exports but would have raised the internal level of prices. When nine months later, fighting in Korea broke out and commodity prices soared, heavy export duties had to be levied on raw cotton and jute to avoid an inflationary rise in prices inside the country. On the other hand, devaluation would have raised the rupee prices of capital goods from outside the sterling area, and to that extent would have made industrialization more difficult. As against this, a decision not to devalue the Pakistan rupee would undoubtedly stimulate imports from the United Kingdom and the rest of the sterling area; and since a policy of free imports on open general license was being followed at this time, the market would be flooded with consumer goods from abroad. Such a state would hardly be conducive to the setting up of new industries.

Ghulam Muhammad, the Finance Minister, who happened to be away from Pakistan at this juncture sent a lengthy telegram to the Prime Minister strongly urging devaluation *pari passu* with the sterling. Fazlur Rahman, the Commerce Minister, however, insisted even more strongly that there should be no devaluation. There were lengthy debates in the cabinet. Zahid Husain, the Governor of the State Bank, was sent for to advise the cabinet. On the whole, he was in favor of devaluation but the advantages and disadvantages of either course of action appeared to him to be fairly evenly balanced. I was of the opinion that a devaluation was needed, not to stimulate exports—since these mainly consisted of primary commodities—but to stem the inflow of consumer goods; and for that purpose a partial devaluation, not so steep as that of sterling, would be enough. The situation might have been met by import restrictions, but the cabinet at this time was intent on maintaining a policy of open general license. After thoroughly discussing every aspect of the question for



two days the cabinet finally decided not to devalue the Pakistan rupee. An important element in the final decision was the feeling that it would enhance Pakistan's prestige.

The decision to maintain the value of the Pakistan rupee was made after a careful weighing of pros and cons in the light of Pakistan's interests. It startled the world by its demonstration of Pakistan's economic strength and independence of judgment. The Indians were not only startled but felt humiliated into the bargain; they had to accept that 100 Pakistan rupees were worth 144 Indian rupees. Alone of all the countries of the world, India refused to recognize Pakistan's decision and started a trade war.

The jute crop was being harvested at this time. India which had 60 percent of the world jute loomage was the main purchaser. And Calcutta, with its many baling presses was the principal port for the export of raw jute from East Pakistan to outside markets. The Marwaris, who handled most of the trade, were Indian citizens with headquarters in Calcutta. Banking facilities for providing credit to the trade were also concentrated in Calcutta. So confident were the Indians of the strength of their position in regard to jute, that the leader of an Indian delegation remarked to me, during the course of negotiations for a trade agreement between the two countries: "What can you do with your jute except sell it to us? Burn it? Throw it into the Bay of Bengal?"

Now, suddenly, Pakistan was faced with a grave crisis. India's refusal to buy jute, and its blocking of the export and banking facilities of Calcutta meant a disastrous fall in jute prices and financial ruin for millions of farmers in East Pakistan. I accompanied the Prime Minister to East Pakistan where a number of emergency measures were taken. An ordinance was issued "to safeguard international trade in jute." Under it the central government could fix minimum support prices and appoint agents and brokers to purchase, store, and sell jute on its behalf. A Jute Board was formed to carry out these functions. Minimum prices for loose jute were announced. Agents were appointed throughout East Pakistan to buy at the minimum prices and Pakistanis were encouraged to enter the jute trade. To provide credit facilities it was decided to set up the National Bank of Pakistan. More orders were placed for modern baling presses. Work on the development of Chittagong port and the establishment of Chalna anchorage was accelerated. These vigorous measures, and the enthu-

siastic support of the people for government policies, enabled Pakistan to overcome the crisis created by India's hostile response to Pakistan's decision not to devalue its rupee. Ultimately, India realized the futility of its action and recognized the Pakistan rate of exchange in February, 1951. This rate of exchange was maintained till the middle of 1955. Imports of consumer goods were severely curtailed from 1952 onward, when the policy of open general licenses was belatedly abandoned. An intense drive was made for building up industries based on Pakistan's raw materials, particularly cotton and jute. When Pakistan's manufactured goods were ready for the world markets, devaluation was carried out in order to facilitate their export. An earlier devaluation would have served no purpose since it would have hampered the import of capital goods and made no difference to the offtake of primary commodities which were at that time Pakistan's main exports.

During the period 1947-48 the country was still suffering from the inflationary effects of the Second World War. Price controls with all their attendant evils of black-marketing and profiteering were in force. The production of food had suffered a decline following the dislocation caused by disturbances and migration. The availability of goods required from abroad for capital projects or essential consumer needs was limited. Measures had to be taken to offset the effect of these forces that were raising the general price level and the cost of living. Gradually the situation improved and prices were stabilized. The ground was prepared for economic growth. Pakistan had to win the right to exist before it could plan to develop. There was then no program of foreign aid and Pakistan had to rely on its own efforts. Even the extremely modest Point Four program of technical assistance announced by President Truman, and the Colombo Plan evolved by the Commonwealth, lie outside the period with which we are dealing. The record during the first years of Pakistan is thus one of severe handicaps and difficulties successfully overcome, and of financial and economic stability gained by courage, determination, and resourcefulness.



## Administrative and Political Problems of the New State

THE BIGGEST administrative problem facing Pakistan was the shortage of competent and experienced personnel in the central and provincial governments. There were serious deficiencies in the cadres of general administrators as well as in the technical services. The administrative set-up inherited from prepartition days consisted of a number of classes: Superior and Class I Services filled the higher appointments; Class II were the junior executives; Class III, ministerial clerks; and Class IV, messengers and orderlies. The Indian Civil Service was the "steel frame" which empowered its administrators to maintain law and order, collect land revenue in the districts, and shape the government policies in the central and provincial secretariats. This was general service par excellence. Other services, such as the Indian Police Service, the Indian Audit and Accounts Service, and the Indian Service of Engineers, had specialized functions.

In Pakistan, the main structure of the services was preserved intact, together with the existing conditions of service, in keeping with the promise made at the time of partition to those who opted for the

service of Pakistan. But significant modifications were made to suit conditions in Pakistan.

The Indian Civil Service was divided into a number of provincial cadres. Each officer was assigned to one province or the other where he spent all his service except for possible deputation to the central government for limited periods. The provincial cadres consisted for the most part of British officers; and since they had a fundamental unity of outlook, their allegiance to separate provinces did not affect the unity of the administrative structure in British India. With more than 15 major languages in India, it was in fact impossible for any British officer to master them all and thus be able to serve in any province of India.

With the establishment of Pakistan, the position was basically altered. The Civil Service of Pakistan, which replaced the Indian Civil Service, would now consist only of Pakistanis, and if they were to serve only in their own province, provincial loyalties might in the long run prevail over a national outlook. On my recommendation (in my capacity as Secretary-General) the central government decided to amalgamate the various provincial cadres into a single cadre that would meet the needs of the provinces and of the nation as a whole. An academy for the training of young civil service officers was set up at my instance. This was an innovation, for there had been no such institution for civil service probationers in prepartition India. Every officer was required to learn both Urdu and Bengali; his training was to be conducted in both East and West Pakistan; and he was to divide the first ten years of his service equally between East and West Pakistan. By these means an understanding of social and economic conditions in both wings of the country would be gained, friendships would be formed between East and West Pakistanis, and when, at a later stage in their careers, these officers would move to the central government, they would know the administrative problems of the whole country and be equipped to handle them. National unity would thus be forged through administrative integration. Partly to broaden the base of the Civil Service of Pakistan and partly to overcome shortages, a number of military officers and provincial service officers were appointed to it. This was also a departure from the previous rule according to which officers of the provincial civil service could be appointed to a specified list of posts, but could never be promoted to become members of the Indian Civil Service.



The decision to break up the provincial cadres and form a unified service was not reached without strong resistance from the conservative members of the Civil Service of Pakistan. There had also been passionate opposition to the suggestion that provincial civil service officers be promoted into the Civil Service of Pakistan. But the advantages of the new arrangement for Pakistan were so great that, finally, I was able to persuade them to agree to the change.

A few officers of the Indian Political Service (which was composed of officers drawn from the Indian Civil Service and from the Indian army for service in the Indian states and frontier areas) had opted for Pakistan. They were incorporated into the Civil Service of Pakistan. It was considered unnecessary to retain a separate political service for such a very small cadre. The specialized experience needed for frontier areas could well be gained by officers of the Civil Service of Pakistan in the course of their normal career.

I was of the view that the Pakistan Police Service also should be organized into a single national cadre. The reasons for amalgamating the provincial cadres into the Civil Service of Pakistan applied with equal force here. But during one of my absences as delegate to the United Nations it was decided to retain provincial cadres in the police service. The unfortunate effects of the decision were seen later when the central government found it had neither sufficient communication with nor adequate control over the operations of the provincial police force. The proposal to form a federal police force could not be accepted, on the grounds of expense, overlapping of functions, and likely friction with provincial authorities.

Again, at my instance all the accounts services—previously known as Indian Audit and Accounts Service, Military Accounts Service, and the Railway Accounts Service—were merged into a single Pakistan Accounts Service. The work of all these services was similar in nature, although different in detail. In a united service each officer would have a much larger range of experience. The number of officers in each service was not large, and many difficulties arise when working with small cadres. There may be unexpectedly rapid promotion followed by long periods of stagnation. However, this reform also met with strong internal resistance and after some time of experimenting with the new system, it was given up.

In the filling of higher appointments in the secretariat, a more elastic policy was followed than in undivided India, where higher ap-

pointments had been given only to Indian Civil Service officers. The only exception was a "pool" of higher appointments in the Finance and Commerce departments, which required expert knowledge. The Finance and Commerce "pool" was formed shortly before the Second World War and was filled with specially selected officers from the Indian Civil Service, the Indian Audit and Accounts Service, the Military Accounts Service, the Indian Customs Service, and the Income Tax Service. A similar "pool" was formed in the Pakistan government also. But apart from this specialized cadre, it was considered to be in the national interest to make use of talent wherever it was available. Suitable officers from services other than the Civil Service of Pakistan were, therefore, appointed to top posts. I, the Secretary-General, belonged to the audit and accounts service. An officer of the police service was appointed Secretary to the Ministry of the Interior, and so on.

There were severe shortages of administrators of middle rank in the secretariat. To remedy this deficiency, a general administrative reserve was formed. This was intended to be a temporary arrangement to tide over the first ten or twelve years until normal recruitment to the permanent services would have reached a level sufficient for filling all vacancies. The general administrative reserve was filled partly by promotion from the ministerial establishment of the secretariat and partly by recruitment through the public services commission from the open market. Those who proved themselves competent would have a chance of permanent absorption into one of the regular services. However, as often happens in expanding bureaucracies, temporary arrangements continue indefinitely.

An altogether new service, the Pakistan Foreign Service, had to be created for carrying out diplomatic and consular functions. In this field there was little experience among Pakistani officers. Ikramullah, a senior officer in the Civil Service of Pakistan was appointed Foreign Secretary; and he, with a handful of officers, some from the existing services and others newly recruited, strove bravely to set up the Foreign Office and to meet the ever increasing demands for diplomatic missions to be sent abroad.

The demands for administrators, from the provinces and the various ministries of the central government, were far greater than the available supply of officers with requisite experience. And as new and grave problems, like refugee rehabilitation and Kashmir and canal



waters, continued to arise, the task of finding men to deal with them became harder and harder. An equitable distribution was the best that could be attempted, but this was far from easy when every ministry and department clung desperately to the few competent officers it had. An administrative collapse anywhere would have been disastrous. It was my responsibility as Secretary-General to keep every front supplied as well as I could and to maintain its morale. Notwithstanding these pressures, the easy and unreal solution of making unduly rapid promotions was avoided. Even when promotion to a higher grade was made, the full pay of the appointment was not given until the officer had completed a specified number of years of service. These and other measures for maintaining administrative standards were on the whole accepted in good spirit by the officers who at that time were filled with a patriotic fervor to build up Pakistan.

In February, 1948, the Pakistan government appointed a pay commission, presided over by Justice Muhammad Munir, to report on "the scales of pay and allowances and the standards of remuneration which should apply in Pakistan, keeping in view its financial resources and with the object of achieving rationalisation, simplification and uniformity therein in regard to services," for both the central and provincial governments.

At the time of partition two systems of pay scales existed. Those who had entered service before July 1, 1931, continued to draw pay on the old scale; new entrants recruited after this date received revised and substantially lower pay. This revision had been necessary because of the financial stringency that followed the great depression and was justified by the fall in prices and cost of living in the thirties. After the outbreak of the Second World War the general price index began a steep rise until, by the end of the war, it was more than three times as high. The fall in the purchasing power of the rupee brought acute distress to government servants with fixed incomes, particularly to those who received lower salaries. Cost-of-living allowances only partly alleviated the hardship: a systematic investigation was called for. A pay commission was appointed, and it submitted its report on April 30, 1947. After partition the question arose whether the recommendations made by the Indian pay commission to the undivided Government of India should be accepted by the Pakistan government. The financial circumstances of Pakistan were not the same as those of undivided India or even those of the Indian

Union. The grave disturbances and the vast population movement that immediately followed partition had placed a severe strain on the economy. But this was a transient phase that darkened the perspective; the time was not yet ripe for taking stock of long-range factors and visualizing the future shape of the economy.

Ghulam Muhammad, the Finance Minister, was a conservative financier and a strong believer in private enterprise. He was firmly possessed with the idea of a balanced budget and was ruthless in keeping down expenditure. At his instance there had been an appeal for a voluntary cut in salaries to which there had been a good response. Now, instead of finding a temporary or *ad hoc* solution to the problem posed by the findings of the Indian pay commission, he persuaded the cabinet to appoint a new pay commission. As the commission itself recognized, "We find ourselves engaged in an attempt to discharge our duty at a time when the only thing we can be sure of is that the whole thing, except that Pakistan has come to stay on the world map as an important State, is uncertain."

The appointment of the commission was a mistake. The circumstances under which it was appointed gave rise to a general impression that it had been commissioned merely to cut down salaries. It put avoidable work on departments which were already overburdened. It started with a bias imbibed from Ghulam Muhammad that public services need not be well paid since men with brains and energy were needed in trade and industry. The truth of the matter is that, in an underdeveloped country, it is impossible to achieve a high rate of economic growth except through a comprehensive plan, and this needs the best available administrative talent to produce and operate it. Only within such a framework can private enterprise function to the best advantage of the country.

I learned of the commission's views and advised the Prime Minister to send for its Chairman and put the problem in a balanced perspective. This was not simply a financial matter but one involving the purity, quality, and efficiency of public administration. Justice Muhammad Munir reported his conversation with the Prime Minister to Ghulam Muhammad who at once came to the conclusion that I had tried to interfere in his domain. The upshot of it all was that Ghulam Muhammad felt aggrieved and the pay commission stated flatly in their report that they "did not think it to be a right policy for the State to offer such salaries to its servants as to attract the best avail-



able talent. The correct place for our men of genius is in private enterprise and not in the humdrum career of public service where character and a desire to serve honestly for a living is more essential than outstanding intellect." One could hardly help wishing that the commission had the imagination to say instead that "the correct place for our men of genius is in our universities and research institutions." Instead of simplifying and rationalizing the pay structure, the commission's report left it still more complicated. The cabinet had to improve on the rather niggardly recommendations of the commission.

In the provinces, the severest shortages in personnel were to be found in East Bengal. East Pakistan had, at the time of independence, only one officer in the Indian Civil Service, a few in the Indian Police, and fewer in the other Superior Services. The rest of the Muslim officers came partly from West Pakistan and partly from Muslim minority provinces. Though Muslims from the minority provinces of India had an equal right to move to East or to West Pakistan, most of them settled in West Pakistan and were readily accepted as part of the general population. Throughout the ages, West Pakistan has been the gateway of the subcontinent. People from outside have poured into it and been absorbed into this melting-pot of races and cultures. East Pakistan being at the far eastern end has been more sheltered and consequently more insular. East Pakistan thus looked upon everyone—official or businessman—who came from areas outside Bengal as a West Pakistani. Officers from West Pakistan and from the minority provinces of India were lumped together in a single category.

Fundamentally, the imbalance between East and West Pakistan in the public services stemmed from the discrimination exercised against Muslims in undivided Bengal in every sphere, including education. Calcutta University was a closely guarded preserve of the Hindus. Hindu teachers dominated schools and colleges. Discrimination against Bengal Muslims so handicapped them that they could not compete successfully in all-India examinations for the Superior Services.

This state of affairs had to be remedied as rapidly as practicable so that East Pakistan could play an equal and effective part in the administration of the country. In the first competitive examination held by the Pakistan public service commission for recruitment to the Superior Services, forty-odd candidates qualified from East Pakistan.

Although we did not need so many, I recommended to the Prime Minister that all of them, including those who had barely qualified, should be appointed so as to redress the balance as rapidly as possible. Thus, in the very first recruitment of civil services candidates in Pakistan the number of East Pakistani officers was several times greater than at any time before partition. For future recruitment the cabinet approved a plan whereby 20 percent would be taken on merit from the whole of Pakistan, and 40 percent each from East and West Pakistan. The West Pakistan quota was further subdivided between various provinces so that the educationally backward provinces could secure their due share of appointments. The system worked to the disadvantage of candidates from the Punjab, but was in the best national interest. The effects of this policy can only make themselves felt over a period of time; it is impossible to redress the neglect of a century in a few years. All this was well recognized. Yet, voices of discontent soon began to be raised against the preponderance of West Pakistanis in the central government, and the entire blame for the existing imbalance was laid at the door of the central government. This unjust accusation was repeated endlessly until it became an article of faith with many in East Pakistan.

Another set of grievances arose from the posting of officers from other provinces to East Pakistan. There was a serious shortage of experienced officers in every province and in the central government. The overriding necessity of the time was to get the administration going. Since East Pakistani officers were not available, others had to be sent there to take care of the provincial administration and services under the control of the central government, such as railways and customs. Many of them had never been to East Pakistan before and were not familiar with the language, manners, and susceptibilities of the people. To the normal failings of bureaucratic behavior was added, in some cases at least, an attitude of supercilious superiority. With tact and sympathetic understanding the strains and stresses of establishing a new administration could have been eased. But not everyone is blessed with these virtues. Soon grievances multiplied and some people went so far as to suggest that the behavior of West Pakistani officers was the main cause of estrangement between East and West Pakistan. Though this is an exaggerated view, it has an element of truth in it.

The geographical separation of East and West Pakistan produced



not only administrative but social, economic, and political problems as well. Distance made communication fitful and expensive. Misunderstandings arose easily and were difficult to dispel. Since the capital was in West Pakistan, East Pakistan felt neglected. The differences in language and background put obstacles in the way of national integration. Within West Pakistan there were a number of provinces and states, and four linguistic regions. The powerful binding forces of Islam—a common ideology, a common history as a single community in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, a common struggle for independence from British rule and Hindu domination, a common fear of Hindu designs, and the instinctive sense of a common destiny—had created a state of unique structure. The foreigner might feel entitled to doubt if these forces would successfully withstand the strains and stresses inherent in that structure. The nation in the first flush of independence won by unity, faith, and discipline felt certain of enduring as a single entity.

In a broadcast talk to the people of Australia, on February 19, 1948, the Quaid-i-Azam said:

West Pakistan is separated from East Pakistan by about a thousand miles of the territory of India. The first question a student from abroad should ask himself is—how can this be? How can there be unity of government between areas so widely separated? I can answer this question in one word. It is "faith"; faith in Almighty God, in ourselves and in our destiny.<sup>1</sup>

A month later, he made an impassioned appeal for national consolidation. In a public speech in Dacca, East Pakistan, on March 21, 1948, he said:

Let me warn you in the clearest terms of the dangers that still face Pakistan and your province in particular as I have done already. Having failed to prevent the establishment of Pakistan, thwarted and frustrated by their failure, the enemies of Pakistan have now turned their attention to disrupt the State by creating a split amongst the Muslims of Pakistan. These attempts have taken the shape principally of encouraging provincialism. As long as you do not throw off this poison in our body politic, you will never be able to weld yourself, mould yourself, galvanise yourself into a real true nation. . . . Islam has taught us this, and I think you will agree with me that whatever else you may be and whatever you are, you are a Muslim. You belong to a Nation now; you have now carved out a territory, vast territory, it is all yours; it does not belong to a Punjabi or a Sindhi, or a Pathan, or a Bengali; it is yours. You have

got your Central Government where several units are represented. Therefore, if you want to build up yourself into a Nation, for God's sake give up this provincialism.<sup>2</sup>

One sees clearly here the struggle between two forces: one making for unity, the other for disruption. It was the task of practical statesmanship to forge instruments of unity in every sphere of social and political action. The effort would, in the very nature of things, have to be a continuing one.

The background to the Quaid-i-Azam's warning against provincialism was provided by the language controversy that raised its head in East Bengal only a few months after the establishment of Pakistan. In spite of failing health, the Quaid-i-Azam undertook an arduous journey to East Pakistan in March, 1948 to still the controversy. During the Pakistan movement it had been universally accepted that Urdu would be the national language of Pakistan, and declarations to this effect had often been made. Urdu was the lingua franca of the Muslims of the subcontinent and the symbol of their unity. Differences between Muslims and Hindus over the language question have been noted earlier. These differences played a large part in shaping the demand for Pakistan. Urdu was not the mother tongue of the people in any of the provinces and states of Pakistan, East or West, but it enjoyed everywhere a unique position as the national language of the Muslims. It was never suggested that Urdu should replace any provincial language, least of all Bengali, which is a highly developed language with a fine literature.

The agitation against Urdu as the sole national language was started by a small group of politicians in East Pakistan, mainly to embarrass the Nazimuddin ministry; but it was soon taken up by the students. The powerful Hindu press of Calcutta fanned the flames of the controversy. In February, 1948, when the Pakistan constituent assembly was considering its rules of procedure, Dharendra Nath Dutta, a member of the Congress party, moved an amendment that the proceedings of the assembly should be kept not merely in Urdu and English but also in Bengali, and suggested that the language spoken by the majority of people should become the state language. In a speech at the Dacca University convocation of March 24, 1948, the Quaid-i-Azam said:

Is it not significant that the very persons who in the past have betrayed the Musalmans or fought against Pakistan, which is after all



merely the embodiment of your fundamental right of self-determination, should now suddenly pose as the saviours of your "just rights" and incite you to defy the Government on the question of language? I must warn you to beware of these fifth columnists. Let me restate my views on the question of a State language for Pakistan. For official use in this province, the people of the province can choose any language they wish. This question will be decided solely in accordance with the wishes of the people of this province alone, as freely expressed through their accredited representatives at the appropriate time and after full and dispassionate consideration. There can, however, be only one *lingua franca*, that is, the language for inter-communication between the various provinces of the State, and that language should be Urdu and cannot be any other. The State language, therefore, must obviously be Urdu, a language that has been nurtured by a hundred million Muslims of this sub-continent, a language understood throughout the length and breadth of Pakistan and above all, a language which, more than any other provincial language, embodies the best that is in Islamic culture and Muslim tradition and is nearest to the language used in other Islamic countries. It is not without significance that Urdu has been driven out of the Indian Union and that even the official use of the Urdu script has been disallowed.<sup>3</sup>

The tremendous weight of the Quaid-i-Azam's authority suppressed the agitation for the time being, but the issue remained alive. Some years later it assumed formidable proportions. Finally, the controversy was settled when the 1956 constitution recognized both Urdu and Bengali as the national languages of Pakistan.

But, as the Quaid-i-Azam said in his farewell message to East Pakistan on March 28,

This language controversy is really one aspect of a bigger problem—that of provincialism. I am sure you must realize that in a newly-formed State like Pakistan, consisting moreover as it does of two widely separated parts, cohesion and solidarity amongst all its citizens, from whatever part they may come, is essential for its progress, nay for its very survival. Pakistan is the embodiment of the unity of the Muslim nation and so it must remain. That unity we, as true Muslims, must jealously guard and preserve. If we begin to think of ourselves as Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, etc., first and Muslims and Pakistanis only incidentally, then Pakistan is bound to disintegrate. Do not think that this is some abstruse proposition: our enemies are fully alive to its possibilities which I must warn you they are already busy exploiting.<sup>4</sup>

Another disease infecting the political life of Pakistan was factionalism; and this was at its worst in the Punjab. In the months following partition, the Punjab was threatened with one mortal peril after another. The rivers of blood flowing in East Punjab, the flood of

refugees, the war across its borders in Kashmir, the devastation resulting from the closure of canals by India—all of these followed in rapid succession. But in the midst of these perils, the Punjab cabinet, instead of working as a united team, presented a spectacle of petty squabbles, sordid intrigues, and all the other accompaniments of an internecine war between factions. The highly ambitious Finance Minister, Mumtaz Daultana, was ranged against the s'ow and easy-going Chief Minister, the Khan of Mamdot. The Muslim League party in the legislature was split. High officials started taking sides. In April, 1948, the Quaid-i-Azam summoned Mamdot, Daultana, and Shaukat Hayat Khan, the Revenue Minister, to Karachi to sort out the ministerial tangle, but even he threw up his hands in disgust. Soon afterward Daultana and Shaukat Hayat Khan resigned and Mamdot formed his second ministry. After the Quaid-i-Azam's death, when there was a sense of national emergency, a move was made by the central government to bring about unity in the Punjab. Mamdot agreed to include Daultana and Feroze Khan Noon in the cabinet, but before they could be sworn in, a fresh dispute broke out. The quarrel was intensified when, in November, Daultana was elected President of the West Punjab provincial Muslim League. Finally, in the beginning of 1949, the ministry was dismissed; the Punjab legislative assembly was dissolved; and Governor's rule was imposed under section 92-A of the adapted Government of India Act, 1935. The communiqué issued by the central government stated:

Public life has been demoralized by corruption and the discipline of the services destroyed by intrigue. The administration has been carried on for the benefit of the few and little or no heed has been paid to the hopes and needs of the people. Many causes have contributed to this state of affairs, but in the Governor-General's opinion the main cause is the failure of the Members of the Legislative Assembly elected in different circumstances to rise to the greater responsibility which Independence brings.

This was the first occasion on which normal constitutional processes had to be suspended in Pakistan.

In the North-West Frontier Province, Chief Minister Abdul Qayyum Khan had to face a difficult situation because of the opposition of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his die-hard Red Shirt followers. After the arrest of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the provincial government received reports that the Red Shirts were planning a civil disobedience movement in August, 1948. A large number collected at



Charsadda and there was a violent clash with the police in which some people were killed. Subsequently, however, peace was maintained. In the provincial assembly which had been elected in 1946, the Muslim League was in a minority, but public feeling in the province had since then undergone a profound change as was shown by the results of the referendum on the Pakistan question in July, 1947. In response to the state of public opinion, a number of legislators who had been aligned with the Congress in the past joined the Muslim League, and it became the majority party in the assembly.

Abdul Qayyum Khan's real trouble, however, lay outside the assembly. His autocratic ways and intolerance of any opposition alienated a number of Muslim League leaders, in particular, the influential Pir of Manki, who had rendered outstanding services in the referendum for Pakistan. The result was that the Pir of Manki and others were driven out of the Muslim League. In April, 1948, the Quaid-i-Azam toured the North-West Frontier Province. In a public speech in Peshawar, on April 20, he warned the people of a grave national emergency that existed both internally and externally, and adjured them "to avoid domestic controversies and provincialism." He continued:

I know we have got men who are guilty of jobbery, bribery and nepotism. I do not say that the Government is perfect. Believe me, we are wide awake; we are watching your Government, your province, your ministry and your civil services. It is under our searchlight and there is no doubt we shall soon be able to X-ray it and throw out the poison from our body-politic. But you must have patience and give us a chance and a reasonable time.<sup>5</sup>

Before partition, Sind had been notorious for political instability produced by the shifting combinations of a number of groups. At the time of partition a Muslim League ministry under Muhammad Ayub Khuhro was firmly in the saddle. The Chief Minister was not, however, on good terms with the Governor, Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah. In the beginning of April 1948, a public controversy started between Khuhro and two of his ministers, Pir Ilahi Bakhsh and Mir Ghulam Ali Talpur. Charges and countercharges appeared in the press. The Governor reallocated portfolios in the hope that this would lead to a more harmonious working of the cabinet, but Khuhro regarded this as undue interference by the Governor. The matter was reported to the Quaid-i-Azam. The Governor placed before him evidence of maladministration and corruption on the part of Khuhro.

Under the direction of the Quaid-i-Azam, who was determined to root out such evils in Pakistan, the Governor dismissed the Chief Minister on April 26, 1948, although he had the support of a majority of the Sind assembly. This action was taken under section 51 of the adapted Government of India Act, 1935. This section provided that the Governor's ministers "shall hold office during his pleasure," and that in the exercise of his functions under this section the Governor "shall be under the general control of, and comply with such particular directions, if any, as may from time to time be given to him by the Governor-General." The communiqué issued by the Governor stated that a *prime facie* case had been made out against Khuhro on charges of maladministration, gross misconduct in the discharge of his duty, and corruption. A judicial tribunal consisting of Justice Abdur Rashid, Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court, and Justice Shahabuddin of the Dacca High Court was constituted to try Khuhro on 62 charges. The tribunal found him guilty on a number of charges. But the curious position was that Khuhro was still the leader of the Muslim League party ruling in Sind and wielded great influence over the members of the Sind assembly. In December, 1948, while he was still being tried, he was formally elected President of the Sind Muslim League, although he decided to stand aside until the verdict of the tribunal was known. He had lost the responsibility of public office but not political power.

To deal with this anomalous situation, the constituent assembly passed, in 1949, the Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act, or PARODA. The Act provided that any person found guilty of misconduct in any matter relating to his office as minister, deputy minister, or parliamentary secretary of the federal or provincial government, or as a member of the central or provincial legislature, might be disqualified from holding any public office for a period not exceeding ten years by an order of the Governor-General. "Misconduct" included bribery, corruption, nepotism, willful maladministration, and similar other offenses. The tribunal appointed to try cases under this Act was to consist of two or more High Court judges. The Governor-General was to exercise his powers under this Act not on the advice of the cabinet but in his personal judgment. Khuhro was disqualified under this Act for a period of two years by the Governor-General Khwaja Nazimuddin, although the Governor of Sind, Sheikh Din Muhammad, had recommended disqualification for seven years.



Khuhro's successor was Pir Ilahi Bakhsh. Within six months he was in serious trouble. Toward the end of October, 1948, the editors of five Karachi dailies simultaneously published an indictment against him headed "Pir Ilahi Bakhsh must go." The charges were the familiar ones of jobbery and nepotism. To these was added the charge of protecting criminals, of which a specific instance was that of the Chief Minister's Hindu confidential assistant who was arrested on the point of escaping to India, allegedly with state documents. At a meeting in the Governor-General's house attended by the Prime Minister, the Governor of Sind, and me, it was decided that the Governor should conduct an enquiry into these allegations. At the same time, there was a case against Pir Ilahi Bakhsh before the Sind election tribunal, which led to his disqualification. Pir Ilahi Bakhsh was followed by Yusuf Haroon. During these changes, Sind politics reverted to the old pattern of strife among the ministers and constantly shifting loyalties among the members of the assembly. Eventually the central government had to impose Governor's rule in Sind under section 92-A of the adapted Government of India Act, 1935.

In East Bengal, the difficulties encountered by Chief Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin from the activities of a small but active assembly group were considerably eased when at his request one of its prominent members was sent out as ambassador. When Khwaja Nazimuddin became Governor-General, in September, 1948, Nurul Amin succeeded him. During both regimes, East Pakistan maintained political stability. There was, however, a growing volume of opposition which played upon the people's sentiments by charges of neglect and stepmotherly treatment by the central government. A number of active political workers, including Maulana Bhashani who, as the President of the Assam Muslim League had campaigned vigorously for the success of the Sylhet referendum, joined the ranks of the opposition. Sensing a shift in the people's attitude, the provincial government fought shy of holding by-elections. This betrayed weakness and an inability to put the government's case before the people. There was a wholly inadequate appreciation of the staggering difficulties the central and provincial governments had to overcome in order to establish an administration and to stabilize the economy. The expectations of the people for a sudden transformation in the conditions of life after attaining independence could not possibly be fulfilled, but the disappointment would have been less acute if a true appraisal of

the situation had been frankly and repeatedly put before them by the government. It was primarily the failure to establish public relations which (though understandable in the midst of the pressures of administrative work) had far-reaching effects on the political future of the country.

Suhrawardy, who found India inhospitable after Gandhi's assassination, returned to Pakistan to organize an opposition. At first he could make little headway, but as dissensions within the ruling party grew he was able to gather support. He joined hands with the Khan of Mamdot and Mian Abdul Bari, both former Presidents of the Punjab Muslim League, with Pir Manki Sharif in the North-West Frontier Province, and with Maulana Bhashani in East Bengal. All of them had rendered notable services in the cause of Pakistan, yet within a few years of the achievement of Pakistan they felt compelled to leave the Muslim League. Thus, within the space of a few years, the Muslim League was faced by an active opposition born from within itself.

These events threw into relief a structural weakness of the League. In the first thirty years of its life, the Muslim League had not been a mass organization. It voiced the aspirations of the Muslim intelligentsia, but was not actively at work among the masses. The pillars of society, the landlords, the well-to-do lawyers, the rich businessmen, and the titled gentry, were its main support. With some exceptions, they were not men noted for total commitment to any cause. Their willingness to sacrifice their personal interests or comfort for the sake of the nation was often in doubt, and not unjustly. They were, by and large, estimable men who served their country and their community within the limits dictated by discretion.

When the Quaid-i-Azam took the organization in hand in the middle thirties and started transforming it, its Hindu opponents and Muslim critics continued for a number of years to look down upon it as incapable of effective political action. But within a short period the character of the League had changed.

The striking successes that the Muslim League gained in the decade before partition were brought about by the political sagacity of the Quaid-i-Azam and the enthusiastic response to his leadership among the Muslim intelligentsia, the students, and the rising middle class, aided, of course, by the shortsighted folly and arrogance of Hindu leadership. Once the goal of Pakistan had been adopted by the Muslim League, it was not difficult for the middle classes to arouse



the enthusiasm of the Muslim masses to whom the idea of an Islamic state with its just social order, its puritanical vigor, and its energy in looking after the interest of the common man has always had a profound appeal. The tradition of how the early Caliphs had nourished orphans and widows and had dealt out even-handed justice to high and low, the stern simplicity of their lives, and their ceaseless vigil over the welfare of the masses had passed into the common lore that was the heritage of every Muslim child. Despite the oppression and tyranny of intervening centuries, that distant ideal had not lost its force. The Muslim masses had never fully grasped the meaning of political safeguards in a united India. But a homeland for the Muslims in which an Islamic state could function was a simple and striking idea; it could be readily understood by the most ignorant and, by evoking memories of a heroic and just social order, could arouse mass enthusiasm as nothing else could. There was unison between the mass of the people, the middle classes who provided the bulk of the political workers, and the top leadership of the Quaid-i-Azam. For the first time in its history, the League was actively in touch with the Muslim masses, voiced their innermost aspirations, and drew its strength from them.

As public support for the idea of Pakistan gathered strength, Muslim politicians, who were in training under the British in the art of contesting elections and in capturing such crumbs of power as the British allowed to fall, turned more and more toward the Muslim League. They were shrewd and hard-headed men, capable of being infected temporarily by mass enthusiasm but never forgetful of their own advantage. As the decisive elections of 1946 drew near, they were the people who, for the most part, knew the electoral game and were, so to speak, the obvious candidates for the elections. The Quaid-i-Azam knew their quality, but he carried them along with him, and in that tide they were riding the wave of popular support. The masses also knew them for what they were, and looked to the Quaid-i-Azam to keep them disciplined. They, for their part, were mortally afraid of the Quaid-i-Azam, for they knew that their success in public life depended upon the trust he showed in them.

As long as Pakistan had not yet been established, the revolutionary mass movement led by the Quaid-i-Azam under the banner of the Muslim League was all that mattered. When Pakistan was achieved, the Quaid-i-Azam's attention was devoted almost wholly to the estab-

lishment of the state and the solution of the host of problems that rose thick and fast; he did not have enough time and energy to devote to the discipline and control of those politicians who needed it. If the social and economic objectives of the Pakistan movement had been kept more prominently before the leadership and the masses, the situation might have been different. However, with the establishment of Pakistan, some of the politicians felt free to revert to their old habits of a naked struggle for power through factions and cliques.

At the time of independence the All-India Muslim League, which had won Pakistan under the leadership of the Quaid-i-Azam, enjoyed universal support. It was the only political party of Muslims in Pakistan. The Congress party was confined to caste Hindus, and the Scheduled Caste Federation represented the Hindu Depressed Classes of East Pakistan. But Muslims, whether in East or West Pakistan, gave unstinted loyalty to the League. The small minorities of Christians, Buddhists, and Parsis also supported it.

On December 15, 1947, the All-India Muslim League meeting in Karachi resolved to split itself into two separate organizations, one for Pakistan and one for India. Although this decision came as a shock to the Muslims in India, who felt orphaned, it was an inevitable consequence of partition. The Pakistan Muslim League that came into existence was heir to the love and esteem in which the All-India Muslim League had been held. But from the very beginning it loosened its ties with the leadership that had made the All-India Muslim League so powerful and disciplined an organization. When the Council of the Pakistan Muslim League met in Karachi in February, 1948, to consider the constitution and rules of the League, an amendment to the draft constitution was moved and accepted, I was informed, against the wishes of the Quaid-i-Azam. The amendment provided that no minister or other officeholder in the government could become an office-bearer of the Pakistan Muslim League. It was proposed that the Quaid-i-Azam be exempt from this rule, but he declined the offer. Choudhry Khaliqzaman, who was entrusted with the task of organizing the Pakistan Muslim League and later became its first President, had neither the authority nor the prestige to keep feuding factions within the League disciplined. Since the League was the only political organization, control over it was the key to political power. The struggle for power within the League was pursued by all sorts of dubious means. False returns of members, denial of member-



ship forms to the opposing faction, and rigged elections of Council members and officeholders became common practices. The masses and the bulk of the intelligentsia began to lose interest in politics, which came to be regarded as a game pursued by professional politicians for self-interest. The failings of the politicians stood out all the more prominently against the prevailing atmosphere of Islamic zeal and patriotic fervor among the masses.

There was also another factor at work. Before partition, control was centralized in the All-India Muslim League organization. The provincial Leagues enjoyed limited power and had to obey the mandates of the central organization. The central organization drew its strength from the powerful personality of its President, the Quaid-i-Azam, and the support of the hundred million Muslims of the sub-continent. When the Pakistan Muslim League was formed in February, 1948, it was constituted on the federal pattern. Each province was allotted a fixed number of seats in the League Council. There were 180 for East Bengal, 150 for the Punjab, 50 for Sind, 40 for the North-West Frontier Province, 20 for Baluchistan, and 10 nominated by the President. The provincial League organizations were under the control of the Provincial Chief Ministers, who also controlled the election of the Pakistan Muslim League Councillors from their provinces. In some cases, the election to the League Council was nominal—the Chief Minister virtually appointed his loyal supporters. Thus the Pakistan Muslim League, instead of drawing its support directly from the masses, became dependent upon the provincial leaders.

Throughout this period, the stability and strength of the central government were in striking contrast to the state of the provincial governments. In the composition of the central cabinet, regard has always been paid to regional representation, particularly between East and West Pakistan. Under proper leadership this makes for unity and strength and not for weakness and division. Under the leadership of the Quaid-i-Azam and, after his death, of Liaquat Ali Khan, the central cabinet worked with a single will toward the solution of the grave problems facing the country. There were, it is true, differences of view which found vigorous expression but, in general, a consensus of opinion would emerge to which all gave willing consent. At times, as happens with every human group, misunderstandings would arise even over minor matters. On one occasion, a senior minister

threatened to resign because the Prime Minister, who was also Defence Minister, ignored his recommendation for the promotion of an army officer and thus, in his view, failed to do justice. However, wiser counsels prevailed and I was able to bring about a reconciliation. A more persistent discord was that which developed, after the Quaid-i-Azam's death, between the Finance Minister, Ghulam Muhammad, and the Commerce Minister, Fazlur Rahman. In temperament they were poles apart—the one as quick and sharp as a rapier and the other as blunt and heavy as a bludgeon. I begged the Prime Minister a number of times to do something about this running quarrel, which unnecessarily hampered business, but he took a philosophic view of the matter. It is possible that he considered this conflict between two strong personalities not entirely disadvantageous. Anyhow, the differences never went beyond a certain limit, and remained more or less personal to the two ministers.

The only serious jolt to the cabinet came from the defection of the Labor Minister, Jogendra Nath Mandal, to India in 1950. As the leader of the Scheduled Caste Hindus in Bengal he had stood loyally with the Quaid-i-Azam in the struggle for Pakistan. After the Quaid-i-Azam's death a gradual change came over him, as the caste Hindus in the Pakistan constituent assembly started wooing him and urging him to assume leadership over them as well. At the same time links were being forged between him and the Indian High Commission in Karachi. Liaquat Ali Khan was aware of these developments, and I was taking precautionary measures not to let top secret documents fall into Mandal's hands. It appears that Mandal came to know he was being watched, took fright, and bolted to India.

Relations with India have played a pivotal part in determining Pakistan's defense needs and foreign policy. The leaders of India accepted partition in the hope of undoing it soon and establishing their hegemony over the whole subcontinent. "Most of the Congress leaders and Nehru among them," wrote Brecher, "subscribed to the view that Pakistan was not a viable state—politically, economically, geographically or militarily—and that sooner or later the areas which had seceded would be compelled by force of circumstances to return to the fold."<sup>6</sup> Pakistan was, for them, a transient phase, a tactical retreat that did not affect their strategic aims.

The events described in the earlier pages bear eloquent testimony to India's persistent hostility toward Pakistan: In the East Punjab



massacres, the interference with canal waters, the withholding of military stores and other assets, the military occupation of Junagadh and Kashmir, and the trade war in 1949, every effort was made by India to truncate Pakistan territorially, to encircle it strategically, and to strangle it economically.

In order to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan, it was essential to build up and equip the armed forces. Resources that were urgently needed for economic reconstruction and development were diverted to defense, which used up half and, at times, even more of the central budget. The people bore these sacrifices willingly. Liaquat Ali Khan's remark "We can afford to be hungry for a day but we can not afford to be slaves even for a minute," reflected the will of the whole nation. The original plan for an army of 125,000 men was revised upward under the constant threat of aggression by India. Since India had withheld Pakistan's share of military stores, large sums had to be spent on defense equipment. In a broadcast to the nation on October 8, 1948, the Prime Minister said: "The defence of the State is our foremost consideration and has dominated all other governmental activities. We will not grudge any amount on the defence of our country."

Army, air, and naval headquarters had to be set up. The Indian air force and the Indian navy were not well developed. The number of Muslims serving in them was relatively small. The Pakistan navy and air force began in a modest way with headquarters in Karachi. The headquarters of the Northern Command in Rawalpindi became the general headquarters of the Pakistan army. Though Muslims had formed one third of the strength of the Indian army, there were no homogeneous Muslim units. The fragments left after the departure of non-Muslims had to be reorganized and brought up to strength. Shortages in technical arms, such as artillery, and in engineers, were very great, and even in the infantry the number of senior officers with staff and command experience was limited. The Pakistan army was, in consequence, far more dependent upon British officers than the Indian army. Nationalization of the armed forces could be carried out only gradually. A debt of gratitude is owed to the British officers who worked with zeal and devotion to build up the Pakistan army, navy, and air force.

For two centuries there had been a serious neglect of the military potential of Bengal. The result was that the Pakistan army, which was

constituted out of the Indian army, had only a handful of men from East Pakistan. The importance of changing this state of affairs was realized from the very start. The false theory of "nonmartial" races was discarded and opportunities for recruitment from East Pakistan were opened up. The East Bengal Regiment was formed in February, 1948. To provide army accommodation in East Pakistan, cantonments were built.

Pakistan did not have a single ordnance factory. All the sixteen ordnance factories of British India were located in the Indian Union. They had been modernized and expanded during the Second World War; and new factories, such as the Hindustan Aircraft Factory at Bangalore, had been built. The Indian leaders were stubbornly opposed to the transfer of any factory or, indeed, any piece of machinery to Pakistan. They even refused to part with the machinery for a Bren-gun factory and a fuse-filling factory, which was lying packed and had not yet been installed.

In the face of this determined opposition, there were no means by which Pakistan could get its rightful share. The best that could be arranged was a financial settlement, and in the final agreement over the partition of assets, I negotiated a sum of Rs. 60 million in lieu of Pakistan's share of ordnance factories. With this money the establishment of a new ordnance factory at Wah near Rawalpindi was taken in hand. I had sponsored the project and I had to look after it. Finance Minister Ghulam Muhammad opposed it on the ground that private enterprise could do the job. Strangely enough, army headquarters did not take much interest in the project and was not prepared to spare any suitable officers for it. With great difficulty I persuaded the railway authorities to release a senior mechanical engineer for the job. For designing the factory, the services of an ordnance expert, Newton Booth, were obtained from England through the good offices of Sir Archibald Rowlands, who was Financial Adviser to the Governor-General of Pakistan and had been Permanent Under Secretary of the Ministry of Supply of the United Kingdom during the war. A scheme for the training of Pakistanis was started. When the Prime Minister of Hyderabad, Mir Laik Ali, escaped to Karachi after the occupation of Hyderabad, he was appointed Defense Adviser and was put in charge of the factory.

Apart from the Staff College at Quetta, which had an international reputation, Pakistan inherited no schools of instruction. A Military



Academy was set up at Kakul, and a number of training institutions for the army, navy, and air force were established.

In a broadcast talk to the United States, in February, 1948, the Quaid-i-Azam defined Pakistan's foreign policy in these terms:

Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards all the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fairplay in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter.<sup>7</sup>

The concrete application of these principles can be seen in Pakistan's relations with the British Commonwealth and the West; its neighbors, including China and Russia; and the Muslim world of which it is an integral part.

On the eve of assuming office as Governor-General, the Quaid-i-Azam expressed his profound appreciation of "the high and noble ideals by which the Commonwealth has been and will be guided in future." The expectation that Pakistan's leaders had formed of the Commonwealth as a family of nations that looked after the interests of its members, composed their differences in a fair manner, and came to their aid in the event of aggression were belied by experience. When the Kashmir dispute went to the United Nations, the United Kingdom along with the United States, Canada, and the other members of the Security Council, at first took a just stand, but soon succumbed to Indian threats of leaving the Commonwealth and led the rest of the Security Council in an ignoble retreat. Within the Commonwealth there was an extreme reluctance to resolve the disputes that were dividing India and Pakistan. It was not until Liaquat Ali Khan refused to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference of January, 1951, unless the Kashmir question was discussed, that a discussion was arranged at an informal meeting. On this occasion, it was through the efforts of Prime Minister Menzies of Australia that a deadlock was averted. He stopped in Karachi on his way to London and after securing the agreement of the other Commonwealth Prime Ministers for a discussion of the Kashmir question, succeeded in persuading Liaquat Ali Khan to attend the Conference in London. As the true character of the Commonwealth became more

apparent, there was disillusionment, but not to the point of wishing to break away from it.

Perhaps the main reason for this is to be found in an affinity with Western democratic institutions, which were the principal gift of the British to their former colonies. This was reinforced by cultural and economic ties. English was still the official language of the government and the higher courts, as well as the medium of instruction for university education. Pakistan was a member of the sterling area and held fairly large balances in London. Trade with the United Kingdom predominated. The Colombo Plan brought benefits of aid in economic development to members of the Commonwealth. As part of a worldwide community of nations, Pakistan could exercise some influence in the shaping of world policies.

The disillusionment with the British had, however, one marked effect in foreign relations. There was a tendency to turn toward the United States as the leader of the democratic world. In the Kashmir debate, the American representative in the Security Council of the United Nations, Warren Austin, had spoken in clear accents in support of a free and unfettered plebiscite in Kashmir. When the American hero of the Second World War, Admiral Nimitz, was designated as the plebiscite administrator, the people of Pakistan felt confident that he would carry out his task with strict impartiality. The ties with the United States were greatly strengthened when Liaquat Ali Khan paid an official visit to that country in May, 1950. The visit was a great success in promoting mutual understanding. Liaquat Ali Khan's speeches in the various parts of the United States emphasized the positive ideals for which Pakistan was working. In a speech in New York he said:

We believe in democracy, that is, in fundamental human rights including the right of private ownership and the right of the people to be governed by their own freely chosen representatives. We believe in equal citizenship for all whether Muslims or non-Muslims, equality of opportunity, equality before law. We believe that each individual, man or woman, has the right to the fruit of his own labours. Lastly we believe that the fortunate amongst us whether in wealth or knowledge or physical fitness, have a moral responsibility towards those who have been unfortunate. These principles we call the Islamic way of life. You can call them by any name you like.<sup>8</sup>

Pakistan is an organic part of the Muslim world. Its *raison d'être* lies in Islam as the directive principle of social and political life.



Islamic doctrine and practice lay emphasis on the brotherhood of Muslims all over the world. Even during British rule the Muslim community of the subcontinent was noted for what others called its extraterritorial loyalty. "Having lost its own freedom," observed Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, "the community developed a new consciousness of its ties with the other Muslim people."<sup>9</sup> With the establishment of Pakistan, this consciousness was heightened still further. Sentiment and interest pointed in the same direction. The geographical structure of Pakistan made it a part both of the Middle East and of South East Asia. To the west lie Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, and the Arab countries; and in the southeast are the Muslim lands of Malaysia and Indonesia. In the north there are the Soviet Republics of Central Asia, peopled by Muslims and containing such ancient centers of Islamic civilization as Bokhara and Samarkand, which maintained active communication with the Muslims of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent until modern times.

To strive for the freedom, strength, prosperity, and unity of the Muslim world has been a constant objective of Pakistan's foreign policy. Among the first acts of the Pakistan government was to send a mission of goodwill to the countries of the Middle East. Pakistan treated the Arab cause in Palestine as its own; and there was no more eloquent exponent of this cause in the United Nations than Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Zafrullah Khan. Pakistan has consistently refused to recognize Israel. Full support was given to independence for Indonesia, Malaya, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Nigeria, and Algeria. On the West Irian issue, Pakistan stood by Indonesia. Treaties of friendship have been signed with a number of Muslim countries and cultural exchanges have been arranged. Motamar al-Alam al-Islami, or the World Muslim Congress, was organized. In 1949 the International Islamic Economic Conference representing eighteen Muslim countries was held in Karachi. It unanimously agreed to form the International Federation of Islamic Chambers of Commerce and Industry, but unfortunately the resolution has not been implemented.

The one Muslim country with which relations have been strained is Afghanistan. The border between Afghanistan and British India was settled in 1893 by Sir Mortimer Durand and is known as the Durand Line. Shortly before the transfer of power in India, Afghanistan raised untenable claims that were firmly rejected by the British gov-

ernment. The Durand Line is unquestionably the international boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan; and the Afghan government has never openly challenged its validity. But aided and abetted by India, the Afghan government showed hostility to Pakistan from the very start, although Pakistan has made every endeavor to live on terms of friendship with its closest Muslim neighbor. The first diplomatic mission that Pakistan sent was to Afghanistan. Nevertheless, Afghanistan was the only country in the world to oppose Pakistan's entry into the United Nations. The cry for a "Pakhtoonistan," which originated with Gandhi and which was taken up by his disciple Abdul Ghaffar Khan, was adopted by the rulers of Afghanistan. Through malcontents, such as the Fakir of Ipi, and through the Kabul Radio, the Afghan government tried to subvert the loyalty of the tribes on Pakistan's side of the Durand Line. The Afghan consulates in Pakistan acted as centers of hostile propaganda. These efforts, however, failed. There has been peace and tranquillity on the frontier, such as the British were seldom able to attain.

Apart from ties of religion and culture, the economic interests of both countries, and particularly of Afghanistan, demand a policy of close cooperation. Afghanistan is land-locked and a major part of its import and export trade moves through the port of Karachi. Pakistan has readily made available free transit facilities for Afghan goods. The fruit grown in Afghanistan has a ready market in Pakistan in exchange for textiles and other manufactures. Even when Pakistan was faced with acute balance of payments difficulties, it did not impose exchange restrictions on Afghanistan, and goods imported from abroad for internal use in Pakistan found their way into Afghanistan. Despite these efforts, the rulers of Afghanistan have, for the most part, chosen to maintain tension for political ends. However, it is to be hoped that in the course of time the advantages of cooperation between two Muslim neighbors will be realized by the Afghan government.

Barring India and Afghanistan, Pakistan's relations with other neighboring countries have been cordial. The cultural association of Iran and Pakistan has a long history. Persian, which was for centuries the official language of the Muslim Empire in the subcontinent, has been the greatest single influence on Urdu. It is not uncommon for an Urdu poet to write Persian poetry, and two of the greatest Urdu



poets, Ghalib and Iqbal, chose to express their profoundest thoughts in Persian. Turkey lies further afield, but is by long tradition close to the hearts of the people of Pakistan.

Pakistan was among the first countries to recognize Communist China, and exchanged embassies with it in 1950. When the Korean war broke out, Pakistan did not take part in it despite strong urgings by the United States, which offered to equip the brigade that Pakistan was asked to send to the scene of action. Liaquat Ali Khan said in an address at Los Angeles, in 1950: "Pakistan is resolved to throw all its weight to help the maintenance of stability in Asia. Stability in Asia is most important to us not only for our own freedom and progress but for the maintenance of world peace. As things appear to us in our part of the world we cannot imagine how world peace can be maintained unless Asia is stabilized."<sup>10</sup>

When almost immediately after independence Pakistan became a member of the United Nations, it shared the hopes that a war-weary humanity entertained of the world organization. Experience of its actual working, particularly in the Kashmir dispute, tempered that early optimism with a more realistic view. It has not, however, lessened Pakistan's faith in the principles of the UN Charter or in the need to support and strengthen the United Nations in every possible way.

For Pakistan, as for other newly independent countries of Asia and Africa, world peace is an essential condition for economic development and social progress. A world order based on law and justice, which would ensure peace and in which the weak could coexist with the strong without fear of being dominated or exploited, has, however, yet to evolve.

During the first year of Pakistan's existence, questions of such vital importance for the country had to be discussed that it was often necessary for the Quaid-i-Azam to preside over cabinet meetings. There was, it is true, a big gulf between the Quaid-i-Azam and his cabinet colleagues, including the Prime Minister, but that arose from the loftiness of his intellect and the greatness of his position as the Father of the Nation. But contrary to the general impression, he always permitted a full and free discussion. He would support his own view with compelling logic, but was prepared to listen to a contrary opinion, provided it was backed by facts and reason. It was only intellectual dishonesty or stupid obstinacy that aroused his ire. He was

keen to persuade and would patiently explain at considerable length the pros and cons of a policy. He read carefully and conscientiously every paper submitted to him. His industry was as amazing as his inflexible pursuit of truth. No detail escaped him and no shoddy work could pass him. He gave of his best and expected from others the same high standards of integrity and devotion to duty. Not even in the most adverse circumstances did he lose the clarity of his vision and coolness of his nerve. His faith and courage sustained the country when it was passing through one dire peril after another. His motto of unity, faith, and discipline was not a mere slogan. It was the direct expression of a living experience shared by the Quaid-i-Azam with his people. He closed their ranks and composed their multifarious divisions. He gave them unity of command, restored their faith in their own destiny, and made them a disciplined force.

Overwork and the strain of exceptionally grave and pressing problems undermined his health, but he did not spare himself. In July, 1948, when it was discovered that he had serious lung trouble, he had perhaps a premonition that the end was not far off. In his message to the nation on the occasion of the first anniversary of Pakistan, on August 14, 1948, there is a hint to this effect. After recounting the achievements of the first year and reminding his listeners that "the establishment of Pakistan is a fact of which there is no parallel in the history of the world," he bade farewell to the nation with these words. "Nature had given you everything: you have got unlimited resources. The foundations of your State have been laid, and it is now for you to build, and build as quickly and as well as you can. So go ahead and I wish you God speed! Pakistan Zindabad."<sup>11</sup>

I saw him in Quetta a few days before his death. I had gone there to report to him the latest developments in the Kashmir dispute and to obtain his instructions on the policy to be followed in the future. He was lying in bed and his strength was ebbing, but there was the same clarity of intellect, the same vigor of will, the same spark in his eye, and the same faith in the destiny of his people that had always characterized him.

On September 11, 1948, he was brought down to Karachi and passed peacefully away the same evening at the age of seventy-two. An epoch passed away with him. His was a unique achievement in the history of Muslim India. He found a people dispirited by two centuries of foreign rule and led them to win the largest Muslim state in



the face of overwhelming odds by peaceful and constitutional means. The people could hardly believe that the Quaid-i-Azam was dead. For years afterward, meetings would resound with the cry "Quaid-i-Azam Zindabad" (long live Quaid-i-Azam). On the day of his death and on the next, when funeral prayers were held before his burial, there was universal mourning. From India the sound of guns could be heard, for on the following day India invaded Hyderabad.

Great as was the shock of the Quaid-i-Azam's death, it did not stun or unnerve the nation. The best tribute to his memory, it was felt, was to carry on the task of national reconstruction with, if possible, greater determination and devotion. Khwaja Nazimuddin, the Chief Minister of East Bengal, was selected to succeed the Quaid-i-Azam as Governor-General. Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan, the Deputy President of the constituent assembly, became its President. The mantle of national leadership fell on Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister. The choice of Khwaja Nazimuddin as Governor-General was a happy one. He was from East Pakistan and was greatly respected for his sincerity and piety. All the papers and the information that used to go to the Quaid-i-Azam were submitted to him. The Prime Minister always sought his advice on important issues; and he performed his role as constitutional Governor-General with dignity and propriety.

Liaquat Ali Khan rose to unexpectedly great heights as the national leader. He had served with distinction as the General Secretary of the Muslim League and, as the Quaid-i-Azam's chief lieutenant in the central assembly and in the interim government in Delhi. For the last year he had carried the heavy burden of the office of Prime Minister. During the Quaid-i-Azam's illness he was forced to rely more and more upon his own judgment and initiative. His integrity and devotion to Pakistan was outstanding among the followers of the Quaid-i-Azam. He was shrewd of judgment, tenacious of purpose, steadfast, and tactful. He had remarkable self-control and his face gave no indication of the state of his feelings. The manner in which he consolidated the nation after the Quaid-i-Azam's death and carried on the task entrusted to him by the Quaid-i-Azam won national recognition. To this day, his memory is revered as the Quaid-i-Millat—the leader of the nation. But of course, he was not the Quaid-i-Azam, and he never pretended to be anything but a faithful follower of the Quaid-i-Azam. He had to work through provincial leaders who did not stand

in the same awe of him as they had of the Quaid-i-Azam. He could guide, but not direct.

The only major criticism of him that is often voiced is that he did not press forward with the task of constitution-making at a time (1949–50) when the nation was united and the Muslim League party had an overwhelming majority in the constituent assembly. Only a handful of Congress Hindus out of a total membership of 79 were on the opposition side. Among the Muslims, Abdul Ghaffar Khan was opposed to the government, but since he was opposed to Pakistan his voice carried no weight. The only other persistent critic was Mian Iftikharuddin. The rest were solidly with the government.

The Quaid-i-Azam himself had been too absorbed in the problems of the establishment of Pakistan to have found time for constitution-making. There has been some speculation as to the type of constitution the Quaid-i-Azam had in mind for Pakistan. Though no one can say with certainty what precise form the constitutional structure would have taken under his guiding hand, certain aspects of his thought are clear beyond doubt. He envisaged a federal constitution for Pakistan but with a sufficiently strong central government to safeguard the integrity and security of Pakistan. He was keenly aware of the difficulties which the geographical separation of East and West Pakistan presented and wanted to forge every instrument of unity between the two wings of Pakistan.

His own position was unique. He was the Quaid-i-Azam, the Great Leader and the Father of the Nation. As Liaquat Ali Khan said, "Our freedom is the reward of the services and efforts of a single man and that you know is our most beloved Quaid-i-Azam." Even if he had not occupied any official position in Pakistan, those in authority would have turned to him for guidance. He was trusted by the people of Pakistan as no one else was. His judgment of men and affairs was beyond question. No one could dispute what he thought was right for Pakistan. If the cabinet decided, as it did a few months after the establishment of Pakistan, that the Quaid-i-Azam could overrule the cabinet, it was done for him as Quaid-i-Azam and not because he was the Governor-General. It was not an amendment of the constitution but a voluntary surrender of power on the part of the cabinet in favor of the Father of the Nation. It applied to him and to him alone. If the Quaid-i-Azam had so desired, the constituent assembly would have



agreed to amend the interim constitution. The fact that there was not even a hint of such a procedure is sufficient indication that the Quaid-i-Azam did not desire to change the parliamentary form of government in any significant respect. However that may be, there cannot be the slightest doubt that the Quaid-i-Azam envisaged a democratic constitution for Pakistan. The ruling passion of his life was love of law and liberty. On innumerable occasions, before and after the establishment of Pakistan, he affirmed his faith in democracy, social justice, and the equality of man as taught by Islam. It will suffice to quote what he said on the subject in a broadcast talk to the people of the United States of America in February, 1948.

The constitution of Pakistan has yet to be framed by the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. I do not know what the ultimate shape of this constitution is going to be, but I am sure that it will be of a democratic type, embodying the essential principles of Islam. To-day, they are as applicable in actual life as they were 1,300 years ago. Islam and its idealism have taught us democracy. It has taught equality of man, justice and fairplay to everybody. We are the inheritors of these glorious traditions and are fully alive to our responsibilities and obligations as framers of the future constitution of Pakistan. In any case Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic State—to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many non-Muslims—Hindus, Christians, and Parsis—but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan.<sup>12</sup>

In the months immediately following the Quaid-i-Azam's death, the energies of the Prime Minister and the central government were devoted to national consolidation. By the beginning of 1949 it was possible for the Prime Minister to turn his attention to constitutional questions. On March 7, 1949, Liaquat Ali Khan moved the Objectives Resolution "embodying the main principles on which the constitution of Pakistan is to be based." It was adopted by the constituent assembly on March 12, after a stimulating debate that brought out the implications of the resolution. It envisaged a state in which the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance, and social justice as enunciated by Islam would be observed; where Muslims would be able to order their lives in accord with Islam, and minorities could practice their religion and develop their culture; a state which would guarantee fundamental rights including freedom of expression and association, which would secure the independence of the judiciary, and safeguard the integrity of the federation, "so that the people of

Pakistan may prosper and attain their rightful and honoured place among the nations of the World and make their full contribution towards international peace and progress and happiness of humanity."

The basic principles committee was set up on March 12, 1949, and the next year it presented a report. But when the report drew some adverse comments, the Prime Minister asked the constituent assembly to postpone consideration of the report and threw it open to suggestions from the public. Why, his critics ask, did he shelve constitution-making in this manner? India had completed the task by the end of 1949, and held its first general elections simultaneously for the central and provincial legislatures in 1951.

The reason is to be found in the plan that Liaquat Ali Khan formed at this time of holding elections, province by province, and finally for the central assembly, before grappling seriously with constitutional issues. He disclosed this plan to me and a few others. The interim constitution provided by the adapted Government of India Act, 1935, was, he felt, functioning satisfactorily. General elections on the basis of adult franchise were a surer guarantee of the establishment of democratic institutions, but to hold them simultaneously for the central and provincial legislative assemblies would throw excessive strain on the resources of the administration and the Muslim League party. They should, therefore, be staggered, beginning with the Punjab, and going on to North-West Frontier Province, then to Sind, East Bengal and, last of all, the center. Once newly elected governments with a fresh mandate from the people were in the saddle, the task of constitution-making could be taken in hand and completed. But an assassin's bullet, fired on October 16, 1951, put an end to Liaquat Ali Khan's life and to his plan. For Pakistan it was a terrible tragedy and an irreparable loss.

Constitution-making dragged on until the constituent assembly was dissolved in October, 1954. A new constituent assembly, elected the next year, tackled the task with vigor and completed it within six months. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which was based on the Objectives Resolution moved by Liaquat Ali Khan, was promulgated on March 23, 1956. The cornerstone of the Constitution, which I had the privilege of presenting to the country as Prime Minister, was equal partnership between East and West Pakistan in every sphere—administrative, economic, and political.



## Notes

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17. Quoted in Hali, pp. 276-77. A fuller extract is given in Appendix II of Part I of *The Constitutional Problem in India* by R. Coupland (Madras, Oxford University Press, 1945).
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## 3. THE CABINET MISSION PLAN

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